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PHILADELPHIA — The charity for troubled youths started by Jerry Sandusky more than three decades ago — and through which the retired Penn State assistant football coach met the boys he is charged with sexually abusing — said Friday it is seeking court approval to shut down and transfer its ...

Defendant was illegally stopped for a traffic offense, but it was not flagrantly illegal. When the defendant’s DL was run, an outstanding warrant was found on him, and he was arrested for that. After surveying the law, the court decides that there is no per se rule requiring the finding of the outstanding warrant be suppressed. It is a concern that its holding would potentially encourage illegal stops, but the court is not persuaded that always is the case. Remanded for further proceedings. State v. Mazuca, 2012 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 697 (May 23, 2012) (dissent here and here):

We agree with the Arizona Supreme Court's general assessment. In our view, the first Brown factor is certainly relevant, but, even though it usually favors suppression of evidence that is discovered in the immediate aftermath of an illegal pedestrian or roadside stop, it will sometimes prove to be, in the context of the seizure of physical evidence, "the least important factor"—at least relative to the other two. And while we are hesitant to confirm as a categorical matter that the intervening circumstance of a valid arrest warrant is "of minimal importance"—after all, without it, there can usually be no attenuation of taint when physical evidence is unearthed immediately after an illegal stop—we agree that it should not be overemphasized to the ultimate detriment to the goal of deterrence that animates the exclusionary rule. Finally, we agree that the more important factor is the purposefulness and flagrancy, vel non, of the primary illegal conduct—whether the police have deliberately perpetrated what they know to be an illegal stop in the specific hope or expectation that it will generate some legitimate after-the-fact justification to arrest and/or search, or they have otherwise conducted themselves in particularly egregious disregard of the right to privacy and/or personal integrity that the Fourth Amendment protects. For, when this is the case, to admit the physical evidence because of the fortuity that an arrest warrant happens to come to light before the evidence is discovered perversely serves to encourage, rather than discourage, official misconduct and renders the Fourth Amendment toothless.

To summarize: When police find and seize physical evidence shortly after an illegal stop, in the absence of the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant in between, that physical evidence should ordinarily be suppressed, even if the police misconduct is not highly purposeful or flagrantly abusive of Fourth Amendment rights. Under this scenario, temporal proximity is the paramount factor. But when an outstanding arrest warrant is discovered between the illegal stop and the seizure of physical evidence, the importance of the temporal proximity factor decreases. Under this scenario, the intervening circumstance is a necessary but never, by itself, wholly determinative factor in the attenuation calculation, and the purposefulness and/or flagrancy of the police misconduct, vel non, becomes of vital importance. To the extent that our pre-Brown analysis on direct appeal in Johnson placed practically exclusive emphasis on the intervening circumstance of an arrest warrant to justify the admission of evidence following an illegal stop, we disapprove it.

. . .

The court of appeals nevertheless affirmed the judgment of the trial court out of what it deemed an overriding concern that a contrary ruling would "encourage" the police to undertake unlawful stops on a pretext, "for the purpose of establishing probable cause or discovering the existence of arrest warrants." We certainly share that concern. However, we think that prioritizing the purposefulness and flagrancy factor satisfactorily addresses that concern without fashioning a rule that would altogether remove the intervening discovery of an arrest warrant as a factor relevant to the attenuation of taint analysis, as the court of appeals opinion tended to do. The court of appeals adopted an approach that would effectively presume purposeful and/or flagrant police misconduct from the fact of the primary illegality alone rather than assessing the character of that illegality, and of any subsequent police conduct, to determine whether it indicates that they actually behaved purposefully or flagrantly in the particular case. We hold that the court of appeals erred to rely upon this de facto presumption to affirm the trial court's ruling on the appellee's motion to suppress. Applying the appropriate analysis today, we hold that the trial court should have denied that motion.

There were no objective manifestations that the place to be searched was actually two residences. It was one with defendant staying as a guest, and the search warrant for the building was particular. United States v. Melton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71151 (E.D. Tenn. February 7, 2012):

Nevertheless, even assuming there were two residences, the Court finds nothing that would have put Investigator Butler on notice that the River Road house contained two dwellings. The house was a single family dwelling, not an apartment building, a duplex, or a townhouse. The affidavit states [Exh. 1, ¶3] that the officers verified the confidential informant's description of the residence. The record is devoid of evidence that the residence had two mailboxes, driveways, or other physical indication that it contained two residences. The confidential informant's statement to Investigator Butler that he lived in the downstairs portion of the residence did not indicate that the informant was renting a separate residence, rather than staying as Ms. Burgess and the Defendant's guest. ...

The reason for defendant’s traffic stop was a reasonable mistake of fact, and defendant was acting furtively when the officer walked up on him. The furtive gestures justified a frisk of the vehicle producing a gun, then a search warrant issued for the vehicle. United States v. Jenkins, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10431 (1st Cir. May 23, 2012).*

Identification of person to be arrested in the arrest warrant by street name and description and where to find him was particular enough. United States v. Dunaway, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10244 (3d Cir. May 22, 2012):

Here, the warrant did not include the appellant's proper name, Nisia Dunaway, referring to him instead merely as "BLIZZ." But the warrant did provide a physical description of him, including his height, skin color, hair style and color, and build— though not, as Dunaway points out, his age. Further, the warrant specified that he would be found arriving by train in Johnstown at 6:00 pm on April 10, 2010.

