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The stopped motorist pulled his license and registration from his rear pants pocket. His later gesture to the center console of the vehicle was cause for police concern and justified a frisk of the console under Mimms [and Long]. United States v. Colen, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10059 (3d Cir. May 18, 2012):

Here, the police acted reasonably. Their suspicion was aroused when they saw Colen quickly shut the center console as they first approached the car. They did not conduct a search at that point although they clearly could have under Mimms. Thereafter, Colen removed his license and registration from his rear pants pocket, thus negating a possible explanation for his gestures toward the center console. When the officers returned to their car, they both saw Colen again reaching for the center console. Only then did the officers remove him from the car, frisk him, and search the portion of the interior of the car that would have been within his immediate control when they allowed him to get back in. It was during that protective search that Officer Mason found the loaded handgun.

When deciding to conduct the kind of limited search that occurred here, "an officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed' so long as the officer's concern was objectively reasonable." United States v. Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Moorefield, 111 F.3d at 13-14). The officers' decision to check the center console for weapons was completely justified by the circumstances here.

An American DEA officer in Aruba working on a drug investigation ultimately indicted in Puerto Rico was not on a joint venture with Aruba. The Aruba investigation was underway before he got there, and they got the wiretap on their own without U.S. participation and then excluded the DEA officer from having anything to do with it while it was conducted. United States v. Valdivia, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9876 (1st Cir. May 16, 2012).

Officer’s knowledge of an arrest warrant for person is reason for a stop. United States v. Nelson, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9839 (3d Cir. May 16, 2012).*

The stop of the car here was justified because of a license plate light being out, even though there was a temporary paper tag in the rear window. Once an arrest was made of the driver, it was proper to impound and inventory the car at 4:30 am, and there is no constitutional requirement to impose lesser intrusive measures on the police to find the unidentified and unregistered alleged owner. United States v. Cubillos, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68984 (N.D. Ga. March 20, 2012).*

Defendant’s car was stopped for a traffic offense and a pretext for a drug investigation. There was justification for the traffic stop but no reasonable suspicion for anything else. A de minimus Fourth Amendment violation is rejected as inconsistent with Arizona v. Johnson which had reasonable suspicion. Murray v. State, 2012 Del. LEXIS 266 (May 14, 2012):

This case, then, involves baseless police investigation after the conclusion of a traffic stop. The dissent nevertheless defends this continuing investigation, describing it as a de minimis intrusion. The first problem with this conception is that the relevant United States Supreme Court precedent focuses on whether police extended the traffic stop's duration "measurably," not on whether police extend the stop "significantly" or "substantially." In Arizona v. Johnson, the Court said that "[a]n officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of a traffic stop." In Johnson, the Court permitted an officer who suspected criminal activity on the strength of gang clothing, tattoos, and the presence of a police scanner radio to perform a protective patdown at the start of a traffic stop. That is, the 'unrelated matters,' in Johnson, were not matters that the officer dealt with after the traffic stop, but measures taken for self-protection at the very start of the traffic stop. None of the officers in this case spotted items in the car that provided a reasonable basis to think the car's occupants posed a threat, nor did they conduct protective patdowns at the start of the encounter.

NYTimes.com: Kelly Reacts After Stop-and-Frisk Ruling:

A day after a federal judge issued a ruling fiercely criticizing the New York Police Department’s stop-and-frisk tactics, Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly unveiled new measures on Thursday intended to reduce the frequency of illegitimate stops.

The measures, which were outlined in a three-page letter sent to the City Council speaker, Christine C. Quinn, include a re-emphasis on an existing departmental order banning racial profiling. The order is to be incorporated in routine training sessions for officers beginning next month.

