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Defendant’s flight from the officer who was attempting to seize him for a minor offense was a new crime to which the exclusionary rule did not apply. His dropping his gun when shot at was still abandonment under Hodari D. United States v. Gant, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78853 (D. Minn. June 7, 2012), R&R 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79269 (D. Minn. May 22, 2012).*

Probable cause developed to search defendant and his companion’s purse, and that provided probable cause to search the car they arrived in. The defendant admitted that the stop started with the officer quite respectfully offering assistance because they might be lost. One thing turned into another into another, and PC developed. [A new one on me: “motel drug interdiction duty” in North Carolina.] United States v. Laihben, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11682 (4th Cir. June 7, 2012).*

The stop here was not so long that the traffic stop was turned into a detention requiring reasonable suspicion. The passenger also had no standing in the vehicle. United States v. Santos, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79252 (N.D. Ga. April 24, 2012).*

Undercover officers used a man who didn’t know they were police to go to defendant’s house to buy drugs, which he did. When he got back to the car, he was arrested, and the officers went to the house to do a knock-and-talk, ultimately entering and doing a protective sweep and seizing the house pending investigation. In the meantime, another had gone to get a search warrant for the house. They had probable cause to get a search warrant before the protective sweep, and suppression was not ordered because of the inevitable discovery doctrine even though the view of drugs during the protective sweep made it into the search warrant application. Kamara v. State, 2012 Md. App. LEXIS 70 (June 7, 2012):

Thus, the issue here is whether the later search pursuant to the warrant was genuinely independent of the earlier observation of the marijuana in the house. The Court in Murray gave guidance on how to assess this issue. It noted two situations in which the evidence would not be deemed to be obtained by independent lawful means: (1) where the officer's "decision to seek the warrant was prompted by what they had seen during the initial entry"; and (2) where "information obtained during that entry was presented to the [judge] and affected his decision to issue the warrant." Id.

In the present case, neither of these situations are present. The evidence here established that the police planned to get a warrant prior to the protective sweep or the discovery of any contraband. Detective Oaks testified that, when Sergeant Carafano arrived at the house, he announced that the police were going to detain appellant while they sought a search warrant. Appellant was then handcuffed and detained, and two officers conducted the protective sweep. The uncontradicted evidence shows that the decision to seek the search warrant was not prompted by what the officers saw during the initial protective sweep.

Defendant was suspected in the murder of his wife, and he was on the lam with their son. He was tracked to a hotel room that night, but the police waited until the next day to make an entry, which, of course, led to the argument that they had no exigent circumstances. The court finds that they had probable cause to believe that defendant was involved in the murder and the son was likely a witness. And, with probable cause, he could be arrested without a warrant under VI law and the Fourth Amendment. However, the police knew he was at the hotel but not the room, and there was nobody to ask, and that’s why they waited until morning. If they could have isolated the room, then they could have gotten an oral or telephonic warrant if necessary [n.13]. As soon as they had a room number, they went in. Nicholas v. People, 2012 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 48 (June 6, 2012):

