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NYTimes: Police Are Using Phone Tracking as a Routine Tool by Eric Licthblau:

Law enforcement tracking of cellphones, once the province mainly of federal agents, has grown into a powerful and widely used surveillance tool for local police officials as well, with hundreds of departments, large and small, often using it aggressively with little or no court oversight, new documents show.

The practice has become big business for cellphone companies, too, with a handful of carriers marketing a catalog of “surveillance fees” to police departments to determine a suspect’s location, trace phone calls and texts or provide other services. Some departments log dozens of traces a month for both emergencies and routine investigations.

Huffington Post: Illinois State Police Drug Dog Unit Analysis Shows Error Rate Between 28 and 74 Percent:

In the course of reporting on the traffic stop of Terrance Huff, HuffPost was able to obtain the reports of an Illinois State Police K-9 unit over an 11-month period in 2007 and 2008. An analysis of those reports shows that only 25.7 percent of the drug dog "alerts" resulted in police finding a measurable quantity of illicit drugs. Just 13 percent resulted in the recovery of more than 10 grams of marijuana, generally considered an amount for personal use, and 10.4 percent turned up enough drugs to charge the motorists or their passengers with at least one felony.

In all, the police dog conducted 252 "sniffs" over the 11-month period, resulting in 136 alerts. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a drug dog's alert is enough to establish probable cause for a warrantless search of a vehicle. Of the 136 alerts, 35 turned up a large enough quantity of drugs to merit an arrest, and 63 turned up what the police officer refers to as "shake," or "residue." The officer didn't send any of those cases to a lab, so it's difficult to know if what the officer found was actually drug residue or, as appears to have been the case in the search of Terrance Huff, likely something else. In 38 cases, or 27.9 percent of the times a dog alert gave cause for a more thorough search, the officer recorded finding no drugs at all. Still, in most of these cases, the officer still notes in the report that the driver or passengers looked to be under the influence of drugs or, somewhat improbably, admitted to him that they were regular drug users. Obviously, there's no way to verify those claims.

ST. LOUIS (AP) — Congratulations, Mega Millions winners! You've just won the biggest lottery in history! Move over Bill Gates and Warren Buffett!

Not so fast, Richie Rich.

There's no doubt that you're now each a member of the 1 percent. A life of comfort and leisure awaits, and managed ...

TACOMA, Wash. (AP) — In the quest to figure out what happened to Susan Powell in 2009, Utah authorities compiled a heap of evidence — finding blood in the family home, an eerie hand-written "will" and a young son who bluntly said that mom was dead.

Despite all of the ...

Warrant for DNA failed to show probable cause because it was based on mere conclusions. On remand, however, the state is free to use inevitable discovery to validate it. State v. Jenkins, 2012 S.C. App. LEXIS 84 (March 28, 2012):

Nevertheless, the State argues that because this case involves a sex crime, the magistrate could reasonably have inferred the victim was the source of the information. We disagree. The law does not allow the State to justify a bodily intrusion on the possibility that a magistrate made a correct inference as to the source of the information in the affidavit. Rather, "[m]ere conclusory statements which give the magistrate no basis to make a judgment regarding probable cause are insufficient." Smith, 301 S.C. at 373, 392 S.E.2d at 183. Moreover, the complete absence of a source for any of the information makes a variety of scenarios possible. For example, the detective could have pieced together the information from other officers, the victim's neighbors, or even an anonymous tip. This is precisely what the law forbids a magistrate from doing. The magistrate's "action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others." Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 239).

Note: One of the benefits of knowing the Fourth Amendment is that you don't file pointless motions to suppress. Most of the time, 95% of the time, the warrant or search is valid. I filed my first motion to suppress in over a year this week on the same ground: The officer alleged it was his opinion that evidence would be found in the place to be searched without any effort to show probable cause connecting it to the crime under investigation saying only "It is the officer's opinion evidence will be found" in a camera and computer. And, warrants failing on this ground get no good faith exception under Leon's third ground.

Police responded to a shooting call, and defendant was outside being patted down and handcuffed saying, “Just help him. Help him,” referring to his adult son Brian Chapman in the house who was shot. The first responders entered and also did a protective sweep for other possible injured, and they saw evidence in plain view. Those officer left briefly, but second responders were called to process the scene. They could enter the premises under the original consent. “California decisions uphold an officer's reentry to seize evidence observed in plain view during a lawful entry but not seized initially because the officer was performing a duty that took priority over the seizure of evidence.” The reentry was valid, and the trial court erred in suppressing the second entry. People v. Superior Court, 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 369 (2d Dist. March 29, 2012):

Iraq solder was injured by an IED and evacuated stateside for recovery. When he was unconscious, his belongings were inventoried for shipment back with him, and child pornography was found. He was court martialed after recovery at Fort Drum. The inventory was valid under regulation for the injured and dead and MRE 313(c). United States v. Kelly, 2012 CCA LEXIS 103 (Army Ct. Crim. App. March 27, 2012) (unpublished).*

WBIR.com: Lawmakers continue to push plan to drug test welfare recipients:

It's an idea in Nashville that just won't die.

