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After the police entered with consent to seize ammunition, they saw other relevant stuff and they were able to “coax” an expanded consent with defendant’s wife, and it was effective. State v. Niles, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 362 (June 1, 2012):

Although the record shows that Niles's wife initially objected to the detectives' attempts to seize the entire date planner and its contents and the computer, Niles's wife and the detectives were able to reach an acceptable compromise regarding these items. Niles's wife acknowledged at the suppression hearing that she consented to the detectives' photographing parts of the planner and seizing documents inside the planner. Although Niles's wife and William Niles testified that the detectives exceeded the scope of her consent, the trial court accredited the testimony of Detectives Crews and Merlo on that issue. As we have stated, "[q]uestions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact." See Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23. Moreover, because the evidence from the computer and the letters between Niles and the victim were never admitted at trial, any issue regarding suppression of this evidence is moot. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Niles's motion to suppress.

Officers stopped defendant with reasonable suspicion of drugs, and they blocked his car and approached with guns drawn. That was not a per se arrest. State v. Carter, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 769 (La. App. 5 Cir. May 31, 2012):

The vast majority of courts have held that police actions in blocking a suspect’s vehicle and approaching with weapons ready, and even drawn, does not constitute an arrest per se. United States v. Edwards, 53 F.3d 616, 619 (3rd Cir.1995). An investigatory stop necessarily involves an element of force or duress and the temporary restraint of a person's freedom. There is the complete restriction of movement in an investigatory stop, but for a shorter period of time than an arrest. [citing cases] Investigatory stops may be accompanied by features normally associated with an arrest, i.e., use of drawn weapons. An investigatory stop is reasonable even when the police block a vehicle to prevent its occupant from leaving and approach with weapons ready or even drawn. [citing cases] Because an officer's view of a suspect seated in a car is always partially obscured, the officer is at a disadvantage when he approaches the occupant. United States v. Edwards, 53 F.3d 616, 619 (3rd Cir.1995). Furthermore, guns and drugs frequently go hand-in-hand. State v. Warren, 05-2248, p. 18 (La.2/22/07), 949 So.2d 1215, 1229.

The juvenile was found on the street in a high crime area in violation of the curfew. He was patted down and a gun was found in his waistband. His sister testified that he was summoned from his porch and arrested. The juvenile court credited the officer’s version, and that’s the end of it. State in Interest of R.L., 2012 La. App. LEXIS 779 (La. App. 4 Cir. May 30, 2012).*

The government proved the “well-trained” drug dog by training and certification and general lack of false positives sufficient for probable cause. However, the fact of an alert to a dresser in defendant’s house where no drugs were present is excluded from trial under F.R.E. 403 as more prejudicial than relevant. United States v. Pierre, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76411 (E.D. Tex. May 10, 2012):

Here, the Court finds that any testimony about Bartje's alert on the dresser would confuse the issues and cause Defendant undue prejudice. In this case, the Government must prove that Defendant was involved in the distribution - not merely personal use - of cocaine and marijuana. Based on the testimony presented at the hearing, although Bartje's alert may have been reliable as an indicator that drugs were once present near the dresser, there is nothing about the alert that would show the amount of drugs that once were there, the amount of time that had passed since they were there, or the kind of drugs present. Any probative value Bartje's alert might have is outweighed by the risk that the alert was to an amount or type of drug not a part of the charged conspiracy and for a time period not within the charging indictment. Because the alert cannot define the who, what or when -- and because there is no possibility of examining or cross-examining Bartje as to the who, what or when of the alert -- any testimony about it would confuse the issues and unduly prejudice Defendant.

The officer here had a first tip that defendant as a felon in possession of a firearm and a second tip that defendant had shot an antelope. The officer verified that defendant was a convicted felon. When defendant was seen with the dead antelope in his truck, that was reasonable suspicion of FIPF. United States v. Whitley, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11134 (10th Cir. June 1, 2012).

Defendant’s stop for driving one block without headlights for 12 minutes before sunrise was still based on a traffic violation. His continued detention was based on suspicion he was with a prostitute in the car because, among other things, his zipper was down. Defendant’s allegedly answering questions truthfully “are overwhelmingly outweighed by the suspicious circumstances detailed” in the officer’s testimony. Defendant consented to a search that produced a gun. United States v. Anderson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75992 (M.D. La. May 31, 2012).*

There was probable cause for two searches. The second had a warrant. Even if the information for the second warrant was partially misleading under Franks, there was probable cause without it. United States v. Jones, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11094 (9th Cir. June 1, 2012)* [The actual opinion is not much longer than this.]