Eight factors of reasonable suspicion cited by the government were individually quite weak but collectively were reasonable suspicion. United States v. Stepp, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9883, 2012 FED App. 0140P (6th Cir. May 17, 2012).*

“While the totality of the circumstances may include innocent activity, the innocent factors must collectively eliminate ‘a substantial portion of innocent travelers before the requirement of reasonable suspicion will be satisfied,’ as Defendant's actions do. United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 781 (4th Cir. 2004).” United States v. Stacks, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67422 (W.D. N.C. May 14, 2012).*

There was [clearly] probable cause for a search warrant for defendant’s house when the police were able to credibly link him to a bank robbery. United States v. Allen, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68902 (W.D. Mo. April 24, 2012).*

41(g) motion for return of property is denied because the government doesn’t have the property. Also, the claimant has an adequate remedy under state law for the same thing. Bennett v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68298 (N.D. W.Va. April 13, 2012), adopted 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67925 (N.D. W.Va. May 16, 2012).*

In an arrest for DUI, a search incident that included opening a dollar bill that was folded in a way to indicate it held cocaine, which defendant then admitted, was reasonable. The officers did know all that defendant was under the influence of. State v. Armendariz-Nunez, 2012 NMCA 41, 2012 N.M. App. LEXIS 48 (February 9, 2012), Certiorari Denied, March 23, 2012, No. 33,482:

[*13] We disagree with Defendant's argument that the cocaine was not evidence of the DWI crime for which he had been arrested. See NMSA 1978, § 66-8-102(B) (2008) (amended 2010); State v. Aleman, 2008 NMCA 137, 145 N.M. 79, 194 P.3d 110 (affirming the defendant's conviction for driving while under the influence of cocaine). While the deputy observed that Defendant smelled of alcohol, there was no indication that other substances could not have contributed to his intoxicated state. As the State points out, both alcohol and marijuana emit a distinct odor, while cocaine and many other controlled substances do not. The discovery of a particular drug on a suspect's person could be relevant evidence that the suspect may be under the influence of that drug and, therefore, may be appropriately seized.

Police responded to a domestic abuse call and were inside defendant’s house. He was arrested and removed from the house and warrants were obtained. Drugs were found on him when he was booked into the jail. Even if the entry was unconstitutional, which does not have to be decided) the finding of the drugs was sufficiently attenuated from that, and suppression was properly denied. Echavarry v. Commonwealth, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 167 (May 15, 2012).*

Defendant’s mother did not have actual or apparent authority to consent to a search of her adult son’s bedroom. He had been staying with her for four months and she came into the room with “regular access” to make the bed and clean up, but that wasn’t enough because it was apparent that the room was used by only her son. She consented to a search, and the police looked in a box with men’s clothes. Ward v. State, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 7850 (Fla. 4th DCA May 16, 2012).

Jail inventory policy was unconstitutional under the Oregon constitution because it had no limitations on search of containers objectively likely to hold contraband. State v. Taylor, 2012 Ore. App. LEXIS 616 (May 16, 2012).*

Existence of an arrest warrant was justification for a stop. United States v. Nelson, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9839 (3d Cir. May 16, 2012).*

Defendant’s girlfriend consented to a search of their place, but defendant was present and objected under Randolph, except the officer’s didn’t hear him during the noise of the arrest (and neither did she). Since the officers were, at worst, just negligent, the court would not apply the exclusionary rule since the Second Circuit’s rule is that Herring may apply even when not attenuated. United States v. Smith, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68054 (S.D. N.Y. May 15, 2012):

In this case, the benefits of deterrence are marginal. As the Herring Court stated, "the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence." 555 U.S. at 144. The Court has credited the officers' testimony that they did not deliberately disregard Smith's refusal to consent to a search, but rather did not hear Smith make a statement to that effect, (Tr. 77:7-78:3.) Their failure to hear him constituted, at the most, an isolated instance of negligence; there was no evidence that their conduct rose to the level of deliberate or reckless conduct, or gross, recurring, or systemic negligence. The evidence suggested only that, in the midst of the noise and confusion that ensued during the arrest, the officers simply did not hear Smith, just as Smith's girlfriend did not hear him. On those facts, the officers reasonably believed that they were authorized to search the Apartment after obtaining the consent of Smith's girlfriend.

Smith argues that exclusion of the evidence has deterrent value insofar as suppression would "encourage[e] arresting officers to pay attention to a defendant's assertion of rights." (Def.'s Supplemental Mem. at 6.) Although suppression may hypothetically have this effect, such deterrence is insufficient to warrant application of the exclusionary rule: "Even assuming that the rule effectively deters some police misconduct and provides incentives for the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct itself in accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). As noted, in light of all the circumstances, the officers' reliance on Smith's girlfriend's consent was objectively reasonable.

