WV: Stop for no passenger side mirror without legal basis - News - Tue, 2012-06-19 09:42

West Virginia law does not require two side mirrors, so the fact defendant’s car was missing the passenger side mirror was not cause for a stop, and it didn’t render the vehicle unsafe. Similar is State v. Reid, 722 S.E.2d 364 (Ga. App. 2012), where the vehicle had no side mirrors but Georgia law didn’t require them. State v. Dunbar, 2012 W. Va. LEXIS 307 (June 13, 2012).*

The USMJ erred in concluding that a U.S. MLAT request of the Netherlands to locate the defendant for an arrest led to a joint venture. On his own, the Netherlands police officer requested a wiretap warrant to locate defendant’s telephone. The U.S. had nothing to do with the wiretap request, so the product of that was not a joint venture. The fact the U.S. requested copies of tapes and transcripts that weren’t forwarded until after he was wasn’t important. United States v. Omar, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83665 (D. Minn. June 18, 2012).

E.D.Pa.: Search warrant's use of “including but not limited to” not per se a general search; it has to be read in context - News - Tue, 2012-06-19 09:13

Motion to suppress filed twelve days before trial and a month after the motions cutoff was clearly untimely and there is no good cause tendered for the delay. Nevertheless, the court will go to the merits [meaning: the court can rule against the defense anyway, so why leave this 2255 issue looming?]. “[I]ncluding but not limited to” in a search warrant with a specific list is not an authorization for a general search because it has to be read in context of what it connects to. Even so, the good faith exception applies. United States v. Staton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83933 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 2012):

Thus, general phrases in a warrant must be read in the context of the entire warrant and not in isolation. Andresen, 427 U.S. at 473; see also United States v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 60, 64 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that warrants must be read as a whole). Here, the phrase "including but not limited to," followed by the list of materials, certainly is not separate from the list of items to be searched and seized. Based upon a reasonable reading of the language, "including but not limited to" refers to and modifies the prior phrase "business records." If anything, the list of seven categories of materials, and specific examples, that follow define the term "business records" more narrowly and therefore limit, rather than expand, the scope of the searches. Accordingly, the three warrants at issue are not general warrants. See $92,422.57, 307 F.3d at 149 (holding that while the scope of the warrant at issue "was certainly extensive, the warrant was not general" since the warrant "'describ[ed] in ... inclusive generic terms what is to be seized'" and "did not vest the executing officers with 'unbridled discretion' to search for and seize whatever they wished"); ... "Racial Profiling as a Means of Thwarting the Alleged Latino Security Threat" - News - Mon, 2012-06-18 13:28 Racial Profiling as a Means of Thwarting the Alleged Latino Security Threat - III. Fourth Amendment Constitutional Foundations for Racial Profiling by Lupe S. Salinas & Fernando Colon-Navarro:

III. Fourth Amendment Constitutional Foundations for Racial Profiling

A. Search and Seizure Jurisprudence

Unfortunately and surprisingly, the bases for America's racial and ethnic profiling problems can be traced to rulings issued by our Supreme Court. These rulings essentially and collectively state that an officer has a right to make a temporary detention based on reasonable suspicion or a traffic stop even if that stop was primarily for the basis of checking out possible criminal behavior for which the officer lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

We begin first, however, with Terry v. Ohio, the landmark opinion, which created the reasonable suspicion exception to the probable cause standard of the Fourth Amendment. ...

D.Minn.: Matching description of bank robber, wrapped money sticking out of pocket, GPS locator on him was RS - News - Mon, 2012-06-18 07:19

Matching the description of a bank robber just given by the tellers, wrapped and loose cash sticking out of pockets, and GPS transmitter located in the money locating him was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Johnson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83417 (D. Minn. May 23, 2012).* [Come on. If that's not, what is? In fact, this looks like probable cause to me.]