A police show of force at an “armed party” where several officers converged and at least one had a gun drawn on the group was a seizure. Under Florida v. J.L. there is no firearms exception to the reasonable suspicion requirement. Here, there was none on this anonymous report. Without articulable reasonable suspicion, the court would be sanctioning general searches on the street. State v. Williamson, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 380 (May 31, 2012), revg State v. Williamson, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 656 (August 19, 2011):

Since the Court's decision in J.L., its principles have been applied in a variety of cases on both the federal and state levels. Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the denial of a motion to suppress under facts similar to those before this Court today. In United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480 (4th Cir. 2011), police received an anonymous phone call alleging that eight shots had been fired in "a high-crime area." Id. at 482-83. As in this case, there was no description of the suspect. Id. at 483. One of the officers who responded to the call saw four young black men walking a few blocks from where the shots were allegedly fired. Id. ... The district court upheld the propriety of the stop and frisk .... The Fourth Circuit reversed, first emphasizing that in order to justify a frisk, "the Constitution requires 'a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.'" Id. at 486 (quoting United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 2009)). The court found "precious little" to demonstrate that the officer "had reasonable, particularized suspicion . . . such that a non[-]consensual frisk was lawful under the Fourth Amendment," holding that the anonymous tip neither provided any predictive information about the suspect nor tested the knowledge or credibility of the informant. Massenburg, 654 F.3d at 486-87. In addition, the court found that the tip's reliability was undermined because it did not include a "physical description of the perpetrators or any other outward identifying features," meaning that "the only link between the tip and Massenburg's group was [their] rough proximity to the alleged site of the gunfire." Id. at 487. Finally, the court observed that the location of the incident in a high-crime area failed to bolster the credibility or reliability of the anonymous tip. Id. at 488. "To hold otherwise," the court ruled,

would be to authorize general searches of persons on the street not unlike those conducted of old by the crown against the colonists. Allowing officers to stop and frisk any individuals in the neighborhood after even the most generic of anonymous tips would be tantamount to permitting a regime of general searches of virtually any individual residing in or found in high-crime neighborhoods, where complaints of random gunfire in the night are all too usual[].

Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

. . .

Based upon our review of J.L., and the numerous cases with comparable facts, we conclude that the anonymous tip to the Covington police was insufficient to support the stop and frisk of the Defendant. The unidentified 911 caller, whose complaint was relayed to the various officers by dispatch, contained only an allegation that an armed individual was outside a particular room at the Baxter Motel. The content of the tip provided even less support for a stop and frisk than that in J.L., as there was no description of the suspect, much less "predictive information," which would allow police "to test the informant's knowledge or credibility." 529 U.S. at 271; ... Because of the lack of descriptive information, as in Massenburg, "the only link between the tip" and the Defendant was his proximity to Room 21. 654 F.3d at 486-87.9 In Gomes, the tip at issue was substantially more detailed than the one before this Court, including a description of the suspect's appearance, the make and color of his car, in addition to the allegation that he was "holding a gun in the air" in a high-crime area, 937 N.E.2d at 14, yet the court determined that it was insufficient. In comparison, the tip in this case falls far short of providing sufficiently probative information.

Defense counsel was ineffective for misapprehending the standard for motel operator consent to search a room in not filing a motion to suppress. But, defendant was not prejudiced because he couldn’t show here that he wouldn’t have gone through with it anyway and not pled guilty. Goins v. State, 2012 S.C. LEXIS 110 (May 16, 2012):

Although the PCR court found that the police were in Goins' room to serve a warrant on the distribution charges, there is no evidence to support this finding in the record. Absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, the law is clear that a motel owner cannot lawfully consent to a search of a guest's room. However, in his PCR testimony as to why he advised against proceeding with the suppression hearing, counsel stated: "I told him in the suppression hearing that the law favored the landlord or basically that the proprietor of the motel being able to consent - - excuse me. Being able to unlock the door and let someone in." This unqualified statement is clearly inaccurate considering the search and seizure jurisprudence that specifically recognizes a landlord or motel owner does not enjoy an unfettered right to grant entry into the rented guest rooms of his establishment. We therefore agree with Goins that counsel informing him he could not have prevailed in the suppression hearing was erroneous and does not reflect "reasonable professional judgment. "

. . .

Although counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to properly advise Goins on the law regarding whether a motel owner can freely admit police into a rented room, Goins has failed to prove this advice was his reason for electing not to go to trial and has thus failed to establish prejudice. We therefore affirm the circuit court order denying Goins' PCR application.