Here, the police clearly possessed exigent circumstances at the time they entered the hotel room. "Circumstances involving the protection of a child's welfare, even absent suspicions of criminal activity, may present an exigency permitting warrantless entry, but only if the officer reasonably believes that 'someone is in imminent danger.'" Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1996)). At the time the police gathered the relevant information—that Nicholas was in Room 205 of the Bella Vista Hotel with his son—they had reason to believe that D.N. witnessed his mother's murder and may, in fact, have been the only eyewitness. (S.A. 144.) They knew that a gun was used in the killing but was not left at the crime scene. (S.A. 172.) The police had statements from neighbors establishing that Nicholas entered the apartment that morning. (S.A. 238.) Shortly after he entered, the neighbors heard the sound of a gunshot and a loud thump, and Nicholas was seen leaving the apartment in a hurry with his son. (S.A. 143, 144, 200; J.A. 113-15.) Although the police had no evidence that Nicholas ever threatened his son, they knew that he had both a motive and the opportunity to silence his son, the only likely eyewitness. Therefore, the police acted reasonably and the trial court correctly found that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry and search. See United States v. Thompson, 357 Fed. Appx. 406, 411 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding exigent circumstances where witnesses to a shoot-out saw a participant to the crime pull a child out of a bullet-ridden vehicle and enter an apartment); United States v. Parris, 229 Fed. Appx. 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2007) (determining that it was reasonable for police to enter a home without a warrant where a man who had been firing a weapon outside the house had entered the home, where children were inside and appeared afraid, and where the police could not see inside well enough to determine if anyone was injured or being held against their will); State v. Aviles, 891 A.2d 935, 945 (Conn. 2006) (concluding that police acted reasonably when they entered the room of someone suspected of having committed murder within the last twelve hours and where the murder weapon had not yet been recovered, because the assailant might still have possessed the gun and might still have been willing to use it); Columbus v. Montgomery, No. 09AP-537, 2011 WL 983080, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2011) (unpublished) (finding exigent circumstances where children may have been sexually abused and were inside an apartment, possibility with the alleged assailant, even though there was no evidence of ongoing violence).

In a combined First and Fourth Amendment case, plaintiff was at a city council meeting to speak, and he was animated and concerned others when they determined he was armed. He was removed from the meeting, and it was determined that he was a law enforcement officer, so they let him back in. The decision to remove him was reasonable under the circumstances. Sandefur v. Hanover Park, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79412 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 2012)*:

Here, the court finds it significant that the stop took place in the context of a Village Board meeting. The situation is thus somewhat different from a typical Terry stop of an individual on the street. In the public setting of a Village Board meeting, the potential consequences of failing to apprehend an individual about to commit a crime are significantly enhanced, for any criminal activity is a threat not only to the order of the meeting, but also to the safety of all present. A stop that would not be justified on the street might therefore be reasonable in the setting and circumstances of a public meeting.

With that backdrop, the court determines that there was reasonable suspicion to seize Sandefur at the meeting, take him to the hallway, and search him. As explained above, the defendants had observed that Sandefur was carrying a concealed weapon, and they were not aware that he was a law enforcement officer. Moreover, Sandefur was very animated as he addressed the Board. The defendants were thus justified in attempting to ascertain whether Sandefur was legitimately carrying the weapon. Moreover, the search was minimally intrusive, for it lasted no longer than necessary to ascertain that Sandefur was a law enforcement officer and involved only as much force as necessary to secure Sandefur and prevent any potential harm to the attendees of the meeting. Within only a few minutes of the commencement of the search, Sandefur was free to leave.

Defendant consented to a search that led the officer to determine that a dog sniff was required. He explained it to the defendant, and defendant’s acquiescence expanded the consent. The officer did not have to remove a duffle bag from the car before having the drug dog smell it. United States v. Hill, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79250 (N.D. Ga. June 7, 2012).*

Plaintiff sufficiently pled trespass by border patrol officers coming on his property and assault and battery for nearly driving into him because he attempted to take their picture with his cell phone camera. Moher v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79443 (W.D. Mich. June 8, 2012).*

Defendant was in custody, but the state can meet his heavy burden of showing consent without having Mirandized the defendant. People v. McCray, 2012 NY Slip Op 4579, 2012 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4489 (4th Dept. June 8, 2012).*

In a § 1983 case, the fact a state or local employee lacks statutory arrest authority has no bearing on the Fourth Amendment question of probable cause. Saunders v. Silva, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11509 (9th Cir. June 7, 2012):

The district court found that Silva seized Saunders when he ordered her to leave church and return to her home. It further found that this seizure was unreasonable because Silva, as a Deputy Animal Control Officer within the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office, lacked the authority to conduct an arrest. Although Silva was not authorized under Arizona law to arrest Saunders, "state restrictions [on arrest authority] do not alter the Fourth Amendment's protections." Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008). To constitute a Fourth Amendment violation, an arrest by a state officer must be unreasonable under the United States Constitution, rather than simply not in compliance with state laws. See United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 2005).