Defense counsel was not ineffective for conceding defendant had no standing in the house of another that he was briefly at before the search. There was nothing that supported his standing as a guest. State v. Brown, 2012 Ohio 2672, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2355 (5th Dist. June 13, 2012).*

The warrant in a child pornography case sought “Written documents in communications with [E14] or describing the relationship with [E14], Computers and any other electronic devices used in the transmission of communication and solicitation of [E14], any electronic storage devices that may be used to store communications, ....” Seizure of a computer, camera, CDs, DVDs, and storage media were permitted, but male enhancement lotion was not. United States v. Young, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83198 (D. Neb. June 15, 2012).*

W.D.Tex.: Fingerprint evidence as a result of an illegal seizure in an illegal re-entry case not suppressed - News - Mon, 2012-06-18 06:50

Fingerprint evidence as a result of an illegal seizure in an illegal re-entry case would not be suppressed. United States v. Lopez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83426 (W.D. Tex. June 15, 2012):

No such bright line exists in published case law explicitly preventing the suppression of fingerprint evidence gathered as part of an illegal seizure and arrest in the illegal re-entry context. However, in Roque-Villanueva, the Fifth Circuit held that, "[e]ven if the [d]efendant was illegally stopped, neither his identity nor his INS file [is] suppressible." 175 F.3d 345, 346 (5th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added); Scroggins, 599 F.3d at 450 (quoting the holding in Roque-Villanueva). In a number of unpublished Fifth Circuit opinions, panels have acknowledged that "identity" includes fingerprint evidence by, for example, concluding that "even if there was a Fourth Amendment violation, this [circuit] has held that evidence of identity, such as one's fingerprints and A-file, is not suppressible." United States v. Cervantes-Malagon, 2012 WL 13769, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2012) ...

The Court is persuaded by the reasoning in the foregoing authorities that, in the context of an illegal re-entry prosecution, even fingerprint evidence gathered following a Fourth Amendment violation is not subject to suppression when that evidence is used merely to establish a defendant's identity. ...

TN: Stop of a vehicle after a report of a suspicious man while serial rapist was operating was with RS - News - Sun, 2012-06-17 23:20

Police were investigating a serial rapist who struck on rainy nights. An officer saw a Jeep parked in a likely neighborhood because of a report of a man in a ski mask, and he felt the hood which was warm. He noted the license number finding it didn't stay in the neighborhood, looked through the windows, and drove off. An hour later he saw the vehicle moving and stopped it, asking the driver about what he was doing in the neighborhood, and he noted the answer. He asked for consent which was denied, and he let the driver go. The next day, after a rape was reported, officers followed up on the story obtained from the stop and found it false. The stop was with reasonable suspicion. State v. Burdick, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 396 (June 13, 2012):

We conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Hamm had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant's Jeep. At the time of the stop, "The Wooded Rapist" was at large in the community. "The Wooded Rapist" had committed his rapes on rainy evenings in the Brentwood area. On the night of April 27, 2008, which was rainy, Officer Hamm responded to a call about a man wearing a ski mask and dark clothing in the area of Meadow Lake and Arnold Road. While patrolling that area, looking for something out of place, he noticed a gray Jeep parked on the side of the road. Upon approaching the vehicle, he found the hood of the vehicle warm. He ran the vehicle's tags and determined that it was registered to the Defendant, whose listed address was not in the subdivision. The officer left and returned an hour later, passing the Defendant driving the Jeep away from the Meadow Lake area. Officer Hamm initiated an investigatory traffic stop to identify the driver of the Jeep and determine if he was related to the call about the man in the ski mask. We conclude Officer Hamm had an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the vehicle, or its occupant, were subject to seizure for violation of the law.

We further conclude that Officer Hamm's stop of the Defendant did not exceed the proper parameters. The stop lasted between three and five minutes. The officer asked the Defendant if he had seen anything suspicious, and the Defendant responded negatively. The officer filled out a field interview card, and the Defendant offered the officer his phone number. The officer asked the Defendant why he was in the neighborhood, and the Defendant responded that he was there to visit a friend.