Police entry onto the curtilage, defendants’ carport, violated the Fourth Amendment because, while it could be seen, it was still a trespass under Jones. United States v. Perea-Rey, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10941 (9th Cir. May 31, 2012):

This confusion has persisted for decades. For example, in United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1975), we stated that "'a reasonable expectation of privacy,' and not common-law property distinctions, now controls the scope of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1170-71 (citing Katz). Relying on Magana, we repeated this error in a recent opinion that the government cited to the district court. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1533, 182 L. Ed. 2d 151 (2012). In Pineda-Moreno, despite the government's admission that agents had, without a warrant, entered the curtilage of the defendant's home to place a mobile tracking device on his car in his driveway, our court concluded that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because Pineda-Moreno had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage. Id. at 1215. The Supreme Court recently and emphatically repudiated this reasoning, explaining that "as we have discussed, the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test." Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.

After determining that the carport was part of the curtilage to the home, the district court erroneously concluded that the agents did not violate Perea-Rey's Fourth Amendment rights when they occupied the carport without a warrant. The Supreme Court has explained that the role of reasonable expectation analysis in evaluating the constitutionality of searches of the curtilage is only in determining the scope of the curtilage, and not the propriety of the intrusion. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300 ("[T]he extent of the curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon whether an individual reasonably may expect that the area in question should be treated as the home itself."). The district court circularly reasoned that because the agents were able to freely enter the carport, Perea-Rey had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the carport. Yet, because it was curtilage, it was a constitutionally protected area, and the warrantless entry, search and seizure by the agents violated Perea-Rey's Fourth Amendment rights. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 ("It is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."). No further showing was required of Perea-Rey.

The district court also conflated the ability to observe inside the curtilage with the right to enter the curtilage without a warrant. Although a warrant is not required to observe readily visible items within the curtilage, and "officers [need not] shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares," California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 90 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1986), a warrant is required to enter the home. In Ciraolo, the Supreme Court held that warrantless aerial observation of the curtilage of a home was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that such observations could form the basis for probable cause to support a warrant to search the curtilage. Id. at 213-14. Only after obtaining a warrant based on the observations did officers actually enter Ciraolo's curtilage. The ability to observe part of the curtilage or the interior of a home does not authorize law enforcement, without a warrant, to then enter those areas to conduct searches or seizures. See Struckman, 603 F.3d at 747 ("[P]olice officers must either obtain a warrant or consent to enter before arresting a person inside a home or its curtilage or make a reasonable attempt to ascertain that he is actually a trespasser before making the arrest."). The agents here could observe the curtilage from the sidewalk and use those observations, as in Ciraolo, as the basis for a warrant application. But, the ability to see into the curtilage or the home does not, absent some other exception to the warrant requirement, authorize a warrantless entry by the government. Therefore, the district court erred by admitting the evidence simply because the officers could view the inside of the carport from the street.

On summary judgment, entry into plaintiff’s hotel room was without exigent circumstances or a warrant, and a jury might find the officers liable. On this claim, the law is well settled. “Making all inferences in plaintiffs' favor, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that a competent officer under the circumstances of this case would have understood both that exigent circumstances did not exist before the officers entered the room and that entering the room in the absence of such circumstances violated plaintiffs’ [clearly established] constitutional rights.” Inman v. Siciliano, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75285 (D. Mass. May 31, 2012).*

DUI traffic stop led to plain view of a switchblade in passenger’s lap which caused his arrest. Following that, a plain view of a gun led to a search for which he had no standing. United States v. Seigler, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10854 (3d Cir. May 30, 2012).*

In this murder case the defendant did not specify what was to be suppressed, but “[w]aiver notwithstanding, the only testimony is that the Defendant consented to the search of his vehicle.” That’s first a question of fact resolved against him. State v. Sexton, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (May 29, 2012).*

The government’s motion to compel DNA samples is granted. Defendants are already indicted, and it needs to test the samples to confirm a CODIS match. The government also has shown probable cause for the sample. United States v. Sexton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75847 (W.D. Wash. May 31, 2012):

The Court notes that "the obtaining of physical evidence from a person involves a potential Fourth Amendment violation at two different levels—the 'seizure' of the 'person' necessary to bring him into contact with government agents and the subsequent search for and seizure of the evidence." Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 8 (internal citation omitted). In this case, the first level is not at issue. An indictment has been returned against each Defendant, Dkt. # 23, and a neutral magistrate has found probable cause to seize each Defendant, Dkt. # 1. The Court thus moves to the second level question: whether, "'given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before [the Court] ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'" United States v. Tan Duc Nguyen, 673 F.3d 1259, 1263 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).

