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Officer’s queries with “please” and normal tone of voice, all recorded during the stop of defendant at the El Paso interstate bus terminal, showed defendant’s consent to a search of his person for drugs strapped to him was voluntary. The court concludes it was not an order. United States v. Trujillo, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26580 (W.D. Tex. February 29, 2012).*

Defendant’s conduct was suspicious around a car and indicated either theft, drug dealing, or a car jacking. When the officer stopped with lights, defendant attempted to back away. All this was more than a hunch of criminal activity. United States v. Bady, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26265 (S.D. Ill. February 29, 2012).*

Defendant’s 2255 claim that defense counsel failed to raise a racial motivation issue based on something the officer said during the stop is belied by the DVD of the stop. Defendant’s plea deal to a five year max was a huge benefit, considering where he would have fallen on the guidelines if the government pursued his priors. United States v. Curry, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25803 (D. Neb. February 29, 2012).*

Defendant had to understand that a search of his person for drugs would mean going into the pockets. United States v. Stinson, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4144 (4th Cir. February 28, 2012) (unpublished).*

33 minute delay in the stop here was reasonable and caused by the language barrier and waiting for an interpreter to arrive. United States v. Hernandez-Coria, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24624 (D. Minn. January 25, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped in a taxicab, and marijuana was seen in plain view. People v Souffrant, 2012 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1528, 2012 NY Slip Op 1521 (3d Dept. March 1, 2012).*

A defendant told he’s going to be frisked is “seized.” Here, the record is devoid of any factual justification for the frisk based on what “other people” said. If they were informants, there was no showing of basis of knowledge or any reason to be truthful. Commonwealth v. Arias, 2012 Mass. App. LEXIS 93 (February 28, 2012)*:

Here, the record reveals nothing about the informants' basis of knowledge or veracity. Hart and Halloran, the MBTA employees who told the police about the defendant, expressly stated that they were passing on information they had obtained from "other people" but said nothing about who the other people were and provided no information about the other people that would enable anyone to determine either their veracity or basis of knowledge. In that regard, we treat the individuals who gave information to Hart and Halloran as unknown informants even though police knew their identities by the time of the hearing. ... Nothing in the record suggests that the police knew who the informants were before they arrested the defendant or that they had any idea how the informants knew of the gun. Moreover, information obtained from known informants receives somewhat greater weight than that received from anonymous informants because known informants expose themselves to "charge[s] of filing a false report or any comparable consequence of providing false information to law enforcement." Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 456 Mass. 385, 397, 923 N.E.2d 1004 (2010). See Commonwealth v. Costa, 448 Mass. 510, 515-517, 862 N.E.2d 371 (2007). Here, the informants faced no such consequences when they made their disclosures to Hart or Halloran. Indeed, nothing in the record suggests that they even knew that Hart or Halloran would relay their information to authorities.

Defendant was not in a “Catch-22” by having to establish standing since it couldn’t be used to prove guilt. The trial court explained it to her. State v. Vu, 2012 Ohio 746, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 650 (9th Dist. February 27, 2012):

[*P23] Vu asserted in the court below that the trial court placed her in a "Catch-22" by insisting that she prove a possessory interest in the properties, as any such proof would aid the State's case. She also avers on appeal that it is illogical that she was barred from seeking suppression on the basis that she lacked a possessory interest, but was found guilty of possession, for which there had to be evidence of a possessory interest. The answer to both arguments lies in the difference between the suppression stage and the trial stage.