Does this case suggest a sliding scale of reasonable suspicion where the more serious the crime the lesser reasonable suspicion is required? If so, should that be permissible? Catching a serial rapist is certainly among the weightiest of government and public interests, as was preventing the armed robbery in Terry. Remember, that case also involved a frisk, not just a stop. Can it be said that comparing this case to a drug case where reasonable suspicion is the excuse for a stop, maybe this wouldn’t be reasonable suspicion for a stop? Well, you can’t compare this case to a drug case: Serial rapist on the loose striking on rainy nights; man with a ski mask seen in the neighborhood; a vehicle not belonging in the neighborhood is seen parked there, and it hadn’t been there long; stopping it to ask if the driver had seen anything suspicious, like the man in the ski mask, and asking for identification was not unreasonable. If defendant had been taken in on that, the discussion would be different. But, at the time of the stop, no rape had yet been reported, and he was let go in 3-5 minutes, getting only a name and why he was there. This was just good police work that fully respected the detainee's rights. It wasn't a stop on a pure hunch--it was because this car didn't come back as belonging in the neighborhood, and there was a report of a prowler.

Cal.1: Stop of vehicle and occupants matching description of burglars was with RS - News - Sun, 2012-06-17 23:11

Defendants and their vehicle matched the description of people alleged to have stolen from open houses. They were found within 30 minutes of the initial dispatch in the same city in a distinctive vehicle. The stop was with reasonable suspicion, and they admitted then to having been at the open house in question. People v. Rangel, 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 694 (1st Dist. June 14, 2012);* People v. Little, 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 705 (4th Dist. June 15, 2012).*

Claimant’s money was seized after a valid consent, and his testimony was found incredible on the consent issue. He was flagged by an Amtrak drug courier profile: one-way ticket bought just before departure for a sleeper car on somebody else’s credit card. United States v. Funds in the Amount of $239,400, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82682 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2012).*

In a forfeiture case, the government is not required to show probable cause or meet its ultimate trial burden. Therefore, claimant’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is denied, and he must answer. United States v. $33,984.00 in United States Currency, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83119 (D. Neb. June 14, 2012).*

FL5 follows state precedent permitting SI of cell phone without cause - News - Sun, 2012-06-17 23:03

Following state precedent, the search incident of a cell phone without any reason to believe it contains evidence of a crime is sustained. The issue is certified to the Florida Supreme Court. State v. Glasco, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 9717 (Fla. 5th DCA June 15, 2012):

Pursuant to Fawdry [v. State, 70 So. 3d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)] and Smallwood [v. State, 61 So. 3d 448 (Fla. 1st DCA), review granted, 68 So. 3d 235 (Fla. 2011)], we reverse the order granting the motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. We certify to the Florida Supreme Court a question of great public importance similar to the questions certified in Fawdry and Smallwood:

DOES THE HOLDING IN UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973), ALLOW A POLICE OFFICER TO SEARCH THROUGH INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN A CELL PHONE THAT IS ON AN ARRESTEE'S PERSON AT THE TIME OF A VALID ARREST? "Unwarranted Intrusion" - News - Sun, 2012-06-17 10:40 Unwarranted Intrusion / When it comes to wiretaps, the federal government's official policy is: "Trust us!" by J.D. Tuccille:

On June 11, Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) temporarily blocked the renewal of legislation that allows the U.S. government to listen in, without a warrant, on Americans' conversations, so long as they're chatting with overseas chums who are the official targets of the eavesdropping. In doing so, Wyden not only stood against a bipartisan cabal of snoopy legislative colleagues, but also against the White House, which wants the extension passed and is vigorously battling against constitutional challenges to such electronic eavesdropping. That may come as a bit of a surprise to anybody who remembers then-presidential candidate Barack Obama promising to end the use of warrantless wiretaps that were so popular under the George W. Bush administration.

