VoteKansas.org

Defendant’s stop was justified for reasonable suspicion, and that is all the standard is; not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Turrentine, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28511 (W.D. Okla. March 5, 2012)*:

While the defendant's evidence might well be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant committed the traffic violation, that is not the standard here. For present purposes, the question is whether the government has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation occurred, hence justifying the trooper's action. The court concludes it has. Trooper Painter testified that he observed the violation and the court found his testimony to be generally credible. Defendant's suggestion that the trooper's smile shown on the video is inconsistent with observing a traffic violation is speculative and ultimately unpersuasive.

Changing information from the CI served to enhance his credibility. The CI was believable and supported the stop, as did only the information that the police knew. United States v. Pete, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4501 (3d Cir. March 5, 2012) (unpublished).*

Gizmodo: Police Drone Crashes into Police:

The Montgomery County (Texas) Sheriff's Office had a big day planned. After becoming the first department in the country with its own aerial drone ($300,000!), they were ready for a nice photo op. And then the drone crashed into a SWAT team.

. . .

Not only did the drone fail [at 18' altitude], and not only did it crash, it literally crashed into the police. It's no wonder we're not able to find a video of this spectacular publicity failure. Luckily, the SWAT boys were safe in their Bearcat.

This would be a fine one-off blooper story if it weren't for some upsetting implications. This is exactly why we have reason to raise multiple eyebrows at Congress, which wants to allow hundreds of similar drones to fly over US airspace. These drones are still a relatively young technology, relatively unproven, and relatively crash-prone. The odds of being hit by one are low, of course, but should a Texas-style UAV plummet ever happen in, say, a dense urban area, nobody would be laughing. Not all of us are driving around in Bearcats. [Examiner]

Defendant used a buddy’s work computer to do internet searches on “how to kill a baby, how to have a miscarriage, and how to find a missing person.” He was told before the search that the company could see it. The computer was password protected but the search history was available to IT. He was convicted of arranging the murder a 14 year old he impregnated. He had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the internet search history after the computer was turned over the police after the murder. State v. Robinson, 2012 Kan. LEXIS 149 (March 2, 2012). [The court did not have to go this far to show a lack of REP in the search history. It was somebody else's computer, and he assumed the risk it would be found and turned over to the police. That's all it had to say.]

An officer approached a van parked too long in a McDonald’s parking lot and he saw the occupants “moving frantically as if they were trying to hide something or retrieve something.” He yelled, “‘Show me your hands,’ and moved toward the front of the van; neither individual complied.” He pulled his gun, and ordered them from the vehicle and then searched for a weapon. This did not constitute an arrest, and was for officer safety. State v. Walker, 2012 Ohio 847, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 739 (2d Dist. March 2, 2012).*

The fact that defendant was a little slow in responding to an officer’s command to put his hands on the steering wheel does not justify a protective weapons search of the car. The officer first called him "reluctant," then qualified it. In addition, the government used every innocuous fact to attempt to show reasonable suspicion and came up short [damaging its credibility in the meantime; like a lawnmower and weedeater in the trunk must have meant the defendant was trading for drugs]. United States v. James, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28355 (E.D. N.C. January 19, 2012).*

Trash pulls and a records check of the resident showing a drug history was probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for drugs in the house. State v. Mooney, 2012 Ohio 852; 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 745 (5th Dist. February 23, 2012).*

Police responded to a shooting call and asked for permission to look in defendant’s house to see if anyone was shot. Defendant let them in. The officer could see marijuana and scales in plain view in the kitchen and, through a floor heating vent, he saw marijuana in baggies. The officer removed the vent grill and pulled out what he could. Then he went to the basement to get the rest by removing the ductwork. All this was reasonable. State v. Smith, 2012 Ohio 845, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 737 (2d Dist. March 2, 2012).*

Based on a CI’s tip, the details of which had panned out completely, as soon as defendant was stopped, the officer reached for the center console and found a gun where the CI said it would be. Also, there was cocaine there. Defendant was not secured at the time it happened, and it “cleanly” fit within the Michigan v. Long protective weapons search exception. United States v. Ware, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4425, 2012 FED App. 0244N (6th Cir. March 1, 2012) (unpublished).