. . .

Moreover, the Court sees no reason to deny the United States' request as to the DNA or the fingerprints simply because the United States may have already procured similar samples. As the United States explains, the laboratory requests new DNA samples in order to confirm that the CODIS record is accurate. Frankly, this is not only logical, but reassuring. It minimizes the risk that an erroneous positive will result in the conviction of an innocent defendant. And while Defendants may have been fingerprinted already in this case, major case prints—a far more thorough recording of all the friction detail ridges covering the hand—have not been obtained.

Police arrived at the location of a 911 call that was just ending when they saw a man fitting the description of a man with a gun. All things considered, that was reasonable suspicion and not a generic discovery of this defendant. United States v. Willis, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75858 (N.D. Okla. June 1, 2012)*:

In this case, police heard a dispatch that a black man wearing a gray shirt was present at a disturbance with a gun at a specific address. Officers Hamm and Zeller immediately responded to the dispatch and drove to the address. They arrived at the address within two minutes of hearing the dispatch, and they found a black man wearing a gray shirt about a block away from the 911 caller's house. ... [¶] Although not cited by the parties, the Court finds that the Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), is relevant to the Court's determination as to whether Officers Hamm and Zeller had reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop. ...

Considering the evidence known to Officers Hamm and Zeller before initiating the stop, the Court finds that the stop was reasonable from its inception. Defendant bore a reasonable resemblance to person described by the dispatcher and he was found near the 911 caller's house. Officers Hamm and Zeller arrived at 911 caller's house about two minutes after hearing the dispatch, and it was reasonable for them to believe that the black male wearing a gray shirt was the same person described by the dispatcher. The Court gives particular weight to the close geographical proximity of the defendant to the caller's house and the temporal proximity of the events. Officers Hamm and Zeller arrived at the 911 caller's house almost before the 911 call was completed and they found a person matching the description provided to them. The Court also notes that this was a residential area, not a commercial or high traffic area, and police were not confronted with a situation where they were likely to find numerous persons meeting a generic description. ...

A website on dealing with United States v. Jones in the future: usvjones.com:

USvJones.com
How to Define Fourth Amendment Doctrine for Searches in Public?

Papers due June 4th, if you're interested. A meeting in DC June 7-8.

Boston Occupier Free Press: CISPA Follows SOPA in Attacking Internet Freedom by Kendra Moyer

The Cyber Information Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) was drafted by Representative Mike Rogers (R-Michigan) with the stated intention of protecting consumers and business owners by reducing intellectual property theft, identity theft, and perceived “cyber threats.” The bill was passed by the House of Representative in April 2012, as an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947. It has not yet come up in the Senate.

Those concerned with civil rights, privacy, and the freedom of information have expressed strong concerns about the bill.

Findlaw: First Arrest by Pilotless Drone Raises Fourth Amendment Questions:

The first American citizen to be arrested with the help of a pilotless drone in the U.S. is claiming his legal rights were violated when a drone flew overhead during a stand-off with police.

The Lakota, North Dakota, resident held police off for nearly 16 hours as he threatened to kill anyone who came on his property. (The stand-off took place over the ownership of six cows that had made their way onto the man’s property.)

The Department of Homeland Security eventually got involved. It used a drone to accurately pinpoint the man’s location on his farm. Then the arrest was made.

The novel facts of the case seem settled, but the outcome is not.

Slate.com: Safe Data: Amending the Constitution to protect informational privacy by Adam Cohen:

When the National Security Agency spying scandal broke in 2005, it revealed that the government was engaged in a sweeping program of surveillance of its own citizens. As technology advances, the ability of the government to spy on ordinary Americans is growing rapidly. The government has sophisticated methods of intercepting phone calls and Internet traffic. And the FBI has just told Congress it wants to expand its ability to monitor Web-based communications, including Facebook and Twitter, in part by requiring these services to build special "back doors" for the government to use for monitoring. We are also being observed every day by spy cameras, throughout major cities and suburban shopping malls. The public has no way of knowing how much information the government is collecting and what it is being used for.

LATimes: Who's got your back online? by Michelle Maltais:

Twitter may be full of a bunch of followers, but the social networking site has proved itself a leader when it comes to protecting its users' privacy.

In an annual survey of who's got your back, the Electronic Frontier Foundation gave Twitter three and a half gold stars out of four. New to the list this year, Sonic.net was the only four-star company.

EFF examined the policies of 18 major Internet companies to assess whether they publicly commit to standing with users when the government seeks access to user data. The companies included email providers, ISPs, cloud-storage providers, and social networking sites.