In a search of business’s desks and computers, the individual defendants had standing under Mancusi v. DeForte. Also, one password protecting her computer supported standing as to her computer. The warrant limited seizure of records to 2007, and the government's seizure of records before that violated the terms of the warrant, and the motion to suppress is granted to that. United States v. Shellrock, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68962 (D. N.J. May 17, 2012):

The Court finds both Meloney and Bryan have standing to challenge the search of the Harbor House premises. First, Bryan is a co-owner of Harbor House and Defendant Meloney worked directly for Bryan and was his personal assistant. As co-owner of the corporation, Bryan had an ownership and possessory interest in Meloney's workplace computer and as Meloney's direct supervisor, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the work she completed on the computer at his direction. Therefore, the court finds that Defendant Bryan has standing to challenge the search of Harbor House's premises.

Defendant Meloney also has standing to challenge the search of her computer. Though Meloney did not have a private office and her workspace was in a common area, is not conclusive of whether Meloney had an expectation of privacy in this area. The area searched was Meloney's personal desk and workspace where she worked for more than ten years. She did not share this desk, computer, and workspace with other employees. Other employees did not use her computer or her desk to complete their work. Meloney also kept personal items on her desk in her workspace.

The Supreme Court has clearly held that even where a person's workspace is located in a room shared with others, the person's expectation of privacy in their own desk and files is not diminished. See Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369 (holding that a union officer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his workspace which was located in one large room which was shared with several other union officials and therefore had standing to successfully challenge the warrantless search therein). Here, the court is satisfied that the area searched was Meloney's personal workspace which she did not share with other employees and was used as her workspace on a regular basis for more than ten years.

In addition, Meloney's computer was password protected. While her password was commonly known at the work place among her fellow employees, it was not known to the public and could not be accessed by anyone outside this small, closely held corporation. This is sufficient to show her intent to exclude members of the public and maintain privacy in the documents kept on her computer, an expectation shared with the business owner. The electronic documents were retrieved from Meloney's "My Documents" folder and it is unclear from the record whether this folder was part of the network or an independent folder on Meloney's desktop. However, these documents were found on Meloney's computer and there is no evidence that these documents were found in any of the other computers searched by the government. This leads to the conclusion that the "My Documents" folder was not part of the general corporate network. While Meloney's standing is a closer question than Bryan's, the court is satisfied that society would recognize that Meloney has a reasonable expectation of privacy in her personal workspace and that subjectively, Meloney intended to keep her workspace private as she did not share or allow others to use her desk or computer.

Therefore, both Meloney and Bryan have standing to challenge the execution of the search warrant at Harbor House.

Tracking a cell phone by court order was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment under Jones because there was no trespass on defendant’s property. (Defendant had the telephone that was the target of a tracking warrant, and that was sufficient to give him standing. His name was even on the tracking order issued by the Florida state court.) United States v. Sereme, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68202 (M.D. Fla. March 26, 2012):

With regard to the merits, the Defendant argues that the interception of his movements by the use of a GPS device constituted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment and therefore any items of evidence found at the traffic stop must be suppressed. Here, the Government had obtained an order from a state court judge which instructed Sprint to provide the location of the cell phone in question at any time for a period of sixty days. There was no device physically placed on the vehicle by law enforcement. Rather, the monitoring was only done through the cellular telephone. This distinction is important as the Supreme Court recently held in United States v. Jones, that the Government's installation of a GPS tracking device on a vehicle and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements without a valid warrant was a search in violation of Jones' rights. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). Sereme relies on Jones, contending that the GPS evidence should be suppressed as five members of the Court in a concurring opinion authored by Justice Alito, expressed the view that long-term GPS monitoring of an individual by law enforcement impinges on expectations of privacy, without regard to the specific technology employed. Id. at 954, 964. "But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. For such offenses, society's expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual's car, for a very long period." Id. at 964. The concurring opinion was not limited to the attachment of physical devices to monitor movements.