Certain state lawmakers say they're not ready to give up on their plan to drug test welfare recipients, even though the attorney general says it's unconstitutional.

Lawmakers say they want to make sure those who receive public assistance are using the money as intended, and not for illegal drugs.

The plan is already moving ahead in both chambers even though the attorney general says drug testing those on benefits violates the Fourth Amendment.

Memphis Commercial Appeal: Sheriff's Office will no longer hold prisoners for 48-hour detention | Practice violates Tenn. constitution, court finds by Lawrence Buser, Daniel Connolly, Kevin McKenzie:

Local authorities have suspended the practice of detaining people in jail for up to 48 hours without charging them with a crime.

The move follows a scathing opinion by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals at Jackson, which said the Memphis Police Department was routinely violating the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. That amendment says authorities can't make arrests or search and seize property without probable cause. The opinion also said the policy violates Tennessee's constitution.

The appeals court had ordered that convicted murderer Courtney Bishop must get a new trial because the detention that led to his confession of shooting a man in a robbery was illegal.

It was the third time since 2001 the court had issued a harshly worded opinion criticizing the 48-hour detentions.

The case is here.

As Ronald Reagan famously said, "There you go again."

RED BUD, Ill. (AP) — The Mega Millions winners — at least three of them — stayed out of sight. The losers, who could number 100 million, had plenty to say Saturday about losing out on the world's largest-ever lottery jackpot and their dashed dreams of colossal wealth.

Journalists descended ...

After much drama and untold $1,000s in hair color: Lindsay Lohan is officially off probation. You have been warned.

The urchins were startled. "Hey, let's go outside and play some baseball," I said.

Bad search where officer’s testimony was clearly designed to skirt the constitution was not attenuated from a later search. United States v. Roberts, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42752 (E.D. Pa. March 28, 2012):

The Fourth Amendment protects "against unreasonable searches and seizures." Faced with a motion to suppress, the Government bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of a warrantless search or seizure. United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995). Here, the Government relied only on the testimony of Officer Kostick to meet its burden as to the October 7th search of Roberts and his van. As discussed supra, we do not believe Kostick's story. The objective physical facts, which are not subject to the biases of humans, prove his testimony to be false. We find his entire sequence of events (excessively tinted windows -> traffic stop -> failure to comply with commands -> drugs in plain view on the door -> gun in plain view on the floor) a fabrication, carefully constructed to stay just within the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. As such, the Government has not demonstrated the reasonableness of the October 7, 2010 traffic stop and subsequent search. This stop and search violated James Roberts' Fourth Amendment rights, and we have suppressed the evidence recovered during that search accordingly. (See Doc. No. 41).

Now we must tackle the difficult question of whether this Fourth Amendment violation taints the fruits of the December 21st search to which Roberts consented. Roberts contends it does, while the Government argues that time and intervening events have purged the taint. Because of the flagrancy of the constitutional violation that occurred here, we must agree with Roberts. Time cannot heal all wounds, and it cannot heal this one.

Attenuation proved: First search October 7th, second search December 21st; Davis must be considered. United States v. Roberts, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42752 (E.D. Pa. March 28, 2012)*:

Not all Fourth Amendment violations warrant the suppression of evidence. The Amendment itself says nothing about suppression; rather, the exclusionary rule is a "prudential" doctrine with a singular purpose — to deter future Fourth Amendment violations. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011) (citation omitted). And as the Supreme Court recently reiterated, "real deterrent value" is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for exclusion. Id. at 2427. Instead, we balance the hard-to-quantify social costs of exclusion (suppressing the truth) against its benefits (deterring police misconduct) and exclude the challenged evidence only when the latter outweighs the former. See id. at 2427-28 (cautioning that "[p]olice practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield 'meaningful' deterrence, and culpable enough to be 'worth the price paid by the justice system.'") (citation omitted). Since we, as a society, have a compelling interest in deterring flagrant police misconduct, the more egregious the violation, the more likely it justifies exclusion. See id. (recognizing that "the deterrence benefits of exclusion 'vary with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct' at issue."). Importantly, our exclusionary rule analysis must account for the conduct of all the officers involved. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) ("In analyzing the applicability of the [exclusionary] rule, Leon admonished that we must consider the actions of all the police officers involved.").