A suspect does not have a right to know what it is the police are looking for in a consent search, which is essentially his only issue for suppression. Here, defendant clearly consented by signing a consent form and even unlocked doors for the officers. He’s been through a police investigation before that was apparently fruitless and consented to a search there. State v. Chesrown, 2012 Ohio 2476, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2175 (9th Dist. June 6, 2012).*

That defendant may have been injured in an accident did not affect the admissibility of the evidence in a DUI case by motion to suppress. That went to weight of the evidence. Even assuming the officers misstated their ability to force a blood draw, that does not require suppression of the search here. State v. Walters, 2012 Ohio 2429, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2138 (9th Dist. June 4, 2012).*

While the officers never saw money change hands, they had probable cause to arrest defendant after months of investigation, wiretaps, and tailing the defendant on drug runs, always on a Sunday. United States v. Rucker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78323 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2012).*

A patdown that revealed a wad of money was not a valid plain feel because it should have been apparent that it was not a weapon. State v. Robinson, 2012 Ohio 2428, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2137 (9th Dist. June 4, 2012):

[*P20] Here, the testimony is unclear as to whether the nature of the "wad of money" was apparent by touch during the Terry search, or whether the officer reasonably believed the "wad" in Robinson's pocket to be a weapon. Moreover, the record does not indicate that Officer McConnell at any point subjectively believed that the "wad" in Robinson's pocket was a weapon. Therefore, the seizure of the money from Robinson's pockets is not justified by the Terry search or the plain feel doctrine. See Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297, 1999 Ohio 68, 720 N.E.2d 507 (1999) ("Generally, at a suppression hearing, the state bears the burden of proving that a warrantless search or seizure meets Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.")

Plaintiff is a state prison inmate required under state law to give fingerprints for SORNA purposes, and he refused. He was placed in segregation for refusing, and a criminal investigation was opened by the State Police. He sued under § 1983, but he doesn’t state a claim for relief because the intrusion is minimal [not to mention that, as a prison inmate, his fingerprints are in multiple places and were likely taken when he got there]. Ford v. Curtin, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79439 (W.D. Mich. June 8, 2012).*

Officers lawfully in defendant’s place with an arrest warrant saw a gun and ammunition in plain view, so the seizure was valid. United States v. Lyons, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11651, 2012 FED App. 0590N (6th Cir. June 7, 2012).*

Defendant argued that one question from the officer expanded the scope of a traffic stop. The court concludes, however, that his shaking and obvious nervousness and deflection when the question was asked was reasonable suspicion. One question could be enough, but not here. State v. Smith, 2012 Minn. LEXIS 239 (June 6, 2012)*:

[W]e conclude that Smith's extreme shaking and his evasive response when asked about his shaking provided the officers with reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to support an expansion of the traffic stop. In essence, because we conclude that the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to support the alleged expansion of the stop, we assume without deciding that Ehrhardt's question caused an incremental expansion in the scope of the traffic stop.1
1 We are not persuaded by the State's argument that a question cannot expand the scope of a traffic stop. Instead, we recognize that even a single question, depending on its content, could expand the scope of a traffic stop under other facts.