In this case, there was no physical trespass onto Sereme's property. There was no physical device attached to the car in which he was a passenger or any other piece of his property. Based upon this Court's reading, the Jones opinion does nothing to preclude the Government's monitoring of individuals through the use of cell site technology. As the opinion stated, it resolved only "whether the attachment of a Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device to an individual's vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements on public streets, constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. The Supreme Court has not answered the broader question presented here which is whether the Government's monitoring of an individual's movements through their cell phone for a certain period of time constitutes a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and more importantly whether that "search" requires a warrant issued upon probable cause of some other level of suspicion, such as the traditional reasonable suspicion.

In this case, law enforcement monitored and tracked the movements of the target telephone that was believed to be used by Sereme for a period of 12 days after law enforcement had received an Order allowing them to do so in accordance with Fla. Stat. § 934.32. Thus, the initial stop of the vehicle was not unlawful on these grounds.

Defendant was seen leaving a stash house with a box, and he was followed from a distance where he went to a liquor store and then somewhere else. He was stopped but the stop was without probable cause. There was no showing that he had drugs when he left the stash house and his driving was not indicative of “counter-surveillance.” Officer's alleged expertise that it was a stash house was a mere unsupported conclusion. United States v. Cervantes, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9843 (9th Cir. May 16, 2012):

The government asks us to place heavy reliance on Hankel's conclusory statement that, based on Hankel's training and experience, the white box in Cervantes's possession came from a "suspected narcotics stash house." But in the absence of any underlying facts as to why Hankel suspected the house was a "stash house," this statement is entitled to little, if any, weight in the probable cause analysis.

"One of the themes which runs through the decisions on the Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement is that when the ultimate probable cause determination is made, whether by a magistrate when a warrant is sought or upon a motion to suppress evidence obtained without a warrant, mere conclusions will not suffice." 2 Wayne Lafave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.5(e), at 297 (4th ed. 2004). See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239 (noting that "wholly conclusory" statements of officers are insufficient to establish probable cause); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965) (noting that "purely conclusory" statements of officers, without detailing any of the underlying circumstances, will be insufficient to establish probable cause); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933) (noting that an officer's "mere affirmance of suspicion or belief without disclosure of supporting facts or circumstances" is insufficient to establish probable cause).

In United States v. Thomas, we noted that a conclusory allegation by law-enforcement that a particular house was a suspected narcotics stash house, was entitled to little (if any) weight in determining whether officers had satisfied the lower reasonable suspicion standard required to stop a vehicle leaving the house. 211 F.3d 1186, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 2000). We explained that the conclusory allegation, without any foundational facts, was akin to an anonymous tip and, consequently, was entitled to little weight. Id. at 1190.

Here, as in Thomas, Hankel's statements amount to nothing more than conclusory assertions. Hankel failed to provide any underlying facts as to why he, or any other officers, suspected the house was a "narcotics stash location." While Hankel's training and experience are factors to be considered, "it is incumbent upon the arresting or searching officer to explain the nature of his expertise or experience and how it bears upon the facts which prompted the officer to arrest or search." 2 Wayne Lafave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.2(c), at 45 (4th ed. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Conclusory statements and a general claim of expertise will not suffice. Id.; Thomas, 211 F.3d at 1189-92.

Officer saw a vehicle pull off a well-traveled road, stop, and the driver opened the hood. The officer stopped to see if the driver needed assistance and asked for the driver’s identifying information. This led to the officer finding that defendant’s DL was revoked. The fact that the officer asked for defendant’s identifying information did not necessitate a conclusion that he was conducting a criminal investigation. Further, the officer’s asking for defendant’s identifying information had the safety benefit of allowing the officer to know whom he was dealing with, should defendant attempt to harm one of the officers or flee. People v. Mains, 2012 Ill. App. LEXIS 368, 2012 IL App (2d) 110262 (May 11, 2012).

Officers had a warrant for defendant’s arrest, and his mother was found to have consented to an entry into her apartment. She said he wasn’t home and she’d call him. A cell phone rang in the back of the house, and the police went to look finding defendant going out the window. In plain view were drugs and a handgun. The entry into the apartment was valid as was looking for defendant because he was expected to be armed. State v. Craft, 2012 N.J. Super. LEXIS 73 (May 14, 2012).*

More from the political party of small government: Ohio Republicans AGAIN Try to Pass Unconstitutional Laws. This Time: Welfare Drug Testing:

Ohio Senate Republicans have proposed a three-county, two-year program where welfare applicants who are suspected of having a drug problem would have to submit to and pay for drug tests before receiving benefits. The Dispatch notes that Ohio is not unique: the “move appears to be part of a renewed national GOP movement to require drug testing for welfare recipients. ... revised laws have been introduced this session in about 30 states, and lawmakers in Georgia, Utah, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Louisiana have moved legislation in recent weeks.”