It was a reasonable condition of supervised release in a child pornography case to submit to searches of any computers or devices which may access the internet. United States v. Grigsby, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4423 (9th Cir. February 27, 2012) (unpublished)*:

The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a condition of supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) requiring that Grigsby submit to searches and seizures of computers and related devices. "Subjecting computers and other devices able to access the Internet to monitoring, search and seizure is critical to preventing [Grigsby] from viewing or obtaining child pornography." United States v. Goddard, 537 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008). This condition of supervised release is sufficiently narrow because it applies only to those devices connected to the Internet. See United States v. Quinzon, 643 F.3d 1266, 1272-74 (9th Cir. 2011) (analyzing an identically-worded condition of supervised release).

Volokh: Are Historical Cell-Site Data Protected Under the Fourth Amendment After United States v. Jones? by Orin Kerr:

No, concludes Judge Bennett in United States v. Graham (District of Maryland, March 1, 2012). Judge Bennett concludes that historical cell-site records are not protected because they fall under the third-party doctrine: ...

[posted here, too].

“This is an appeal asking that we overrule State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992), and hold that the Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to violations of Article I, section 17, of the Idaho Constitution. Because the State has not shown any ground for doing so, we decline to overrule that case and affirm the order of the district court suppressing evidence obtained incident to an arrest pursuant to a wrongly issued warrant.” Considering state case law, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule in State v Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927), and the good faith exception was not adopted in Guzman. State v. Koivu, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 54 (March 1, 2012).

Officers responded to an alleged burglary call, but they found that a tenant was removing stuff, and there was no burglary. Defendant asked to get a cigarette, and the officer said no because of “officer safety,” but she reached into her purse and pulled out a cigarette pack which the officer took away from her and laid it down for. After awhile the officer looked in the cigarette pack and found a glass pipe, so he then searched her purse. The search of the cigarette package could not be justified for officer safety which, the officer said, was based on his experience with prostitutes and drug addicts having sharp objects in there, which this case wasn’t. Also, his casual after-the-fact search of the cigarette package belied the “officer safety” rationale. Finally, the state’s failure to raise an expectation of privacy argument in the trial court is a waiver on appeal [not that it would have worked anyway]. State v. Johnson, 2012 Kan. LEXIS 148 (March 2, 2012).

Officers approached an already parked car, and they did not need reasonable suspicion to do that. When defendant got out of the car and reached for his pocket, officers were justified in a patdown because of information from an informant. State v. Ray, 2012 Ohio 840, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 733 (2d Dist. March 2, 2012).*

Plaintiff was “confined” when she was strip and body cavity searched, so the state one year limitations applied, and this suit was not timely. Bing v. Haywood, 2012 Va. LEXIS 40 (March 2, 2012).*

There was actual authority to consent to a search by the consent, although she did not have a working key to the front door, she did to the back. Alternatively, the court finds that it was reasonable for officers to believe in her apparent authority to consent. Finally, even if the information derived from that entry were excised from the application for the search warrant, there still would be probable cause for issuance. United States v. Taitano, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27489 (D. Guam February 17, 2012).*

Defendant’s guilty plea waived his illegal search claim, so defense counsel was not shown to be ineffective for not challenging the search before the guilty plea. Schniepp v. State, 2012 Ark. 94, 2012 Ark. LEXIS 108 (March 1, 2012).*

Neither defendant had standing to challenge the search of the car: the passenger because he was a passenger and the driver showing no connection to having it with permission of the owner. They did have standing to challenge the stop, and there was cause for the stop for wandering within a lane. United States v. Perez-Guerrero, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27365 (D. Kan. March 2, 2012).*

A dog alert on a car justifies a search of the trunk. A new Fourth Amendment issue raised in a reply brief is waived. United States v. Greene, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4407 (4th Cir. February 29, 2012) (unpublished):

Greene's second argument — that the search of the trunk was outside the scope of a warrantless search — is likewise meritless. See Kelly, 592 F.3d at 589-90 ("The scope of a search pursuant to [the automobile] exception is as broad as a magistrate could authorize. Thus, once police have probable cause, they may search 'every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.'") (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (citation omitted)).