UT: Defendant was let go after a stop in a store, and his Catch-22 that if he went to his car he be arrested is not the government's problem - News - Sun, 2012-06-17 09:04

Defendant and a companion were suspected of shoplifting in a Target store, and defendant was a suspected lookout for the other. Both had come and gone from the store repeatedly. When defendant was confronted in the store, there was reasonable suspicion, but he was frisked and told he was free to leave. The loss prevention people, however, were looking for the vehicle to see if shoplifted stuff was in it. Defendant was clearly free to leave, and his companion was already let go. “We acknowledge that this left Little in an unfortunate catch-22—if he stayed, the officers would ultimately discover the car; if he attempted to leave in the car, he would lead the officers to it; and if he left on foot, the officers would eventually find the car and arrest him later. However, this situation resulted from information the officers legally obtained in the course of the lawful investigatory detention, and the officers were not required to cease all investigation simply because they determined they could no longer legally detain Little.” So, there was a second encounter when he went to the car, and that didn't make the stop unreasonable. State v. Little, 2012 Utah App. LEXIS 175 (June 14, 2012).*

Catch-22 is the name of a novel. It should be capitalized, unless it is now in general use. Since copyrights are good for 70 years after the death of the author, I'd say not yet allowed for general use, but a lot of people do. Joseph Heller created it by his own genius. The value of the word and concept is undeniable, and I don't use it without thinking of the book, which I read twice in 1968.

E.D.Tenn.: CI's falsity is not the affiant's under Franks - News - Sun, 2012-06-17 08:45

The informant’s false statement, comparing grand jury testimony with the affidavit for the search warrant, is not chargeable to the officer under Franks, so the motion is denied. United States v. Neal, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81849 (E.D. Tenn. April 13, 2012).

A game warden received a call about unlawfully taking a deer by three people in a “whitish old Subaru car,” and that justified the stop when it was seen. United States v. Wilks, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82165 (D. Mont. June 12, 2012).*

The USMJ’s findings of voluntary consent is adopted by the USDJ. There is no testimony except that the consent was voluntary. United States v. Talamante-Rodriguez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82009 (D. Ariz. June 12, 2012).*

D.Me.: Multifaceted Franks challenge failed because none undermined PC; they could be questions for trial - News - Sun, 2012-06-17 08:27

Defendant was charged with internet stalking and identity theft for using a false name, and he raised a host of issues over the search warrants, all of which failed. The government did not violate curtilage by pulling into defendant’s driveway to view his house. The defendant lacks standing for the government’s viewing his neighbor’s wifi signal that defendant was accused of hacking. Defendant’s Franks issues are each an overstatement of the situation, and, even so, excluding what he complains of still leaves probable cause. “Most of the issues raised by the defendant are legitimate jury issues for the jury to consider in assessing whether or not the offender is guilty of the crime charged, but they do not meet the Franks standard for an evidentiary hearing on this warrant application.” None of the Franks challenges were material to the finding of probable cause. United States v. Sayer, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82729 (D. Me. June 13, 2012).*

Moral here: Taking the court at face value, none of these Franks challenges were even close. Do you have the time to make a massive Franks challenge that's likely going to fail? Just because the client can pay enough fee to pursue it doesn't mean that you should. Put that time and energy into defending at trial. After all these years, my view of Franks has evolved into a rule of reason: Unless it just screams lie or negligent omission, you lose, so use it to attack the officer's credibility at trial, which is just what this court suggests, reading between the lines. But, even if it doesn't undermine the officer as an exaggeration, does it create a reasonable doubt?

Remember my Rule 1 of the Fourth Amendment: “There are no technicalities.” There used to be, but not anymore. Not in the last 20+ years.

W.D.Ky. provides good example of a defense failure of proof on guest standing - News - Sun, 2012-06-17 07:42

The defense failed to show guest standing at the hearing, and the court is left with speculation on critical facts. United States v. Wix, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81871 (W.D. Ky. June 13, 2012)*:

In the context of guests in a residence, the Sixth Circuit has broadly interpreted the Fourth Amendment's protections. Overnight guests staying in a residence's common area have standing to challenge a police intrusion and search. See United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 647 (6th Cir. 2000) (privacy interest existed for occasional overnight guest who was allowed to stay in residence alone and kept personal belongs in closet). Non-overnight guests have also been permitted to challenge the search of personal items kept in a third-party's residence. United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279, 283 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838, 844 (6th Cir. 2005)). Suffice it to say, the appeals court has "generously" interpreted the reach of the Fourth Amendment as it pertains to temporary residents of a dwelling. See id.