. ..

The proposal to drug test welfare recipients is just the latest effort of Republican legislators to import ideological ideas from other states. But at least by bringing in ideas in from other states, we don’t have to guess that the proposals are unconstitutional. We know. We know because judges have already ruled that these efforts in other states are unconstitutional.

Trying to make money for civil rights lawyers when budgets are tight?

Defendant’s discovery request for GPS trade information was denied as was his request for information which would support the government’s claim of Davis good faith until he files a motion to suppress the GPS information. United States v. Rose, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68095 (D. Mass. May 16, 2012).*

Delay in seeking a search warrant for a computer was not unreasonable where the delay was caused by the government thinking that defendant was going to cooperate. United States v. Armstrong, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68429 (M.D. Pa. May 15, 2012)*:

The fact that an earlier application was presented to a Magistrate Judge is not dispositive, particularly because the Magistrate Judge was concerned about the timing of the warrant in light of the imminent trial. Although the timing of the request for authorization, almost one year after the initial seizure of the laptops, is of concern, I am willing to accept the Government's representation that it did not immediately request an authorization to search the computers because it believed Armstrong intended to cooperate with the Government and plead guilty.

Where body language allegedly belied the defendant’s denial he had drugs in the car, a frisk was reasonable. United States v. Acosta, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67551 (W.D. Mo. April 27, 2012).*

If Brady likely applies to suppression motions, there was no showing that the evidence was sufficiently impeaching to change the outcome. United States v. Harmon, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67260 (D. N.M. May 10, 2012).*

Circuit courts have split on the issue whether Brady v. Maryland's restrictions apply to suppression hearings, although it is not likely that a prosecutor must disclose impeachment evidence before a suppression hearing in light of the Supreme Court's conclusion in United States v. Ruiz that a prosecutor does not have to disclose impeachment evidence before the entry of a guilty plea. In an unpublished opinion, the Tenth Circuit, without discussing whether Brady v. Maryland applies to a suppression hearing, rejected a defendant's argument that the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose impeachment evidence before a suppression hearing on the basis that the evidence was not impeachment evidence and not material. See United States v. Johnson, 117 F.3d 1429, 1997 WL 381926 at *3 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision). ...

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has recognized that "it is hardly clear that the Brady line of Supreme Court cases applies to suppression hearings," because "[s]uppression hearings do not determine a defendant's guilt or punishment, yet Brady rests on the idea that due process is violated when the withheld evidence is 'material either to guilt or to punishment.'" United States v. Bowie, 198 F.3d 905, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Without deciding the issue and in an unpublished opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit quoted with approval this language from United States v. Bowie. See United States v. Bullock, 130 F.App'x 706, 723 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) ("Whether the suppression hearing might have come out the other way, however, is of questionable relevance to the Brady issues at stake here."). The Fifth Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, before the Supreme Court issued its United States v. Ruiz decision, that Brady v. Maryland restrictions apply to suppression hearings. See United States v. Barton, 995 F.2d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e hold that the due process principles announced in Brady and its progeny must be applied to a suppression hearing involving a challenge to the truthfulness of allegations in an affidavit for a search warrant."); Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 965-66 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Timing is critical to proper Brady disclosure, and objections may be made under Brady to the state's failure to disclose material evidence prior to a suppression hearing."), vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S. 930 (1992)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that, under its precedent and the law from other circuits, it was not "obvious" for clear-error purposes that "Brady disclosures are required prior to suppression hearings." United States v. Scott, 245 F.3d 890, 902 (7th Cir. 2001).