Information from Medivac crew was sufficient to provide probable cause defendant was under the influence when he was taken to the hospital after a wreck. Crowe v. State, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 227 (March 2, 2012).*

A Wii stolen in a burglary had the victim’s Netflix account, and the police were able to track the Netflix use back to defendant’s IP address. That was sufficient nexus for a search warrant for the premises, and it also was not stale. United States v. Medel, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27410 (C.D. Cal. February 29, 2012).*

The protective sweep here was legal. But, even if it wasn’t, the person consenting didn’t know about it, so the consent was tainted by the sweep. United States v. Gomez-Rivero, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26867 (N.D. Ga. January 20, 2012).*

As a mere passenger, defendant had no standing to challenge the inventory search of the car. State v. Parker, 2012 Ohio 839, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 730 (2d Dist. March 2, 2012).*

Officers saw a van parked in an industrial area around noon on Sunday, and they approached because that was unusual. Defendant would not roll down the window and reached under the seat, and that justified a protective search of where he was reaching. State v. Rose, 2012 Iowa App. LEXIS 167 (February 29, 2012).*

Defendants failed to show a connection to the car they were driving, so they did not have standing to challenge the search. They did, however, have standing to challenge their stop. The stop, however, was justified by crossing the fog line three times in a couple of miles. United States v. Perez-Guerrero, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27365 (D. Kan. March 2, 2012).*

In this circuit the good faith exception in considered first, and the affidavit for the warrant is not so lacking in probable cause that the good faith exception would not apply. United States v. Oldaker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25788 (N.D. W.Va. February 16, 2012).*

The patdown down was reasonable based on the strong smell of marijuana coming from defendant’s department. The feel of a baggy in the pocket was plain feel. State v. Banks, 2012 Iowa App. LEXIS 173 (February 29, 2012):

At the suppression hearing, Officer Younie testified he felt the crunch or crinkle of plastic in Banks's front pants pocket. Based on his experience he knew marijuana is routinely packaged in plastic baggies. He smelled the odor of burnt marijuana, and therefore, he opined the item in Banks's pocket was packaged marijuana. Officer Younie acknowledged that it was possible the baggie may have contained something other than marijuana, but as stated above, absolute certainty is not required. In addition, in his police report Officer Younie stated that he felt something in the pocket during the pat-down and that it felt like a plastic bag with a soft substance inside. We believe this evidence provided Officer Younie with probable cause to believe the item he felt in Banks's pocket was contraband, justifying his seizure of the item during the Terry pat-down.

Defendant was stopped for his license plate being out near his house, and a bag of marijuana was in plain view between his feet. Defendant asked if he could put his dog in the house, and the officer let him, and the officer could see a small quantity of marijuana and a grinder in the living room. There was no reason to believe anyone else was inside, and the entry for a protective sweep was unreasonable. State v. Alihassan, 2012 Ohio 825, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 718 (10th Dist. March 1, 2012):

[*P22] We disagree with the state's contentions. There was no evidence presented that the marijuana and grinder were in danger of destruction or removal. Although Leighty testified he knew there had been prior disturbance calls to the apartment regarding appellant and his girlfriend, he never said that he believed appellant's girlfriend lived at the apartment, and he admitted that people can have domestic disturbances when they do not live together. Leighty also admitted he heard no voices coming from inside the apartment, the television was not on, and there were no indications that a person was in the apartment. Although Leighty first testified that he heard no noises coming from inside the apartment, he later said he heard "noises" inside, and the noises were from an aquarium. Importantly, Leighty never testified that he believed the noises were made by people inside the apartment.

[*P23] With no evidence of any third parties present in the apartment, there was no risk of destruction of the evidence. Although, conceivably, the dog could have ingested the small amount of marijuana on the table, the grinder would not have been easily destroyed. ...

[I resisted the temptation.]

Defendant was stopped for having a headlight out and was given a warning. Immediately after he was told he was free to leave, the officer went into asking whether he had any drugs, firearms or knives on him. In the meantime, a second officer showed up to observe. The consent to search his person was a mere submission to authority at that point. State v. Dieckhoner, 2012 Ohio 805, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 699 (8th Dist. March 1, 2012):

[*P22] We find no legal distinction between Robinette and the case before this court. Just as the Ohio Supreme Court was in Robinette, we are also troubled by the timing of Comerford's immediate transition from giving Dieckhoner the warning for the improperly working headlight to questioning him about contraband and then requesting to search his person.

[*P23] Comerford gave Dieckhoner a verbal warning for the improperly working headlight and told Dieckhoner that "he was all set and to have a good night." As Dieckhoner turned to walk toward his car, Comerford then asked, "[b]y the way, do you have anything illegal; guns, knives, bombs, anything[?]" Unlike the facts in Robinette, there was no departmental or "drug interdiction policy" that required Comerford to question Dieckhoner about weapons or drugs. With the second officer standing five feet away, Dieckhoner denied having any contraband. Comerford immediately asked for consent to search him and Dieckhoner agreed.