Nevertheless, this generosity does not arise without some measure of proof by a defendant. Whether an informal sleeping arrangement creates a reasonable expectation of privacy naturally begets a fact-dominated inquiry for a court. Criminal defendants hoping to establish Fourth Amendment standing offer a variety of evidence to show a reasonable expectation of privacy. Factors that courts have considered include how often the defendant stayed in the dwelling, e.g., United States v. Love, 70 F.3d 116, at *4 [published in full-text format at 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 35493] (6th Cir. 1995) (table) (defendant did not have expectation of privacy in mother's house as he was not an overnight guest and had moved out six months before the search), whether the defendant maintained personal belongings in the residence, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 297 F. App'x 722, 726 (10th Cir. 2008) (defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy when hotel room was not registered in his name and "no personal items indicating an overnight stay were present"), whether the defendant provided any sort of remuneration for the privilege of staying there, e.g., United States v. McRae, 156 F.3d 708, 711 (6th Cir. 1998) (no expectation of privacy where defendant was squatting in building and did not pay rent to the owners of the structure), or whether the defendant could come and go freely, e.g., United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1991) (where defendant had key to apartment, could come and go freely, and stored items in an apartment, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy).

Too many questions exist to accurately measure Defendants' legitimate expectation of privacy in the mobile home. How often did Defendants spend the night in the mobile home and on the Property? The Court cannot possibly measure with any accuracy the subjective statement of Dozier that Wix and she stayed there "a lot." When was the last time Dozier and Wix were guests in the mobile home? Dozier admitted during her testimony that she did not spend the previous night in the trailer and the Court does not have additional information on the subject. Did Defendants have permission to stay there from the owner, Clifford Wix? It may be safe to assume so, but no direct evidence on this point was presented during either hearing. Were there any personal belongings of Defendants in the mobile home? Dozier did not offer any proof on this matter and Wix's silence is impossible to measure. Were Defendants providing Clifford Wix some sort of compensation to stay in the mobile home? Again, there is a deficiency in the record on this issue. Did Defendants have a key to mobile home and could they come and go without first obtaining permission from Clifford Wix? No relevant information was offered in this regard. The only verifiable information about which the Court can be sure is Defendants did not own the mobile home and they did not stay there the night before the police raided the Property. 1 HR, DN 41 p. 9-10.

Defendants undoubtedly possessed some connection to the mobile home. However, "the act of staying overnight at a third party residence does not automatically entitle a defendant to the protections of the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Hunt, No. 2:07-CR-284-WKW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111768, 2008 WL 4080770, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 3, 2008). The evidence Defendants submitted to the Court falls short of establishing an expectation of privacy in the mobile home. For the Court to find otherwise would be to apply guesswork and conjecture to the present record. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to suppress is improper.

Standing is the defense burden, and they simply failed to adequately pursue it, maybe believing labeling the defendants as "guests" was enough to carry them through the hearing, but it's not.

D.Md.: PC was shown for violations of Clean Water Act - News - Sun, 2012-06-17 07:15

In a mail fraud for violations of the Clean Air Act, the search warrant for the business’s records was issued with probable cause: “Hailey's inconsistent statements and inability to identify or locate records of the sources of his vegetable oil donors, or the buyer of his equipment, and his provision of a photograph of another facility, ECF No. 62-1, showed that Hailey had probably issued RINs without producing bio-diesel, and fraudulently caused wire transfers. There was ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime [would] be found’ in Hailey’s business records and in his home, office, and production facility.” United States v. Hailey, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82053 (D. Md. June 13, 2012).* [If lack of probable cause is your only issue, you’re almost certainly going to lose. The threshold is just not that high, and a judicial finding of PC is almost unassailable.]