The Secretary of Agriculture failed to show “special needs” for random drug testing of civilian employees of the Job Corps Civilian Conservation Centers of the U.S. Forest Service. The only evidence shows that there is no drug problem. Nat'l Fedn. of Fed. Employees-IAM v. Vilsack, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11605 (D.C. Cir. June 8, 2012):

The National Federation of Federal Employees ("the Union") challenges the constitutionality of a random drug testing policy applicable to all employees working at Job Corps Civilian Conservation Centers operated by the U.S. Forest Service. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of Agriculture and the Chief of the U.S. Forest Service (hereinafter "the Secretary") and denied the Union's request for a preliminary injunction. Upon de novo review, we conclude that the Secretary has failed to demonstrate "special needs" rendering the Fourth Amendment requirement of individualized suspicion impractical in the context of Job Corps employment. See Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989). Although identifying governmental interests in the students' abstention from drug use and in their physical safety, the Secretary offered no foundation for concluding there is a serious drug problem among staff that threatens these interests and thus renders the requirement for individualized suspicion impractical. Rather, the Secretary's evidence to date suggests the contrary. Because the Secretary has offered a solution in search of a problem, the designation of all Forest Service Job Corps Center employees for random drug testing does not fit within the "closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches," Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997). Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Week: The drone over your backyard: A guide / U.S. skies are being opened to police and private drones. Will it be the end of privacy?

Drones are coming to the U.S.?

They're already here — and the drone era is just beginning. Predator drones — the same remote-controlled, camera-equipped aircraft used to hunt terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan — have been patrolling U.S. borders since 2005. Emergency responders have used smaller drones to search for missing persons and track forest fires, and police departments in Florida, Maryland, Texas, and Colorado are testing drones for surveillance and search-and-rescue missions. Last month, the Federal Aviation Administration, acting at the behest of Congress, relaxed the rules for deploying unmanned aerial vehicles. Police departments across the country can now fly drones weighing up to 25 pounds, as long as the aircraft stay within sight of the operator and fly no higher than 400 feet (so as not to get in the way of commercial aircraft). More rules easing restrictions on commercial drones are expected by 2015. By the end of the decade, the FAA expects 30,000 unmanned aerial vehicles — some as small as birds — to be peering down on American soil.

Why are they allowing more drones?
Law-enforcement officials love them. They believe the mobile, eye-in-the-sky technology will improve public safety at a low cost. With high-resolution cameras, drones can help police patrol large areas, spot runaway criminals, and track drug shipments. And since a small police drone with a camera can be purchased for around $50,000 (with some basic models costing as little as $300), they're far cheaper than standard helicopters, which can cost $1 million or more.

BuzzFeed.com: The App That's Taking On The New York Police; The ACLU's new “Stop-and-Frisk Watch” app aims to help observers report and quantify stop-and-frisks. But can an app really change the police? by Rosie Gray & Matt Buchanan:

The New York branch of the ACLU has big dreams for the newest piece in its crusade against stop- and-frisk, the New York Police Department’s practice of stopping young men — nearly always men, and nearly always minorities — and frisking them on the street in public. The NYCLU’s “Stop and Frisk Watch,” a smartphone app designed to let observers record and report stop-and- frisks they see on the street, is a “free and innovative smart phone application that will empower New Yorkers to monitor police activity and hold the NYPD accountable,” per its description online.

The app is only on Android phones right now — with an iPhone version due later — in an effort to reach those who are regularly stopped-and- frisked. “We chose Android first because the demographic who gets stopped and frisked in New York City is the same demographic as who's on Android — 86 percent of people stopped are black or Latino,” NYCLU Communications Director Jen Carnig said.

New Haven Independent: FBI Gets OK To Inspect Cop-Filmer’s Phone by Paul Bass:

Federal agents will prepare a “mirror image” of Jennifer Gondola’s iPhone4 to see what happened on a violent night in the Temple Street courtyard.

Gondola’s attorney Friday faxed signed consent forms from Gondola to both the FBI and the New Haven police department’s internal affairs division giving them permission to review a video she shot on her cellphone camera before Sgt. Chris Rubino demanded she turn it over. Gondola refused and stashed the cellphone in her bra. Rubino ordered a female officer, Nikki Curry, to snatch the cellphone from Gondola’s bra. Then Rubino pocketed the phone and arrested Gondola for “interfering.”

