VoteKansas.org

A defendant who denied living in an apartment at the time of a search did not waive his reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment where he actually paid the rent. A ruse to get defendant to open the door of the apartment did not violate the Fourth Amendment. It would have if the ruse led to consent, but this one didn’t. People v. Nelson, 2012 Colo. App. LEXIS 419 (March 15, 2012).

“[W]e need not conduct the balancing test for an Article 1, Section 11 determination because the manager of the motel evicted Harper immediately upon his arrest and then gave officers permission to search the room.” Harper v. State, 2012 Ind. App. LEXIS 102 (March 15, 2012).*

Defendant consented after he was told he was free to go. His prior possession offenses made the officer “curious.” McLain v. State, 2012 Ind. App. LEXIS 106 (March 16, 2012).*

Police with information that a suicidal person is driving to a location to kill himself can stop the car. State v. Dunn, 2012 Ohio 1008, 2012 Ohio LEXIS 688 (March 15, 2012):

[*P22] Thus, we hold that the community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows police officers to stop a person to render aid if they reasonably believe that there is an immediate need for their assistance to protect life or prevent serious injury.

[*P23] In this case, officers received a dispatch regarding an allegedly armed and suicidal person with an imminent plan to kill himself upon reaching a certain destination. Given that stopping a person on the street is "considerably less intrusive than police entry into the home itself, Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001), the officers' effecting a traffic stop to prevent Dunn from harming himself was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the community-caretaking/emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows police officers to stop a driver based on a dispatch that the driver is armed and plans to kill himself.

Defendant fled at high speed across city boundaries from Cleveland to Lakewood City, and officers from the latter actually arrested him. Jurisdictional limits on police officers are irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes. United States v. King, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5407, 2012 FED App. 0270N (6th Cir. March 12, 2012).

A drug dog was called at the conclusion of the traffic stop, and it took 50 minutes to arrive. Since there was reasonable suspicion, this did not unreasonably extend the stop. Federal cases have permitted such detentions for longer. United States v. Adams, 2012 CCA LEXIS 87 (N.-M. Ct. App. March 15, 2012).*

Pro se defendant didn’t file a motion to suppress, so he couldn’t challenge the search on appeal. State v. Henderson, 2012 Ohio 1040, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 930 (8th Dist. March 15, 2012).

Buccal swab for DNA requires a court order if defendant doesn’t consent. People v Smith, 2012 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1983, 2012 NY Slip Op 1896 (4th Dept. March 16, 2012):

An order compelling an individual to provide corporeal evidence, such as blood or saliva for DNA analysis, constitutes a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment (see Skinner v Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 618; Schmerber v California, 384 U.S. 757, 767; Matter of Abe A., 56 NY2d 288, 295). Although no New York statute expressly authorizes courts to compel uncharged suspects to supply a DNA sample (see Abe A., 56 NY2d at 293-294; cf. CPL 240.40 [2]), the Court of Appeals has held that a court may issue an order to obtain a blood sample from a suspect so long as the People establish: "(1) probable cause to believe the suspect has committed the crime, (2) a clear indication' that relevant material evidence will be found, and (3) the method used to secure it is safe and reliable. In addition, the issuing court must weigh the seriousness of the crime, the importance of the evidence to the investigation and the unavailability of less intrusive means of obtaining it, on the one hand, against concern for the suspect's constitutional right to be free from bodily intrusion on the other. Only if this stringent standard is met ... may the intrusion be sustained" (Abe A., 56 NY2d at 291). Here, the court determined that the People satisfied the requirements of Abe A. set forth above, and defendant does not expressly challenge that determination. Rather, defendant contends that (1) he was denied due process because the second order compelling defendant to provide a buccal swab was not made upon notice to him; and (2) the method of collecting the swab, i.e., the use of the taser, was excessive and objectively unreasonable. We agree with defendant on both counts, and thus that reversal is required.