[*P24] Although the State bore the burden of proof at trial, it was Vu's burden to prove that she possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy for purposes of suppression. Redding, 2010 Ohio 4286, at ¶ 8, quoting Blackert, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3818, 1992 WL 174642, at *3. Further, any evidence she introduced at the suppression stage to prove that she had a possessory interest would not have been admissible against her at trial on the issue of guilt. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394. The trial court explained both propositions of law to Vu's counsel at the suppression stage. Even so, Vu's counsel maintained that he did not have any testimony to offer, the record spoke for itself, and Vu automatically should be entitled to challenge the applicable search warrants, given that the State intended to pursue possession charges against her. The United States Supreme Court has specifically rejected the notion of "automatic standing," however, and it was Vu's burden to demonstrate a privacy interest. State v. Johnson, 63 Ohio App.3d 345, 347-348, 578 N.E.2d 867 (9th Dist.1989), citing United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-93, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1980). Because she failed to carry her burden, the trial court did not err by concluding that she lacked standing to challenge the warrants issued for the houses at Troon Avenue, Baywood Drive, and Autumnwood Lane and the apartments at Grand Lake Drive and Stoneybrook Lane.

Come on: Simmons is almost 45 years old.

The affidavit was more than just “bare bones,” and the good faith exception was satisfied. The question is not “just lacking” in probable cause, but so lacking that no reasonable officer could rely in it. United States v. Oldaker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25788 (N.D. W.Va. February 16, 2012).*

Officers had reasonable suspicion for a probation search, and probable cause was not the standard. United States v. Bolivar, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4096 (9th Cir. February 29, 2012).*

To satisfy the Fourth Amendment, an inventory did not require watch commander approval. The policy mentions it, but failure to follow is not a Fourth Amendment issue when the inventory is otherwise proper. State v. Stewart, 2012 Ida. App. LEXIS 17 (February 27, 2012).*

Plaintiff overcame qualified immunity in his claim that he was standing in a tree showing his hands when officers were trying to arrest him, having thrown down his rifle. They gave him conflicting orders, and Tasered him and he fell from the tree. Their claim that he could have jumped on them from the tree to grab the gun was dubious at best. Harper v. Perkins, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4064 (11th Cir. February 29, 2012) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s racial motivation for a stop failed here because, after the stop ended and he was told he was free to leave, he continued to talk to the officer and ultimately consented. United States v. Curry, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25803 (D. Neb. February 29, 2012).*

Plaintiff in this FTCA case was caught stealing from the mail, and a body search was conducted with his consent to locate fluorescent powder markings from the mail he tampered with. Thus, his consent and failure to object denies him a claim for this. Pinero v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22376 (D. P.R. February 20, 2012).*

Defendant was arrested at home in her pajamas. She was allowed to reenter to get dressed, but officers were allowed to go in with her for self-protection, and a sawed off shotgun was seen inside leaning against the wall. This observation was lawful. [If she didn’t want them to see the gun, she should not have asked to go back inside. This is just like Christman.] United States v. Reid, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24523 (E.D. Mo. February 7, 2012):

When the deputies arrested Graham at 712 Thrush, she was dressed in her pajamas. Following the arrest and a brief discussion, the deputies allowed Graham to reenter 712 Thrush to change her clothes. Although the deputies had no specific reason to suspect danger to them or that Graham might attempt to escape, the deputies were entitled to enter the residence immediately before or with Graham and to remain with her as she changed clothes. Debuse, 289 F.3d at 1074-75 (holding that where the defendant "chose to reenter his house simply for his own convenience[,] [a]llowing reentry on the condition that the officers accompany him was reasonable"); ....

Based on prior wiretaps, officers had probable cause as to defendant. When they saw what appeared to be a hand to hand transaction, they had more probable cause to stop him. United States v. Coria, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24624 (D. Minn. January 25, 2012).*

Forbes op-ed: The TSA Is Coming To A Highway Near You by Rep. Marsha Blackburn (R-TN):

One of the great honors of my service to Tennessee is having the opportunity to represent Ft. Campbell which is home to the storied 101st Airborne, the 5th Special Forces Group and the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment which piloted Navy SEAL Team Six during the raid on Osama Bin Laden.