After defendant was arrested for touching her children, the woman of the house delivered two laptops used by the entire family to the police to look for evidence on the computers. She had apparent authority to consent to a search of the computers because all that the police knew was that the computers were used by everybody in the house. State v. Rice, 2012 Ohio 2174, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1909 (9th Dist. May 16, 2012).*

The car had no trunk, and a dog alert to the interior was to the whole interior. The state proved that the dog was a well trained dog. State v. Duran, 2012 Ohio 2114, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1857 (9th Dist. May 14, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped with reasonable suspicion based on a detailed call from a citizen informant who called to report an erratic driver in front of him. He gave his first name and stayed on the phone until police caught up. State v. Bunn, 2012 Ohio 2151, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1868 (12th Dist. May 14, 2012).*

The vehicle defendant was a passenger in was stopped for a lane change violation, and the driver said that he had drugs. On the floor in front of him was paraphernalia in plain view. Coupled with his furtive movements, a search was reasonable. State v. Jackson, 2012 Ohio 2123, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1861 (11th Dist. May 14, 2012).*

NYTimes Editorial: Reform Stop-and-Frisk:

Judge Shira Scheindlin of Federal District Court spoke up for the constitutional rights of blacks and Hispanics on Wednesday by granting class-action status to a lawsuit that accuses the New York Police Department of using race as the basis for stopping and frisking hundreds of thousands of citizens a year.

The decision opens the door to potential claims by an enormous number of people who may have been illegally stopped, and any remedy would be applied citywide. In a fierce defense of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, Judge Scheindlin was profoundly critical of the police program. The city’s arguments, she wrote, “do not withstand the overwhelming evidence that there, in fact, exists a centralized stop-and-frisk program that has led to thousands of unlawful stops.” She allowed the class-action status because “the vast majority of New Yorkers who are unlawfully stopped will never bring suit to vindicate their rights.”

Judge Napolitano: Shoot down a drone, become an American hero:

Fox News commentator Judge Andrew Napolitano has found a novel approach to handling the whole drone surveillance dilemma that has Americans worried that the government will soon watch their every move from the sky.

Speaking out against the future of aerial eavesdropping in America, Judge Napolitano said on Fox on Tuesday, “The first American patriot that shoots down one of these drones that comes too close to his children in his backyard will be an American hero.”

[He's not a judge. He resigned to make more money as a Fox flack. Kenneth Starr insisted that his minions continually refer to him as Judge, like it was a title of nobility, as he did with Webb Hubbell, who was a judge for all of four months by appointment. You resign, judge goes away with the job. And, isn't shooting a gun into the air from one's backyard kind of a bad idea?]

A Washington state ABC compliance check of a licensed establishment that only had officers in open areas was not a search under the constitutions. Dodge City Saloon v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., 2012 Wash. App. LEXIS 1145 (May 15, 2012):

In this case, the Liquor Board's actions did not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes because the Liquor Board did not violate Dodge City's privacy interests. Dodge City had no reasonable privacy interest in areas of its licensed premises that it actively invites the public to enter. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. at 315. Even if, as Dodge City argues, it had a subjective reasonable expectation of privacy to exclude persons under 21 years old, which it did not, Dodge City lost that interest when it voluntarily admitted C.M. onto the premises. United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Once consent has been obtained from one with authority to give it, any expectation of privacy has been lost."). Thus, the Liquor Board's officers did not conduct a "search" when they entered the public portions of Dodge City's premises and observed only what members of the public could also observe. Likewise, the Liquor Board's officers did not conduct a "search" when they observed C.M.'s entry into Dodge City from a public street. Accordingly, because there was no "search" in this case, the Liquor Board's actions do not implicate constitutional considerations and Dodge City has no "search" on which to base a Fourth Amendment or article I, section 7 unreasonable search and seizure claim. Centimark Corp., 129 Wn. App. at 375.

Attempted search of water department employee’s meters was not in violation of clearly established law, so the complaint failed to state a claim for relief against city officials, if it even violated the Fourth Amendment. Clemente v. Vaslo, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9746, 2012 FED App. 0135P (6th Cir. May 15, 2012).*

Defendant’s admission that he had child pornography on his flash drive being used on a university library computer was justification for his arrest by university police. He consented to a further search. United States v. LaPradd, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9728, 2012 FED App. 0495N (6th Cir. May 14, 2012).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not pursuing a search claim that would have lost under the automobile exception anyway. United States v. Whitfield, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67292 (E.D. Va. May 11, 2012).*