Placing a GPS on defendant’s car to track him for 26 days violated defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy and required a search warrant under Jones and relying on its lower court decision in Maynard. State v. Zahn, 2012 SD 19, 2012 S.D. LEXIS 19 (March 14, 2012):

[*P22] In this case, the State argues that Zahn could not have had a subjective expectation of privacy in his movements because he voluntarily exposed his movements to the public. We disagree. While a reasonable person understands that his movements on a single journey are conveyed to the public, he expects that those individual movements will remain "disconnected and anonymous." Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 (citation omitted). Indeed, the likelihood that another person would observe the whole of Zahn's movements for nearly a month "is not just remote, it is essentially nil." Id. at 560. The prolonged use of a GPS device in this case enabled officers to determine Zahn's speed, time, direction, and geographic location within five to ten feet at any time. It also enabled officers to use the sum of the recorded information to discover patterns in the whole of Zahn's movements for twenty-six days. The prolonged GPS surveillance of Zahn's vehicle revealed more than just the movements of the vehicle on public roads; it revealed an intimate picture of Zahn's life and habits. We thus believe that Zahn had a subjective expectation of privacy in the whole of his movements. This subjective expectation of privacy was not defeated because Zahn's individual movements were exposed to the public.

. . .

[*P31] We thus hold that the attachment and use of a GPS device to monitor an individual's activities over an extended period of time requires a search warrant. Because the unfettered use of surveillance technology could fundamentally alter the relationship between our government and its citizens, we require oversight by a neutral magistrate. Wright, 2010 S.D. 91, ¶ 9, 791 N.W.2d at 794 (quoting Thunder, 2010 S.D. 3, ¶ 13, 777 N.W.2d at 378). Thus, the warrantless attachment and use of the GPS device to monitor Zahn's activities for nearly a month was unlawful, and the evidence obtained through the use of the GPS device should be suppressed.

[*P32] By our holding today, we do not deny police the ability to use this valuable law enforcement tool. We recognize that police must be allowed to use developing technology in the "often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Sweedland, 2006 S.D. 77, ¶ 22, 721 N.W.2d at 415 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2333, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)). The Fourth Amendment "cannot sensibly be read to mean that police [should] be no more efficient in the twenty-first century than they were in the eighteenth" century. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 883 (2007). But police must obtain a warrant before they attach and use a GPS device to monitor an individual's activities over an extended period of time.

While inventory does not permit forcing open locked compartments in a car, the finding of ammunition in this car justified a further search for a gun. That was inevitable discovery. Essentially, where there's ammunition there's probably a gun. United States v. McCullum, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5584 (4th Cir. March 15, 2012) (unpublished):

Although the policy did not permit officers to force open a locked glove compartment during an inventory search, the ammunition discovered in the trunk would have provided probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle for the gun associated with the seized ammunition. See Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 260-62 (1982) (explaining that evidence seized during an inventory search of a vehicle can provide probable cause to search elsewhere in the vehicle for additional contraband). The scope of that warrantless search would have included "every part of the vehicle and its contents that may [have] conceal[ed] the object of the search." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). Because a glove box can conceal a gun, the glove box of the Cadillac was obviously within the scope of the warrantless probable cause search. The fact that the glove box was locked would not prevent us from upholding the lawfulness of its search. "[I]f the police have probable cause to believe that there is contraband . . . anywhere in the car they can search for it even if it is in a ... locked compartment such as the glove compartment ...." United States v. Mazzone, 782 F.2d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Ross, 456 U.S. at 823 ("The scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no narrower ... than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause."). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of the motion to suppress because the marijuana, the clip of ammunition, and the gun would have been inevitably discovered.

A consent to search for firearms includes checking clothing hanging in a closet. The consent was obtained for a parole search. United States v. Anderson, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5506 (8th Cir. March 16, 2012)*:

Even assuming a reasonable officer would have interpreted the consent as limited in scope to a search for firearms, the search was within the scope of such consent. United States v. Dinwiddie, 618 F.3d 821, 831 (8th Cir. 2010) ("The scope of consent for a search is limited to what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the investigating officer and the person to be searched."). Firearms easily could be located in clothing hanging in a closet, particularly in outerwear such as a coat, jacket, or vest, and most particularly in a blaze orange hunting vest. See United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d 861, 867 (8th Cir. 2010) ("The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object ..."). Further, the testimony supports the conclusion that the searching officer identified the ammunition without delving into spaces, pockets, or containers smaller than might hold a firearm.