Each soldier who calls Ft. Campbell home has gone through some of the most intensive training on the planet which pushed their minds and bodies to their physical limits. In the end, those who make the cut have earned the right to be part of our United States military, are honored to wear its uniform, and are serving on the frontlines in the fight against global terrorism.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for our nation’s Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) who Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano contends are our nation’s last line of defense in fighting domestic terrorism. Unlike “hell week” which faces potential Navy SEALs, becoming a TSO requires a basic level of classroom and on the job training. In many cases this rigorous training is less severe than the requirements of becoming a security guard in most states.

The possibility, not even the probability, of remote wiping of a cell phone with applications for nearly all phones, is enough to justify entering the phone to get its number. The question of a more detailed search is saved for another day. United States v. Flores-Lopez, 10-3803 (7th Cir. February 29, 2012):

This appeal requires us to consider the circumstances in which the search of a cell phone is permitted by the Fourth Amendment even if the search is not authorized by a warrant. Lurking behind this issue is the question whether and when a laptop or desktop computer, tablet, or other type of computer (whether called a “computer” or not) can be searched without a warrant—for a modern cell phone is a computer.

. . .

A modern cell phone is in one aspect a diary writ large. Even when used primarily for business it is quite likely to contain, or provide ready access to, a vast body of personal data. The potential invasion of privacy in a search of a cell phone is greater than in a search of a “container” in a conventional sense even when the conventional container is a purse that contains an address book (itself a container) and photos. Judges are becoming aware that a computer (and remember that a modern cell phone is a computer) is not just another purse or address book. “[A]nalogizing computers to other physical objects when applying Fourth Amendment law is not an exact fit because computers hold so much personal and sensitive information touching on many private aspects of life. ... [T]here is a far greater potential for the ‘intermingling’ of documents and a consequent invasion of privacy when police execute a search for evidence on a computer.” United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 178 (6th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999); cf. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1175-77 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009). An iPhone application called iCam allows you to access your home computer’s webcam so that you can survey the inside of your home while you’re a thousand miles away. “iCam—Webcam Video Streaming,” http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/icam-webcam-videostreaming/id296273730?mt=8 (visited Feb. 6, 2012, as were the other web sites that we cite in this opinion). At the touch of a button a cell phone search becomes a house search, and that is not a search of a “container” in any normal sense of that word, though a house contains data.

A complication in this case is that, remarkably, the record does not indicate the brand, model, or year of the defendant’s cell phone, so we do not know how dumb or smart it is. But does that matter? Even the dumbest of modern cell phones gives the user access to large stores of information.

. . .

We said it was conceivable, not probable, that a confederate of the defendant would have wiped the data from the defendant’s cell phone before the government could obtain a search warrant; and it could be argued that the risk of destruction of evidence was indeed so slight as to be outweighed by the invasion of privacy from the search. But the “invasion,” limited as it was to the cell phone’s number, was also slight. And in deciding whether a search is properly incident to an arrest and therefore does not require a warrant, the courts do not conduct a cost-benefit analysis, with the invasion of privacy on the cost side and the risk of destruction of evidence (or of an assault on the arresting officers) on the benefit side of allowing the immediate search. Toting up costs and benefits is not a feasible undertaking to require of police officers conducting a search incident to an arrest. Thus, even when the risk either to the police officers or to the existence of the evidence is negligible, the search is allowed, United States v. Robinson, supra, 414 U.S. at 235, provided it’s no more invasive than, say, a frisk, or the search of a conventional container, such as Robinson’s cigarette pack, in which heroin was found. If instead of a frisk it’s a strip search, the risk to the officers’ safety or to the preservation of evidence of crime must be greater to justify the search. Campbell v. Miller, 499 F.3d 711, 717 (7th Cir. 2007), citing Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983). Looking in a cell phone for just the cell phone’s phone number does not exceed what decisions like Robinson and Concepcion allow.