[*P24] Comerford testified that he asks everyone he stops if they have any weapons, drugs, or guns on their person, and that he had no particular reason for asking Dieckhoner to search his person. In fact, Comerford testified that Dieckhoner was not acting suspicious in any way and that Dieckhoner was free to leave.

[*P25] Although Detective Leanza testified that Dieckhoner stated he consented to the search because he did not think Comerford would find the drugs in his pocket, the test for whether consent was voluntary depends on the totality of the circumstances at the time consent was given. Dieckhoner's reasoning for consenting to the search given after being arrested and to another law enforcement officer while in police custody does not withstand the State's burden of clearly demonstrating that Dieckhoner's consent was voluntary.

[*P26] After considering the totality of circumstances in the instant case, including Comerford's testimony that Dieckhoner appeared calm, the seamless transition between the detention and the request for consent, the fact that Comerford had no reasonable suspicion that Dieckhoner was involved or engaging in criminal activity, and the presence of another uniformed police officer, this court finds there was a sufficient show of authority such that Dieckhoner would not believe at the time that he was free to get in his car and drive away. Under these circumstances, any reasonable person would have felt compelled to submit to the officer's search, rather than consenting as a voluntary act of free will. See Robinette at 244-245.

The officer lacked reasonable suspicion for a stop in a high crime area, but the officer then saw that the license for the vehicle was expired. When defendant was stopped, he made furtive movements under the dashboard, and that justified the officer handcuffing him when defendant was removed from the vehicle. This was still not an arrest. State v. Walker, 2012 Ohio 847, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 739 (2d Dist. March 2, 2012):

{¶ 25} Considering the totality of the circumstances, the detective's actions of drawing his gun and handcuffing Walker did not constitute an arrest. Given Walker's frantic movements below the dashboard upon being stopped by the police, his failure to comply when ordered to show his hands, and their location in a high crime area, House took reasonable actions to ensure his safety while initiating an investigatory detention.

Officers responded to a shooting call at defendant’s premises, and a cursory review of the premises revealed bags of marijuana. Even opening a closet door was not unreasonable. State v. Smith, 2012 Ohio 845, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 737 (2d Dist. March 2, 2012).*

A bar had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the public area of its establishment under Barlow’s. “Even if, as Dodge City argues, it had a subjective reasonable expectation of privacy to exclude persons under 21 years old, which it did not, Dodge City lost that interest when it voluntarily admitted [the minor] onto the premises.” Dodge City Saloon, Inc. v. Liquor Control Bd., 2012 Wash. App. LEXIS 386 (February 28, 2012). [Update: The Washington courts website has not worked in four days.]

Just because a judge denies a motion to suppress does not mean that the judge is biased against the defendant. United States v. Harris, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26578 (W.D. Mo. January 24, 2012).*

In an Anders brief, the search warrant was valid. State v. Jones, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 207 (La. App. 5th Cir. February 28, 2012).*

Here the officers had an arrest warrant for defendant and performed a “protective sweep” to corral the children in the house so they would be attended to when the officers left with defendant. This was reasonable. Defendant consented to retrieving his ID from the bedroom and the seizure of his cell phones. United States v. Rivero, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26867 (N.D. Ga. January 20, 2012).*

This district court follows the majority and does not require probable cause for historical cell site location data. United States v. Graham, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26954 (D. Md. March 1, 2012):

Some courts, most notably the Eastern District of New York and the Southern District of Texas, have concluded that, under certain circumstances, applications seeking cell site location data must be granted only after a showing of probable cause, and not the lower statutory standard of "specific and articulable facts" contained in the Stored Communications Act. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States, 809 F. Supp. 2d 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (Garaufis, J.); In re Application of the United States, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (Smith, Mag. J.), appeal docketed, No. 11-20554 (5th Cir. Dec. 14, 2011); In re Application of the United States, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (Orenstein, Mag. J.), rev'd No. 10-MC-0550 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011) (unpublished order noting written opinion to follow). Those courts have essentially held that a government application for cell site location records does not implicate the Fourth Amendment if the request is for a discrete, and relatively short period of time. Compare In re Application, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 578-79 (application requesting cell site location data for a period of 58 days required warrant based on probable cause); In re Application, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 829 (60 days), with In re Application of the United States, No. 11-MC-0113, 2011 WL 679925, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2011) (application for a period of 21 days required only specific and articulable facts, and not probable cause). In other words, those courts have concluded that the Fourth Amendment is only implicated when the government surveillance of historical cell site location data occurs over a sufficiently long—albeit undefined—period of time so as to implicate a person's legitimate expectation of privacy. None of these decisions have explicitly defined the length of time at which a request for cell site location data must be supported by probable cause, but Magistrate Judge Orenstein of the Eastern District of New York suggested that thirty days might be an appropriate limit. See In re Application, 2011 WL 679925, at *2.