NYPost.com: Law office of accused madam's upstate neighbor raided by cops by Jeane MacIntosh, Laura Italiano and Antonio Antenucci:

The probe of accused madam Anna Gristina widened today as cops descended on the downtown offices of a criminal defense lawyer who is her upstate neighbor — and the registered agent for Gristina's pig rescue farm house.

The lawyer, David Jaroslawicz, confirmed this afternoon that several cops were in his office at 225 Broadway, going through files.

Asked what they were looking for, he said, "I have no idea."

Prosecutors have claimed that Gristina had a "lawyer friend" who helped her invest and launder her money.

Law office searches are scary for both the target and the police because they're so easy to screw up. If you're a law enforcement officer reading this, get a special master involved ASAP, preferably before the search or at least before records are reviewed. In this case, the key is the fourth paragraph referring to money laundering. Lawyers are not immune from searches for money laundering. Clients, however, have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their lawyer's files and they have every right to challenge the PC and the execution.

When the officer approached this stopped vehicle, he smelled marijuana. When defendant was ordered out of the car, the officer saw hollowed out blunts and loose tobacco which told him that the blunts were to be packed with marijuana. That justified a search of the trunk because that’s a place marijuana could be kept. State v. Morris, 2011 S.C. App. LEXIS 419 (November 2, 2011), substituted for opinion filed August 17, 2011.

The defendant juvenile’s car was stopped because of the pointing of a rifle at a law enforcement officer. The police used a dog to sniff the trunk to see if a person was hiding there, but they stopped because the dog was distracted. Finally, they just opened the trunk as “SOP.” There were no exigent circumstances justifying a search of the trunk under New Mexico law. The search of the trunk also failed as a “protective sweep” looking for a person, but the evidence did not support that either. State v. Leticia T., 2012 N.M. App. LEXIS 12 (March 13, 2012).*

One officer was writing a traffic ticket for the defendant when another officer asked for consent to search the car. Since the request did not extend the stop any, it was valid. State v. Nims, 2012 Ore. App. LEXIS 266 (March 14, 2012).* [Oregon website has no March cases posted yet.]

Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense, and he had a bandana with a marijuana leaf design hanging from the mirror. The officer asked for consent to search his person and then called for back up. He then asked for consent to search the car. The court holds there is no right under state law to have the Fourth Amendment read more broadly to require that juveniles get a warning of a right to refuse a search of a car. State v. Carlos A., 2012 N.M. App. LEXIS 13 (March 13, 2012).*

Police stopped behind defendant’s car which was double parked in front of a garage at 3 a.m. They had a CI’s report, and the car matched a radio call of it being involved in an incident. The occupant made a furtive movement toward the floor. On the totality, they had reasonable suspicion. United States v. Parker, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5509 (3d Cir. March 16, 2012) (unpublished).*

Defendant failed to show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room of another that was searched. He was neither the renter nor the additional guest, but he had a key. It was not shown that the key was to that room. “In any event, as he concedes, possession of a key to a hotel room, without more, does not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. Cooper, 203 F.3d at 1286 n.7 (citing United States v. Conway, 73 F.3d 975, 980 (10th Cir. 1995)). Nor did Bushay prove that the vehicle he was operating was a vehicle that was ‘registered’ for room 308.” He was not an overnight guest, and he lacked standing to contest a search that produced a gun associated with him. United States v. Bushay, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33653 (N.D. Ga. January 24, 2012).*

The warrant application specified a car and the residence as the target of the search. The warrant, however, did not mention the car. Since warrants for houses include vehicles parked on the curtilage, the car could be searched. State v. Washington, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 322 (La. App. 5th Cir. March 13, 2012):

Although the affidavit on which the warrant was based refers several times specifically to the Monte Carlo, the warrant itself does not refer to any vehicles. However, a warrant authorizing the search of a particularly described premises permits the search of a vehicle located on the premises targeted for the search and subject to the authority of the warrant. State v. Smith, 02-1842, p. 1 (La. 9/20/02), 827 So. 2d 1122, 1123 (per curiam); State v. Carter, 10-973, p. 8 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/30/11), 75 So.3d 1, 5. The rationale behind this holding is that the vehicle is capable of concealing the sought-after contraband. Id. Accordingly, the search of defendant's vehicle was valid pursuant to the warrant since it was parked in front of the residence which was the target of the search and which was particularly described in the warrant. This assignment of error is without merit.