Defense counsel was hardly ineffective for not challenge the search and seizure in this case. The place searched was in “open fields,” a ditch near a road where drugs were hidden across the street. Besides, it’s almost a certainty he lacked standing to challenge the search at all. Nunn v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81955 (M.D. Ala. May 29, 2012).*

D.Kan. erroneously shifts burden of proof to defendant to prove inventory unreasonable - News - Sat, 2012-06-16 13:18

The District of Kansas puts the burden on the defendant to prove that the inventory of his car was unlawful, when it was allegedly only parked, after his stop, more than 12" from the curb. No mention that the officer could not have pulled it over closer and left it. United States v. Calvin, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83037 (D. Kan. June 15, 2012).* Shifting the burden:

The burden is on defendant to prove that the challenged search was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Cooper, 654 F.3d 1104, 1124 (10th Cir. 2011). ...

... Further, defendant conceded that department towing policy required Officer Eckel to complete a full inventory search of the vehicle, including the glove compartment. Defendant has not provided any basis to suppress the evidence that resulted from the inventory search of his vehicle.

Maybe the defendant should have lost on the merits, but he at least could have had the correct burden of proof applied. If the court dealt with the merits appropriately, the analysis would be completely different. Really lame.

This was decided by a USDJ, not a Magistrate Judge, and it's just completely wrong in its approach.

D.Mass.: All records warrant was not overbroad in eBay reselling fraud case - News - Sat, 2012-06-16 09:37

Defendant was suspected of running a reselling fraud on eBay, and a search warrant was obtained for all his records pertaining to interstate transportation of stolen property. The search warrant was sufficiently particular and not overbroad. United States v. Kuc, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82398 (D. Mass. June 14, 2012):

1. The First Prong: Evidence of Other Contraband

The degree to which evidence of contraband is believed to be on the premises is largely connected to the pervasiveness of the illegal activity being investigated. ...

Pervasiveness for purposes of the first prong is not limited to large organizations or entities. United States v. Falon, 959 F.2d 1143, 1148 (1st Cir. 1992). Thus, in United States v. Morris, the First Circuit found that two illegal drug transactions at the same residential address gave the magistrate judge "sufficient evidence to believe that a large collection of similar contraband would be present in the premises that were to be searched pursuant to the warrant." 977 F.2d at 681.

2. The Second Prong: Distinguishing Contraband

As to the second prong, the principle that emerges from the First Circuit's caselaw is that a warrant is insufficiently particular if the suspected crime being investigated and leading to the warrant application was substantially narrower than the scope of the warrant that ultimately issued. For example, the First Circuit held in United States v. Roche that where an affidavit in support of the warrant application made clear that only motor vehicle insurance fraud was being investigated, a warrant that authorized the seizure of documents pertaining to all types of insurance was overbroad because it could have been more narrowly tailored to only authorize the seizure of documents pertaining to motor vehicle insurance. 614 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1980). In other words, where there is "information available to the agents which could have served to narrow the scope of the warrant and protect the defendant['s] personal rights" but the information is either withheld from the magistrate or not included in the warrant, "the warrant [is] inadequate." Klein, 565 F.2d at 190.

But where the warrant's list of items to be seized is tailored to the specific crime being investigated, it will survive an overbreadth challenge under the second prong. For example, the First Circuit upheld a warrant against a particularity challenge where it provided for the seizure of all documents relating to a list of seventeen individuals that constituted evidence of the specific suspected crime of conspiring to defraud the Social Security Administration. United States v. Bithoney, 631 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1980).

Even a broad search warrant authorizing the seizure of all of a business's records may be sufficiently particular if the fraud alleged is pervasive such that most, if not all, of the business is suspected of being linked to a mail and wire fraud scheme. This is intimately connected to the scope of the fraud which factors heavily into the first prong analysis. See Brien, 617 F.2d at 306-08. In Brien, as noted above, affidavits submitted with the warrant application demonstrated that the fraud in the business was pervasive. The First Circuit held that "where there ... exists a pervasive scheme to defraud, all the business records of an enterprise may be seized, if they are, as here, accurately described so that the executing officers have no need to exercise their own judgment as to what should be seized." Id. at 309 (emphasis added).