The person answering the door at a motel room said he’d been staying there two days. That was apparent authority for consent to the police to enter. Even if the actual fact was he stayed there one day, the officer still would have seen apparent authority, and that was not IAC for not developing that fact. United States v. Livingston, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25558 (W.D. Okla. February 28, 2012).

Defendant concedes that the marijuana patch in this case was in open fields, but he contends the police entered his curtilage to get a photograph of it. Even if true, that would not have tainted the warrant here when it was excised from the lawfully obtained information. United States v. Simmons, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25615 (D. Me. February 28, 2012).*

Regardless of whether the officer violated Miranda in defendant’s equivocal statement about marijuana in his car in a national park, the officer already had probable cause for a search of the car. United States v. Lehman, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25754 (E.D. Cal. February 28, 2012).*

Defense counsel did, in fact, challenge the search so no IAC for failing to do so. United States v. Davis, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24939 (D. Kan. February 28, 2012).*

The principals in a business subjected to a search warrant had “standing” (which the court notes was a word rejected by SCOTUS). Storing records there is still an expectation of privacy. A second place was a residence owned by the corporation that they kept business stuff in, and they came and went at will. They had “standing” there, too. United States v. Ferguson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24929 (E.D. Mich. February 27, 2012):

The government argues that the Ferguson defendants' bare assertion that they were permitted to store personal belongings at the 500 Griswold offices is insufficient to support a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, as discussed below, the rule in United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951), indicates that if defendant Ferguson Enterprises were permitted to store business records in the search locations, they should be permitted to challenge the government's seizure of those records. In addition, in United States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit held that the owner of an apartment did not have authority to consent to a search of the defendant's luggage that was stored in the apartment because there was an understanding between the owner and the defendant that the luggage was private. Id. at 845-46. This holding implies that a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in goods stored by permission at a third party's residence.

The officer said he was going to patdown the defendant for a weapon after defendant said he had a gun on him which was a violation of Illinois law. It was valid as a search incident, not a patdown. United States v. Lyons, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25408 (C.D. Ill. February 28, 2012).*

Plaintiff’s case was not attempting to invalidate a conviction in another state case, so there was no Heck bar. Plaintiff also barely satisfies a substantive due process claim. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim doesn’t survive. Andrews v. Bureau of Codes Admin. Office, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23835 (M.D. Pa. February 24, 2012).*

Pro se motion to suppress that states no grounds is denied. United States v. Goodrich, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25337 (W.D. Mo. February 10, 2012).*

2255 petitioner’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective for not moving to suppress his stop is wrong; defense counsel did. United States v. Davis, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25314 (D. Kan. February 28, 2012).*

OFAC violated due process and the Fourth Amendment in its seizure of an Islamic foundation’s assets under an Executive Order without a warrant claiming the special needs exception, held not to apply. Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4025 (9th Cir. February 27, 2012):

AHIF-Oregon argues that OFAC's failure to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause violated its Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizures. "In the ordinary case, the [Supreme] Court has viewed a seizure of personal property as per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized." United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983). In most circumstances, searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are "per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Here, OFAC argues that its seizure falls within one of those well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement: the "special needs" exception.

. . .

In any event, OFAC has not given us any reason why it could not have obtained a warrant here. We hold that the "special needs" exception does not apply to the seizure of AHIF-Oregon's assets by OFAC under EO 13,224. See Kind-Hearts II, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 879-82 (holding that the "special needs" exception did not apply to very similar facts).

. . .

Most of our reasoning above, concerning the special needs exception, applies equally here. The cases in which the Court has found warrantless searches to be reasonable all involve very special circumstances and greatly diminished privacy interests—a point repeatedly emphasized by the Court. For instance, in Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154, the Court held that a person's privacy interest in the interior of an automobile's gas tank is not sufficient to overcome the government's interest in preventing drug smuggling at the border. Similarly, in Samson and Knights, the Court explained at length that probationers and parolees, who are subject to a clearly disclosed search condition of parole or probation, have greatly diminished expectations of privacy such that warrantless searches survived Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Samson, 547 U.S. at 850-52; Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-21. Here, however, as we have explained, the reach of OFAC's authority extends to all persons and entities, without limitation. Nothing diminishes the privacy expectation of persons and entities potentially subject to seizure by OFAC because that class includes everyone.