Defendant’s traffic stop was unlawful and was suppressed. Information from that stop ended up in a search warrant application. Excising it, the remainder still showed probable cause. Defendant had been under investigation for quite sometime and a lot of information had been developed. State v. Williams, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 328 (La. App. 2d Cir. March 14, 2012).*

The CI’s tip of a group smoking marijuana was corroborated by plain smell on the officer’s arrival, providing reasonable suspicion. State v. Pineda, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 324 (La. App. 5th Cir. March 13, 2012).*

Seeing a firearm on defendant’s person justified a patdown. While Florida is a concealed carry state, the officer does not have to exclude the possibility of a permit before the frisk. Mackey v. State, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 4063 (Fla. 3d DCA March 14, 2012):

Mackey contends the arresting officer had no reasonable suspicion to detain him for carrying a concealed firearm. He begins by noting that it is generally not illegal to possess a firearm in Florida. Mackey then argues in his brief, relying again upon Regalado, that "since, under Florida law, carrying a concealed firearm is illegal only if the individual does not have a permit and since the officer had no information suggesting that defendant did not have a permit, the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him for carrying a concealed firearm." Whether, as a general proposition, mere possession of a firearm is not illegal in Florida, it is beside the point. Mackey was not observed in mere possession of a firearm; rather, he was observed in possession of a concealed firearm, and the officer testified that he observed a "piece of the handle sticking out" of Mackey's pocket, enabling the officer to identify it as a firearm. It is the concealment of the firearm, not merely its possession, which rendered Mackey's conduct illegal, and authorized the officer's actions in this case. Moreover, Mackey's argument necessarily overlooks the difference between an essential element of the crime and an exception, or affirmative defense, to the crime.

O'Reilly Factor: Drug testing for unemployment benefits? Transcript:

O'REILLY: "Kelly File" segment tonight. Two very hot topics, a call for the U.N. to investigate U.S. voting laws. What?

But first, the Arizona Senate approves a measure requiring a drug test for anyone applying for unemployment benefits in that state. Here now, attorney and Fox News anchor, Megyn Kelly. All right so tell me about Arizona. What do they want?

MEGYN KELLY, FOX NEWS ANCHOR: So they want to test unemployment recipients for drug use.

O'REILLY: Why?

KELLY: But they only want to test those whom they have a reasonable suspicion about, if they have reasonable cause to believe you might be on drugs. And if you got arrested…

In a search warrant for “guns, drugs, and ammunition,” officers searched a box and opened folded papers finding child pornography. This was valid as a plain view because the officers have the authority to look in folder papers for drugs. United States v. McManaman, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5341 (8th Cir. March 14, 2012):

Under a warrant to search McManaman's home for guns, drugs, and ammunition, officers would have had the authority to search in any closet, container, or other closed compartment in the building large enough to contain the possible contraband. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982). We have applied the plain view doctrine in similar circumstances where a search warrant "authorized the police to seize, among other things, drugs and drug paraphernalia, either of which could have been stored in a box in a closet. The police were, therefore, acting within the scope of the warrant when they opened the box containing [incriminating] photos." United States v. Evans, 966 F.2d 398, 400 (8th Cir. 1992). Even if the pictures in the present case were folded up in the box, it seems reasonable to conclude, as the magistrate judge did, that "officers would have had reason to unfold the documents to determine whether they contained drugs, which often are contained within folded pieces of paper." United States v. McManaman, No. CR10-4024-MWB, 2010 WL 3717288 at *7 n.2 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 15, 2010).

The officers came across the photographs and the videotape with McManaman's step-daughter's name on it within the scope of a search that would have been proper had they obtained a search warrant. Because the incriminating nature of this evidence was immediately apparent to the officers, they were entitled to seize it under the plain view doctrine. Therefore the district court did not err in denying McManaman's motion to suppress because of the inevitable discovery doctrine.