OH2: Search for crack not justified by plain feel - News - Sat, 2012-06-16 09:21

Defendant was stopped for jaywalking and he admitted having marijuaua which was produced. The officer conducted a patdown and felt something that was indiscernible, but was clearly not a weapon. A search produced crack, and the search was unjustified. The defendant had been stopped the day before by the same officer and apparently endured the same search. State v. Byrd, 2012 Ohio 2659, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2336 (2d Dist. June 15, 2012).*

Defendant lost suppression motion apparently because she thought the state had to justify the seizure of every item in the search warrant. It was seizure under a warrant, and the defense had the burden. State v. Crumpler, 2012 Ohio 2601, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2288 (9th Dist. June 13, 2012).*

Defendant’s vehicle was properly ordered towed where it was left blocking in a private business’s driveway. State v. Neal, 2012 Ohio 2609; 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2295 (9th Dist. June 13, 2012).*

A DV report described a suspect with a black shirt with skulls on it. Defendant was the only one around with skulls on it, so the stop was valid. State v. Will, 2012 Ohio 2616, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2300 (9th Dist. June 13, 2012).*

CA6: “Good to go” but followed by questions led to effective consent - News - Sat, 2012-06-16 09:06

“Good to go” of a stopped motorist but followed by questions led to effective consent. United States v. Rodriguez, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12009, 2012 FED App. 0601N (6th Cir. June 12, 2012):

At the end of the discussion, Diggs told Rodriguez that he was "good to go." Immediately after making that statement, however, Diggs said, "Let me ask you something," and proceeded to ask Rodriguez additional questions about his travel plans, as well as questions about his arrest history and whether there was anything illegal in his van. After approximately four minutes of questioning, Diggs asked Rodriguez for permission to search his van, and Rodriguez consented. Ultimately, law enforcement officers recovered two kilograms of heroin and ten kilograms of cocaine from a hidden compartment in the van.

TN: Entry into backyard and deck violated curtilage - News - Sat, 2012-06-16 07:31

Officers responding to an anonymous shots fired call entered defendant’s backyard and found him on his deck. The search of his bag violated the Fourth Amendment and Tennessee Constitution because the officers entered the curtilage without exigent circumstances. State v. Anderson, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 385 (June 12, 2012):

Anderson's deck was plainly within the curtilage of his home for the purposes of both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7. Considering the Fourth Amendment test, the deck was immediately attached to the house, and a back door opened to it. Although the area was not included within an enclosure, it was largely surrounded by trees. A grill was on the deck, indicating that Anderson used the area for cooking. The many toys indicate that young children used the area to play. Roberson's testimony indicates that Anderson used the area to relax and entertain guests. Additionally, the area was behind the house and not visible to passers-by on the road. All these factors support the conclusion that the deck was intimately tied to the home, and the deck, therefore, is protected under the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Hardesty v. Hamburg Twp., 461 F.3d 646, 652 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding rear deck to be protected curtilage under similar facts). Furthermore, this same evidence, particularly the nature of the activities that occurred on the deck, demonstrates that the deck was an area to which the activity of home life extended. Consequently, Anderson also enjoyed the protection of article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution while on his deck. Because the deputies intruded on this constitutionally protected area without a warrant, they violated the mandates of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions.

WI: Identified CI with corroborated info could be relied upon for stop - News - Sat, 2012-06-16 06:44

This investigation started with an anonymous informant, but the police then received information from an identified informant who gave predictive information that panned out. The police could rely on that information and it gave cause for a stop when defendant was leaving a supposed drug deal. State v. Miller, 2012 WI 61, 2012 Wisc. LEXIS 357 (June 12, 2012).*

Plaintiff pled to DUI and he was awaiting placement in an alcohol program. Despite the court order, officers went to his house and arrested him and held him for a month without a valid court order. The district court failed to conduct a proper qualified immunity analysis, so the judgment is vacated and remanded. Handt v. Lynch, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12044 (8th Cir. June 14, 2012).*

When the challenged evidence was never offered to the finder of fact, there is no search and seizure question for the appellate court to decide. Fuller v. State, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 381 (June 12, 2012).

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