Speaking of the "mosaic theory":

Most cell phone providers keep location data for a year. AT&T has it going back to 2008.
--Jim Harper, Director of Information Policy Studies, The Cato Institute (June 1, 2012)

As cells get smaller, the tracking data gets more accurate.
--Greg Najeim, Senior Counsel, Center for Democracy & Technology (June 1, 2012)

[I just added it up: There were 1572 posts to this website 6/1/11-5/31/12]

The Amvest Post, a private club, had an Ohio liquor license, and health inspectors showed up to investigate complaints of violation of the Ohio's Smoke Free Workplace Act, and they went into areas not open to the public. The entry and inspection did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the club was closely regulated under New York v. Burger. Amvets Post #711 v. Rutter, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74743 (N.D. Ohio May 30, 2012):

Ohio's Smoke Free Act authorizes warrantless administrative searches to protect its citizens against the well-documented dangers of and harms from secondhand smoke. The regulation complies with the requirements the Supreme Court set out in Burger. The Act, therefore, does not violate plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Because defendants have not violated plaintiff's constitutional rights, they are entitled to dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.

[Note: The court does not differentiate between the liquor licensing authorities and the health department. The point of Burger is the expectation of privacy vis-a-vis one's license. What about inspections unrelated to the license, like here?]

Reasonableness for due process purposes can equal reasonableness for Fourth Amendment purposes. Kinnison v. City of San Antonio, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10937 (5th Cir. May 31, 2012):

"As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a government search is 'reasonableness.'" Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995). "[A] 'reasonableness' determination[] involves a balancing of all relevant factors," Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996), and for Fourth Amendment purposes generally "requires no more of government officials than that of due process of law. Both constitutional provisions recognize an exigency exception, and, thus, lead to no practical distinction in" the summary action context. Flatford v. City of Monroe, 17 F.3d 162, 170 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43 (1993)); see also Freeman, 242 F.3d at 652 (noting that Supreme Court precedent "forecasts, even if it does not compel, that a balancing of the public and private interests at stake will favor the public interest in nuisance abatement after the conclusion of adequate administrative proceedings" (citing GM Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977))).

We see no reason to depart from the general practice of tethering the outcome of the Fourth Amendment inquiry to whether the property deprivation offended due process. In light of the procedural due process analysis above, we conclude that the district court should not have granted summary judgment on Kinnison's Fourth Amendment claim. Cf. Samuels v. Meriwether, 94 F.3d 1163, 1168 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[A]n abatement carried out in accordance with procedural due process is reasonable in the absence of any factors that outweigh governmental interests.") (citations omitted).

Defendant was the suspect in a string of burglaries and thefts to support a drug habit, and the police went where he was staying to get consent. A guest’s backpack and shopping bag in a house could not be the subject of consent by the host. Commonwealth v. Magri, 2012 Mass. LEXIS 464 (May 31, 2012):

Thus, the crucial question is whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bags that were in Barnes's bedroom. It is well settled that an overnight guest maintains an expectation of privacy in luggage stored in a host's dwelling. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1167-1168 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864-865 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Wilson, 536 F.2d 883, 884-885 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976). See also 4 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.5(d), at 231-232 & n.104 (4th ed. 2004) ("Among the articles which it would seem would most commonly be deserving of the 'high expectation of privacy' label in the host-guest context would be the overnight bag or suitcase or similar object brought to the premises by the guest").

Although the bags in this case were not traditional luggage, there is no reasoned basis to draw a legal distinction between a guest's containers based on the materials from which they are made, their shape, or the mechanism by which they are closed. Cf. Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 557 (2010) (defendant held expectation of privacy in backpack he brought to his brother's house for extended visit). The Commonwealth makes no claim that the bags were not closed. We conclude that the defendant maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in both his backpack and the shopping bag.

“It light of Kellerman’s ‘words and gestures,’ the officers reasonably believed that Kellerman had consented to their entry into the basement. See Almeida-Perez, 549 F.3d at 1171 (‘Our circuit precedent ... has been more liberal about allowing police to form their impressions from context.’).” United States v. Derden, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74684 (D. Minn. April 16, 2012), adopted 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74218 (D. Minn. May 30, 2012).*

Defendant consented to the entry of her home by the police: “No, no, come in and look. No one is home.” She was arrested for resisting. United States v. Hernandez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74499 (W.D. N.C. April 16, 2012).*

A pre-Gant search in reliance on it was not subject to the exclusionary rule under Davis. Hinkle v. State, 2011 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 56 (July 29, 2011), Released for Publication April 13, 2012.*