The CIs gave detailed information that indicated a pattern of drug dealing from defendant’s house, and that was probable cause and overcame staleness. The district court did not err in denying a hearing on the motion to suppress where the motion only presented questions of law on PC, nexus, staleness, and good faith exception. United States v. Lawson, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5374, 2012 FED App. 0278N (6th Cir. March 13, 2012):

Lawson's motion, contending that the warrant was based on stale information insufficient to amount to probable cause, set forth purely legal questions. As in Abboud, Lawson "argued that the facts were insufficient to support probable cause" and that there was insufficient corroboration, both of which "contest[] a legal conclusion." 438 F.3d at 577. Similarly, he "argued that the probable cause was stale[, which] too was a challenge to a legal conclusion." Id. Finally, Lawson challenged Leon's applicability to the case, which is also a pure legal question. The issues before that court at the time of its denial were all purely legal questions and, therefore, we do not find that the district court abused its discretion in denying Lawson's request.

Three people trying to tow away a vehicle without proper towing gear was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Boone, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33915 (W.D. N.C. February 1, 2012).*

New Haven Register: Bill would let Connecticut towns seek search warrants to inspect properties by Jordan Fenster:

A bill up for legislative review would grant municipalities the right to seek a search warrant if zoning officials believe there has been an ordinance violation.

The pending legislation, requested by state Rep. Susan Johnson, D-Windham, is the result of a state Supreme Court ruling that affirmed the right of citizens to, in the words of the court’s decision, “be free from unreasonable searches.”

In the case of the town of Bozrah v. Anne D. Chmurynski, town zoning official Thomas Weber had been asked to examine private property because, according to the court record, “he intended to inspect the property for ‘junk.’”

And the beat goes on:

GPB News: Welfare Drug Testing Bill Revised by Jeanne Bonner:

Georgia lawmakers are revising a bill that opponents say is almost certain to land in federal court. It would require welfare recipients to take a drug test before receiving benefits. Its sponsor says the measure would save taxpayers money but others say it’s unconstitutional.

Sen. John Albers, a Roswell Republican, is the bill’s sponsor. He modeled it on a Florida law, now blocked by a federal judge because it violates the Fourth Amendment’s protection from unlawful search.

When these clowns pass such bills, they just make money for the plaintiffs' civil rights bar that files the case in attorneys fees. They are clueless.

Inventory policy that allows the vehicle to go with somebody “immediately available,” not otherwise defined, does not require the police to allow somebody to be called and the police wait for that person to show up. The person essentially has to be there already. If the inventory is conducted in “good faith,” that’s enough. United States v. Reyes-Vencomo, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34141 (D. N.M. February 13, 2012):

The officers initiated the search in compliance with standardized police procedures and the requirement that the officers make a post-search notation regarding the decision to search adds little to the protections that the Fourth Amendment and Supreme Court precedent seeks to impose. The Fourth Amendment is satisfied so long as an officer conducts an inventory search in good faith. See United States v. Battle, 370 F.App'x at 430 (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374). Holfelder and Ortega conducted an orderly inventory search, documenting and photographing the items in the vehicle as they went, and were not "general[ly] rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence." United States v. Martinez, 512 F.3d at 1274. Holfelder explained that he understood the policy's purpose to be to protect the department and the driver's property, and nothing indicates that he was acting in bad faith. See United States v. Maraga, 76 F.App'x at 228 ("An impoundment must either be supported by probable cause, or be consistent with the police role as 'caretaker' of the streets and completely unrelated to an ongoing criminal investigation."); United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d at 636 ("When the police acquire temporary custody of a vehicle, a warrantless inventory search of the vehicle does not offend Fourth Amendment principles so long as the search is made pursuant to 'standard police procedures' and for the purpose of 'protecting the car and its contents.'"). Failing to make a notation in the police report regarding the tow decision was a minor deviation from procedure, and an understandable one given the circumstances, and does not render the inventory search invalid.

