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In an arrest for DUI, a search incident that included opening a dollar bill that was folded in a way to indicate it held cocaine, which defendant then admitted, was reasonable. The officers did know all that defendant was under the influence of. State v. Armendariz-Nunez, 2012 NMCA 41, 2012 N.M. App. LEXIS 48 (February 9, 2012), Certiorari Denied, March 23, 2012, No. 33,482:

[*13] We disagree with Defendant's argument that the cocaine was not evidence of the DWI crime for which he had been arrested. See NMSA 1978, § 66-8-102(B) (2008) (amended 2010); State v. Aleman, 2008 NMCA 137, 145 N.M. 79, 194 P.3d 110 (affirming the defendant's conviction for driving while under the influence of cocaine). While the deputy observed that Defendant smelled of alcohol, there was no indication that other substances could not have contributed to his intoxicated state. As the State points out, both alcohol and marijuana emit a distinct odor, while cocaine and many other controlled substances do not. The discovery of a particular drug on a suspect's person could be relevant evidence that the suspect may be under the influence of that drug and, therefore, may be appropriately seized.

Police responded to a domestic abuse call and were inside defendant’s house. He was arrested and removed from the house and warrants were obtained. Drugs were found on him when he was booked into the jail. Even if the entry was unconstitutional, which does not have to be decided) the finding of the drugs was sufficiently attenuated from that, and suppression was properly denied. Echavarry v. Commonwealth, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 167 (May 15, 2012).*

Defendant’s mother did not have actual or apparent authority to consent to a search of her adult son’s bedroom. He had been staying with her for four months and she came into the room with “regular access” to make the bed and clean up, but that wasn’t enough because it was apparent that the room was used by only her son. She consented to a search, and the police looked in a box with men’s clothes. Ward v. State, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 7850 (Fla. 4th DCA May 16, 2012).

Jail inventory policy was unconstitutional under the Oregon constitution because it had no limitations on search of containers objectively likely to hold contraband. State v. Taylor, 2012 Ore. App. LEXIS 616 (May 16, 2012).*

Existence of an arrest warrant was justification for a stop. United States v. Nelson, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9839 (3d Cir. May 16, 2012).*

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Defendant’s girlfriend consented to a search of their place, but defendant was present and objected under Randolph, except the officer’s didn’t hear him during the noise of the arrest (and neither did she). Since the officers were, at worst, just negligent, the court would not apply the exclusionary rule since the Second Circuit’s rule is that Herring may apply even when not attenuated. United States v. Smith, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68054 (S.D. N.Y. May 15, 2012):

In this case, the benefits of deterrence are marginal. As the Herring Court stated, "the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence." 555 U.S. at 144. The Court has credited the officers' testimony that they did not deliberately disregard Smith's refusal to consent to a search, but rather did not hear Smith make a statement to that effect, (Tr. 77:7-78:3.) Their failure to hear him constituted, at the most, an isolated instance of negligence; there was no evidence that their conduct rose to the level of deliberate or reckless conduct, or gross, recurring, or systemic negligence. The evidence suggested only that, in the midst of the noise and confusion that ensued during the arrest, the officers simply did not hear Smith, just as Smith's girlfriend did not hear him. On those facts, the officers reasonably believed that they were authorized to search the Apartment after obtaining the consent of Smith's girlfriend.

Smith argues that exclusion of the evidence has deterrent value insofar as suppression would "encourage[e] arresting officers to pay attention to a defendant's assertion of rights." (Def.'s Supplemental Mem. at 6.) Although suppression may hypothetically have this effect, such deterrence is insufficient to warrant application of the exclusionary rule: "Even assuming that the rule effectively deters some police misconduct and provides incentives for the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct itself in accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). As noted, in light of all the circumstances, the officers' reliance on Smith's girlfriend's consent was objectively reasonable.