We reiterate that OFAC's interest in preventing terrorism is extremely high. But we cannot accept OFAC's contention that its blocking orders are per se reasonable in all circumstances, solely by virtue of that vital mission. As we noted above, an exception to the warrant requirement would permit OFAC to seize assets without obtaining a warrant in some situations. But, because there is no diminished expectation of privacy and because nothing prevents OFAC from obtaining a warrant in the normal course, we reject OFAC's argument that its blocking orders are per se reasonable under the "general reasonableness" approach.

In summary, no exception applies to OFAC's warrantless seizure of AHIF-Oregon's assets and the seizure is not justified under a "general reasonableness" test. We therefore hold that OFAC violated AHIF-Oregon's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizures. Because the district court did not reach the issue of remedy and because the parties did not brief that issue before us, we remand to the district court to determine, in the first instance, what remedy, if any, is available.

When the state relies on the fellow officer rule, the fellow officer has to testify to establish the cause for a stop or probable cause. State v. Bowers, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 429 (February 23, 2012), aff'g Bowers v. State, 23 So. 3d 767 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 2009), disapproving Ferrer v. State, 785 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001):

As this Court stressed in Peterson, another "unknowing" officer cannot rely on the fellow officer rule simply because the officer finds out relevant information possessed by another officer "after the fact." Peterson, 739 So. 2d at 568. Here, Officer Tracy learned of the information after he became involved in the investigation, which occurred subsequent to the challenged stop. Thus, Officer Tracy cannot testify as to information that Officer Suskovich told him as a basis for determining the validity of the initial stop.

Our ruling is consistent with our precedent and the purpose of the fellow officer rule. The fellow officer rule has been applied by this Court only to instances where the officer is testifying as to the details of a search or seizure in which the officer was a direct participant. If an officer relies on a chain of evidence to formulate his or her belief as to the existence of probable cause for a search or seizure, the rule excuses the officer from possessing personal knowledge of each link in the chain of evidence if the collective knowledge of all the officers involved supports a finding of probable cause. In short, the rule allows an officer to testify with regard to a previous link in the chain for the purpose of justifying his or her own conduct.

This Court has never applied the fellow officer rule, as the Fourth District did in Ferrer, to allow an officer who had no firsthand knowledge of the reasons for the stop and was not yet involved in the investigation to testify regarding what the initial officer told him in order to establish the validity of the initial stop. To do so would be inconsistent with the rationale and holding articulated in Peterson. Moreover, we reject the State's argument that Lara v. State, 464 So. 2d 1173, 1177 (Fla. 1985), set forth a broad rule that hearsay is always admissible in a motion to suppress hearing.

Defendant in his § 2255 failed to adequately support his claim that his defense lawyer failed to properly advise him of the quality of his Fourth Amendment claim that was waived in his guilty plea. United States v. Ferguson, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 3880, 2012 FED App. 0055P (6th Cir. February 27, 2012):

Ferguson argues that the failure of his trial counsel to advise him about the viability of his Fourth Amendment claim when pleading guilty and to preserve the right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion constitutes obviously deficient performance that is apparent on the record. Ferguson bases this argument on his assertion that his suppression challenge is meritorious and dispositive. In short, he argues that the failure of his trial counsel to appreciate the strength of Ferguson's position on the suppression issue, to preserve it for appeal, and to advise Ferguson of the possibility of entering a conditional plea, constitutes clearly deficient performance resulting in prejudice because in the absence of such alleged errors there is a reasonable probability that Ferguson would not have entered an unconditional guilty plea.