The warrant's physical description of "Blizz" and the specific location where he would be found at a precise time were, together, sufficiently particular that an executing officer could identify the appellant with reasonable certainty. Compare Doe, 703 F.2d at 747 (holding that warrant to arrest "John Doe a/k/a "Ed?" was unconstitutional for lack of particularity), with Ferrone, 438 F.2d at 389 (upholding search of defendant's person pursuant to warrant to search "John Doe, a white male with black wavy hair and stocky build observed using the telephone in Apartment 4-C 1806 Patricia Lane, East McKeesport, Pennsylvania"). See also 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.5(e), at 598 n.134 (collecting cases). Thus, we reject Dunaway's contention that the warrant to search his person was so lacking in particularity as to be an unlawful general warrant.

An IP address traced to defendant’s house was probable cause for a search warrant for computers hooked up to the premises for child pornography. Barrett v. State, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 3988 (Tex. App. – Amarillo May 15, 2012).*

The fact that defendant pursued a motion to suppress at the state trial court level shows that he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the search claim, so he could not make a Fourth Amendment habeas claim. Kidwell v. Martin, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10172 (10th Cir. May 21, 2012).*

(1) It was 1:15 a.m.; (2) criminal activity had recently increased in the area; (3) defendant was standing on the private property of an auto body shop; (4) the shop was closed; (5) no other businesses in the area were open; (6) no other people were nearby; (7) the officer heard a loud crash; (8) defendant fled; and (9) defendant was carrying bags. The officer reasonably concluded that he had reasonable suspicion that a theft had occurred. The motion to suppress was improperly granted. People v. Funez-Paiagua, 2012 CO 37, 2012 Colo. LEXIS 350 (May 21, 2012).*

CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. — The private company SpaceX made history Friday with the docking of its Dragon capsule to the International Space Station, the most impressive feat yet in turning routine spaceflight over to the commercial sector.

It marked the first time a business enterprise delivered a supply ship to ...

Faint smell of marijuana on defendant’s DL was not probable cause to search the car. United States v. Hickman, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71330 (D. Idaho May 21, 2012):

The Ninth Circuit has held that "a strong odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle can constitute probable cause to search the vehicle." United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 886 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court, however, concludes in this case that the faint smell of marijuana on Hickman's license did not justify a search of his car. When questioned about the smell of marijuana on his license, Hickman explained that his roommate has a prescription for medical marijuana. While this explanation standing alone may not have excused Hickman, other factors support a finding of no probable cause: Hickman passed the field sobriety test; he was never resistant or confrontational; he appeared coherent in the video; and neither his clothes nor his car smelled of marijuana. Even Officer Cox, who was present at the scene, questioned whether he had probable cause to search the vehicle. While this has no legal bearing on the issue because the existence of probable cause is based on objective facts, it suggests that perhaps that the proper level of justification did not exist for the search.

PORTLAND, Maine — Scores of Maine churches will pass the collection plate a second time at Sunday services on Father's Day to kick off a fundraising campaign for the lead opposition group to November's ballot question asking voters to legalize same-sex marriages.

Between 150 and 200 churches are expected to ...

PUERTO VALLARTA, Mexico — Hurricane Bud weakened to a Category 2 storm as it headed early Friday toward an area of beach resorts and small mountain villages on Mexico's Pacific coast stretching south from Puerto Vallarta.

Authorities canceled school in 11 communities expected to be hit by heavy rains in ...

Defendant’s detention on the side of the road evolved into a custodial interrogation because of the officer’s actions in telling defendant she wasn’t going anywhere until the drug dog did its thing and denied her use of the phone and cigarettes. While basic traffic detentions are not custodial interrogations, they can become one and this one did. United States v. Ramos, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71259 (D. Vt. May 21, 2012) (See Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1190, 182 L. Ed. 2d 17 (2012) (holding that "the roadside questioning of a motorist who was pulled over in a routine traffic stop did not constitute custodial interrogation."); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984) (holding that while motorists subject to routine traffic stops do not generally feel free to leave they are not in custody for Miranda purposes); see Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009) ("An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop ... do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.");

Defendant was detained too long considering the alleged justification, and his subsequent consent was tainted by the overlong detention. United States v. Petersen, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71551 (D. Utah May 22, 2012).*

NEW YORK — Profits at big U.S. companies broke records last year, and so did pay for CEOs.

The head of a typical public company made $9.6 million in 2011, according to an analysis by The Associated Press using data from Equilar, an executive pay research firm.

That was up ...

NEW YORK — Thirty-three years to the day after 6-year-old Etan Patz vanished without a trace while walking to catch a school bus, a man accused of strangling him and dumping his body with the trash was arraigned on a murder charge on Friday in a locked hospital ward where ...