The attorney, Diane Polan, also charged city police with violating her client’s Constitutional rights by grabbing her phone from her bra.

Justin P. Murphy & Matthew A.S. Esworthy: The ESI Tsunami: A Comprehensive Discussion about Electronically Stored Information in Government Investigations and Criminal Cases, 27 Criminal Justice 31 (Spring 2012):

Dealing with electronically stored information (ESI), for clients, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, has steadily grown into a tsunami of cost and complexity—with little guidance provided by courts and none from the rules. Moreover, the paradigms developed in civil litigation to curb ESI discovery abuses are often not effective in the criminal system, due to the onesided nature of ESI burdens and demands in government investigations and criminal matters and the absence of costeffective methods sanctioned by courts to resolve criminal discovery disputes. The world of criminal e-discovery continues to evolve every day, particularly in the contexts of subpoena compliance, social media, Fourth Amendment issues, and postindictment discovery.

The article has helpful sections on:
• Subpoena Compliance,
• Social Media, the Internet, and Admissibility
• ESI and the Fourth Amendment
--CDT and the Ninth Circuit's standards
--Increasing judicial skepticism
--Warrantless searches of cellular telephones
--Warrantless use of GPS tracking devices
• Postindictment Discovery

Search incident of the call log of defendant’s cell phone was valid. (Maybe that's all that's subject to search incident.) People v. Taylor, 2012 COA 91, 2012 Colo. App. LEXIS 926 (June 7, 2012):

[*P10] For present purposes we assume, as apparently did the trial court, two propositions: First, defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cellular telephone's call history4 and second, the officer's review of the call history constituted a warrantless search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

4 Other courts to consider this issue have found a reasonable expectation of privacy in a cellular telephone's call history. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding legitimate expectation of privacy in call history of cell phone); United States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (S.D. Fla. 2011) ("the weight of authority agrees that accessing a cell phone's call log or text message folder is considered a 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes"); United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D. Mass. 2009) ("It seems indisputable that a person has a subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of his or her cell phone."); United States v. De La Paz, 43 F. Supp. 2d 370, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding legitimate privacy expectation in the fact that calls were received and in the identity of the callers); State v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1080-81 (Conn. 2010) (reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone); but see United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1276 (D. Kan. 2007) (when cell phones were taken from defendant's person but defendant did not assert ownership of cell phones, did not testify as to expectation of privacy in cell phones, and did not present testimony that he had a legitimate possessory interest in cell phones or had taken steps to ensure his privacy in them, defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in content of cell phones).

. . .

[*P17] We conclude that a search of the call history of a cellular telephone on the person of the arrestee is a lawful search incident to arrest. Here, the uncontested evidence at the suppression hearing was that defendant's cell phone was removed from his person after his lawful custodial arrest. The officer then searched defendant's cell phone call history to confirm defendant had called the woman who arrived to sell Investigator J.W. the drugs. This search was a lawful warrantless search incident to arrest. See, e.g., Smallwood, 61 So. 3d at 460.

[*P18] Additionally, applying the narrower view proposed by some courts that officers may not search all data contained in a cell phone, nevertheless the search of the call history of defendant's cell phone was lawful. See Hawkins v. State, 704 S.E.2d 886, 891-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) ("Just because an officer has the authority to make a search of the data stored on a cell phone (that is, just because he had reason to 'open' the 'container') does not mean that he has the authority to sift through all of the data stored on the phone (that is, to open and view all of the sub-containers of data stored therein). Instead, his search must be limited as much as is reasonably practicable by the object of the search.").