We find the record insufficiently developed to support Ferguson's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The record is devoid of information regarding the discussions Ferguson had with his counsel regarding the plea agreement. There is also scant information in the record to illuminate whether it might have been sound strategy for defense counsel to allow Ferguson to enter an unconditional plea. What the record does indicate is that defense counsel and the government negotiated a plea agreement that significantly reduced Ferguson's potential sentencing exposure. The maximum sentence for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) is ten years' imprisonment with a possible lifetime term of supervised release. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Sentencing Guidelines range recommended to the district court based on the stipulated Guideline computations for an adjusted offense level of 17 and criminal history category of I was 24 to 30 months. This range was substantially lower than the recommended Guideline range calculated in the Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"), which would have exposed Ferguson to a potential sentence of 46 to 57 months. Whether this favorable plea agreement would not have been offered to Ferguson if he had entered a conditional plea is unknown. In light of the limited record on direct appeal, we have "no way of knowing whether a seemingly unusual or misguided action by counsel had a sound strategic motive or was taken because the counsel's alternatives were even worse." Massaro, 538 U.S. at 505. Nor can we "ascertain whether the alleged error was prejudicial" without further factual development. Id. Thus, in light of the limited record regarding "the preparation of [Ferguson's] trial counsel or his communications with [Ferguson] about this ... issue," it is more appropriately raised in the first instance in post-conviction proceedings. See United States v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459, 461-62 (6th Cir. 2005).

The Maryland state troopers had probable cause to search defendant’s car, so the district court erred in concluding that the officers exceeded the scope of consent and applied the wrong standard of what is probable cause. United States v. Ortiz, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 3896 (4th Cir. February 27, 2012):

This ruling erroneously elevated the probable cause standard to one more demanding than a preponderance. Probable cause requires an officer to have a "reasonable ground for belief of guilt"—"more than bare suspicion." Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175 (emphasis added). A "reasonable ground" for belief is less demanding than a standard requiring a preponderance of the evidence for the belief. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 235; Humphries, 372 F.3d at 660 ("[T]he probable-cause standard does not require that the officer's belief be more likely true than false"). Thus, when the district court concluded that a search of the vehicle would "more likely than not" have uncovered contraband, it reached a conclusion that satisfied the probable-cause standard and authorized the Maryland State Police to search Ortiz's vehicle.

The trial court held that defendant was unlawfully stopped when he refused to stop for the officer’s flashing lights. There was no stop until defendant stopped, so the case is remanded for further fact finding. State v. Holohan, 2012 WY 23, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (February 22, 2012).

The state showed probable cause for the search warrant for defendant’s car and house in a shooting case. [Not a great amount of evidence, but enough for probable cause: matching car color, matching gun.] Robinson v. State, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 1483 (Tex. App. – Austin February 24, 2012)*:

In particular, with regard to Robinson's home and SUV, the affidavits state the following: (1) "a neighbor saw a black SUV drive away very fast" after the shooting; (2) Robinson's girlfriend "owns a small, black, SUV"; (3) an officer previously noted that Robinson kept a .38 caliber revolver in his home; (4) the bullets that were recovered from the crime scene were consistent with that of a .38 or .357 caliber revolver; and (5) the affiant's experience in criminal investigations leads him to "believe that items capable of collecting saturated blood [and other evidence], including but not limited to clothing, vehicle upholstery, carpet, [and] floor mats are located" in Robinson's home and SUV.

Marquette Law School Faculty Blog: The Resurrection of the “Trespass” Element of Fourth Amendment Law by David Behm:

Recently, in United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court ruled that the attaching of a GPS tracking device to a suspect’s car without his knowledge and monitoring of the vehicle’s movements violated the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure. See generally 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012). In so doing, the Court resurrected an idea relating to Fourth Amendment law that had been dormant for almost 50 years – the idea of common-law trespass as a test for violations of the amendment.