A majority of courts, on the other hand, have concluded that the acquisition of historical cell site location data pursuant to the Stored Communications Act's specific and articulable facts standard does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the time period involved. See, e.g., United States v. Dye, No. 10CR221, 2011 WL 1595255, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 2011); United States v. Velasquez, No. 08-730-WHA, 2010 WL 4286276, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2010); United States v. Benford, No. 09 CR 86, 2010 WL 1266507, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 07-023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8-11 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008); In re Application of the United States, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80-81 (D. Mass. 2007). These courts have primarily relied on a line of Supreme Court cases construing the scope of Fourth Amendment rights relating to business records held by third parties. More specifically, these courts have concluded that because people voluntarily convey their cell site location data to their cellular providers, they relinquish any expectation of privacy over those records. See Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8 (finding no expectation of privacy in records kept by third parties) (citing, inter alia, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976)).

For the following reasons, this Court concludes that the Defendants in this case do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the historical cell site location records acquired by the government. These records, created by cellular providers in the ordinary course of business, indicate the cellular towers to which a cellular phone connects, and by extension the approximate location of the cellular phone. While the implications of law enforcement's use of this historical cell site location data raise the specter of prolonged and constant government surveillance, Congress in enacting the Stored Communications Act, has chosen to require only "specific and articulable facts" in support of a government application for such records. Put simply, the Fourth Amendment, as currently interpreted, does not contemplate a situation where government surveillance becomes a "search" only after some specified amount of time.

[Sorry, it was too hard to use Google Scholar to locate all of them. I don't have that much time.]

When defendant refuses to be “seized” and ran away, he obviously felt free to leave. Also, “[t]he district court reviews de novo only those portions of a magistrate judge's R&R to which objections are filed.” There is no de novo review to that which the defendant does not object. United States v. Huckabee, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24491 (N.D. N.C. February 27, 2012).*

The district court reviews de novo only those portions of a magistrate judge's M&R to which objections are filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court does not perform a de novo review of those portions to which a party makes only "general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). Absent a specific and timely objection, the court reviews only for "clear error," and need not give any explanation for adopting the M&R. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005); Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 1983). Upon careful review of the record, "the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

. . .

Detective Hunter did not seize defendant when she attempted to question him near the side of the road. After Detectives Becker and Hunter pulled to the side of the road, Detective Hunter approached defendant from the front and asked, in a conversational tone, if she could talk to him. Defendant responded aggressively by saying, "Who the [expletive omitted] are you? You don't know me." Detective Hunter identified herself as a police detective and again asked if she could talk to him. Defendant again responded, "You don't know me," and then fled. The entire encounter lasted about five seconds.

Under these factual circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt himself free to leave. Detective Hunter did not physically contact defendant, nor was her questioning of him intimidating. Her firearm was holstered, and she did not accuse defendant of any criminal activity. Based on these circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt himself free to go about his business. Further, even if Detective Hunter's conduct could somehow be construed as an assertion of authority, defendant never submitted. Rather, he attempted to flee. As stated above, "[a] defendant who flees the police in response to an assertion of authority has not been seized, and thus his Fourth Amendment rights are not implicated." Brown, 401 F.3d at 594.

2255 petitioner’s claim that his defense lawyer failed to fully investigate the apparent authority of the consenter to consent would have added nothing and the motion to suppress still would have been denied. United States v. Livingston, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25558 (W.D. Okla. February 28, 2012).

Even if the curtilage were entered (it wasn’t), purging that information from the affidavit for the search warrant would not nullify the probable cause. Defendant carries the burden on the GFE, and he fails. United States v. Simmons, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25615 (D. Me. February 28, 2012).*

2255 petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim was time barred, and he couldn’t get in the back door via a writ of error coram nobis. Also, WECN is only available if the petitioner is not in custody, and he was. Johnson v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26522 (E.D. Mo. February 28, 2012).*