The search of defendant’s purse violated the Fourth Amendment, and it was excluded in her criminal case, but that did not make it excludable in her probation revocation proceeding. People v. Lazlo, 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 659 (1st Dist. June 6, 2012):

[T]he exclusionary rule does not apply in probation revocation hearings, unless the police conduct at issue shocks the conscience. (See, e.g., United States v. Vandemark (9th Cir. 1975) 522 F.2d 1019, 1020 [“[t]his accords with the almost unanimous view that the exclusionary rule does not usually apply in probation revocation proceedings”]; People v. Harrison (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 803, 811 [245 Cal. Rptr. 204] (Harrison) [“federal law does not require application of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation hearings”]; People v. Nixon (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 687, 691, 693–694 [183 Cal. Rptr. 878].)

Police were searching woods for a murder suspect and they encountered defendant, whom they asked for identification and why he was in the woods. This was not an investigative detention subject to the Fourth Amendment. He wasn’t the suspect they were looking for. Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 2012 PA Super 118, 2012 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1043 (June 6, 2012).*

The stop was justified based on the testimony even though its basis wasn’t mentioned in the reports. “No extrinsic evidence has been offered to contradict Officer Nelson’s testimony, and ‘[t]he mere fact an incident report omits certain details is not sufficient to render the officer's testimony concerning the underlying action facially implausible.’ United States v. Mendoza, 677 F.3d 822, 828 (8th Cir. 2012).” United States v. Gant, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78853 (D. Minn. June 7, 2012).*

Defendant’s post-conviction claim that his 2007 conviction should be voided because of Gant was rejected, not on Davis grounds, but on the automobile exception. United States v. Carter, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11265 (11th Cir. June 5, 2012).*

Plaintiff stated a claim against officer for procuring an arrest warrant based on name alone when it turned out that there were more than one person in the geographical area with that name. “Basing probable cause solely on a similarity of name could create a substantial risk of error,” and it qualifies as reckless disregard. Parks v. Town of Leicester, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78973 (D. Mass. June 7, 2012)*:

Nonetheless, it is troublesome that Fontaine, in concluding that plaintiff was the assailant, relied on the mere coincidence that the name that the victim provided matched the name in the database. The probability of multiple persons with the same name residing in a single geographic region--at least one as populous as Worcester County--is not negligible. Basing probable cause solely on a similarity of name could create a substantial risk of error. Arguably, an officer who pursued such a practice would be acting in reckless disregard of the truth.

Plaintiff alleged enough facts to stay in court that the police called to aid a repossession of a vehicle converted private action into state action. Morozov v. Howard County, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77767 (D. Md. June 5, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped via a traffic offense that was completely ignored to focus on a drug investigation. Within two minutes they had consent, and it was found not voluntary. United States v. King, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76988 (N.D. Miss. June 4, 2012):

The government argues that the defendant's consent to search is valid because it was given within two minutes of the traffic stop. In looking at the surrounding circumstances, however, it appears that consent was not voluntarily given. As Agent Force requested, Hutchins attempted to make the stop appear normal. Yet, the record shows that the officers were not interested in any alleged traffic violation when they stopped King. They knew the defendant was a suspect in an ongoing drug investigation and the officers acted in furtherance of that investigation when they stopped the defendant. While Hutchins claims King could have left prior to the search, at no time did he or any of the other officers tell the defendant he was free to leave or that he had a right to refuse consent. Hutchins, two police officers, and a K-9 dog were present when King consented to the search. The defendant complied with the officer's requests and told them where money was located inside his truck. Though the defendant was allegedly stopped for violating traffic laws, none of the officers issued a citation prior to asking to search the vehicle. Instead, they held the defendant at the traffic stop without advising him that he was suspected of criminal activity. Looking at these factors, it appears King's consent was not the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice. An objectively reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have felt free to leave the scene or refuse consent.

Nat Hentoff: FISA: Coming: Even more FBI warrantless searches?

On May 9, FBI Director Robert Mueller strongly recommended that Congress reauthorize the 2008 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act by the end of the year. This law allows federal authorities, including the FBI, to conduct warrantless searches. These are beyond the Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations that let the FBI avoid going to a court to get a warrant to track Americans suspected of terrorist ties.