[I had to go read these cases on good faith, and both appear to just be throw-away lines as to what the government's burden of proof is:

Battle: "Rather, he acted in good faith as he undertook to identify, secure and protect valuable property."

Bertine: "We conclude that here, as in Lafayette, reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different procedure."

So, don't see there being a "good faith exception" to inventory searches. Good faith inventory and not a rummaging is something that the government has to prove in every case.]

Attenuation was found with a two hour delay, (unnecessary) Miranda warnings, defendant counseling with his father on his cell phone who told him not to cooperate, and finally thinking about his predicament for at least an hour. United States v. Conrad, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5285 (7th Cir. March 14, 2012)*:

If ordered, suppression of unconstitutionally obtained evidence can permit "[t]he criminal ... to go free because the constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.). Given a blunder that the Government does not dispute here, Defendant David Conrad argues that the district court should have suppressed all the evidence of child pornography that was recovered following an illegal entry into his father's home. As we explain below, however, the district court correctly denied exclusion of evidence obtained from Mr. Conrad's own home—an hour's drive away from the home that had been illegally entered and which Mr. Conrad authorized the Government to search. That evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the original illegal entry so as to have been purged of the unconstitutional taint.

. . .

Consistent with existing precedent, the district court identified intervening circumstances that favored attenuation: Mr. Conrad's repeated consents to search and his waiver of Miranda rights (which law enforcement was not even required to give because he was not in custody), about two hours after the underlying constitutional violation and in a completely different location. As for the different location, we note that in contrast to cases where no attenuation was found after the defendant was taken, for example, to a police station, e.g., Taylor, 457 U.S. 687, here Mr. Conrad volunteered to go from his family home, a location where, according to the unchallenged findings of the district court, he "was undoubtedly comfortable," Conrad, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1037, to a location that was as yet unknown to the agents, the Chicago Apartment. He was likely as or more comfortable there, and thus in a better position to decide whether to stand on his constitutional rights there. Furthermore, because the Chicago Apartment was independently protected under the Fourth Amendment, extending the scope of the exclusion would have little additional deterrent effect. Cf. Harris, 495 U.S. at 20 ("Even though we decline to suppress statements made outside the home following a Payton violation, the principal incentive to obey Payton still obtains: the police know that a warrantless entry will lead to the suppression of any evidence found, or statements taken, inside the home. If we did suppress statements like Harris', moreover, the incremental deterrent value would be minimal.").

Although the district court did not explicitly rely on it for this second factor, we also attach particular significance to another, rather unusual, circumstance. Mr. Conrad not only could use his cell phone to obtain advice about his predicament, but he actually did—and was, as the district court found, specifically told by his father "not to talk to the officers." Conrad, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1025. While he suggests that his decision to ignore that advice was in recognition that he had already confessed to so much that he had no choice but to continue, the district court found, and he does not contest, that his statements were voluntary. Id. at 1036-37. The voluntariness of his statements—made despite superfluous Miranda warnings, a specific warning from his father, and after an hour to think in the car and twenty minutes to think while tending to his cats and showing off music equipment—help establish that his conduct at the Chicago Apartment was "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963) (footnote omitted).

Officer’s waiting for backup to arrive before doing frisk of occupants of the car was not a separate seizure requiring a new analysis of reasonable suspicion. United States v. Boone, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33914 (W.D. N.C. March 8, 2012).

This started as a motorist assist and ended up as a warning ticket. The whole thing took nine minutes, which was not unreasonably long. As defendant was leaving, the officer asked if he could ask some additional questions, and that led to a valid consent. The granting of the motion to suppress was reversed. People v. Kats, 2012 Ill. App. LEXIS 158, 2012 IL App (3d) 100683 (March 9, 2012).*

“The 911 hang-up call, combined with the lack of answer on the return and Defendant's overtly aggressive and hostile behavior and refusal to answer basic questions, provided a reasonable basis for the officers to conduct a protective sweep of the house to ensure that no one inside was in need of immediate help. While Defendant had a right to respond as he did, this nevertheless did not dispel the officers' concern for the safety of the occupants.” United States v. Obbanya, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33627 (N.D. Cal. March 13, 2012).*