. . .

On this particular point, we agree with the Government. As discussed supra, the point of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. The attenuation factors, including "temporal proximity" and "intervening circumstances," are really just clues that help us determine whether the benefits of suppressing certain evidence outweigh the costs. Here, the conduct we wish to deter is Officer Kostick's, not that of the agents who ultimately arrested Roberts on December 21st. Therefore, our purging-the-taint inquiry must center on the events of October 7th. The Defendant implicitly recognizes this, focusing entirely on Officer Kostick's conduct in discussing the "purpose and flagrancy" prong of the attenuation analysis. ...

Using October 7th as the starting point, the "temporal proximity" and "intervening circumstances" attenuation factors weigh against suppressing the fruits of the consensual December 21st search, but only slightly. As the Government points out, over two (2) months elapsed between Officer Kostick's search and Roberts' consent. Apparently, Roberts was not in police custody during this time. In addition, the agents who obtained Roberts' consent are different from the officer who committed the earlier illegality. All of this distances the December 21st search from the October 7th violation.

The affidavit twice used “recently” to describe when the officer learned of information from the CI. Coupled with a showing that this was an ongoing drug operation, that was enough to overcome staleness. Jones v. State, 2012 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 500 (March 28, 2012):

We have suggested that time is a less important consideration when an affidavit recites observations that are consistent with ongoing drug activity at a defendant's residence.33 We quoted from United States v. Johnson, in which the Tenth Circuit explained: "Where the affidavit recites a mere isolated violation it would not be unreasonable to imply that probable cause dwindles rather quickly with the passage of time. However, where the affidavit properly recites facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous nature, a course of conduct, the passage of time becomes less significant."34 Other federal circuits have held that the nature of the activity must be considered, and that, in appropriate circumstances, years could pass without information becoming stale.35 In United States v. Greene, the Sixth Circuit explained that "[e]vidence of ongoing criminal activity will generally defeat a claim of staleness."36 And, according to that court, "where the criminal activity occurred in a 'secure operational base,' the passage of time becomes less significant."37

Greene was a case in which drugs were being sold out of a residence.38 Narcotics had been purchased at the residence at least twelve times, but the last reported time was twenty-three months before a warrant was sought.39 The Sixth Circuit found that the information was not stale.40 The Sixth Circuit has subsequently suggested that information about narcotics tends to go stale quickly but only "in the absence of information indicating an ongoing and continuing narcotics operation."41

The trial court properly denied a Franks hearing because the defense provided no offer of proof as to what was false and how it affected probable cause. State v. Pargo, 2012 Iowa App. LEXIS 228 (March 28, 2012).*

Taillight violation supported stop that revealed defendant was an “habitual” driving without a DL violator. State v. Hughes, 2012 Iowa App. LEXIS 266 (March 28, 2012).*

The trial court erred in not considering the defendant’s offer of proof of the 911 call and other things on the question of reliability of an anonymous tip, but, on de novo review, the court of appeals considers it and finds that it does not change the outcome. State v. Kooima, 2012 Iowa App. LEXIS 231 (March 28, 2012).*

Defendant took a pretrial application for writ to this court on a Gant issue denied by the trial court, and that order was law of the case and could not be appealed again on the direct appeal from the conviction. State v. Massey, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 413 (La. App. 5th Cir. March 27, 2012).

There was no proof that the officer’s challenged statements was anything more than negligent. One was a reasonable assumption based on the facts known to the officer at the time. United States v. Wyatt, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42725 (W.D. Ky. March 28, 2012)*:

Just because there is no Fourth Amendment rights in prison does not mean that an inmate has no rights at all. Here, the inmate’s drinking mug was bought with his own money, and it was arbitrarily confiscated. He stated a claim under the takings clause of the state constitution. Johnson v. King, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 169 (Miss. App. March 27, 2012).*

WEST PALM BEACH, Fla. (AP) — When he was shot, Trayvon Martin was not the baby-faced boy in the photo that has been on front pages across the country. And George Zimmerman wasn't the beefy-looking figure in the widely published mugshot.

Both photos are a few years old and no ...

NEW YORK (AP) — Current TV says it has ejected Keith Olbermann from its talk-show lineup after less than a year.

The network announced late Friday afternoon that "Countdown," the show Olbermann has hosted since last June, was to be replaced with a show hosted by former New York Gov. ...

BLT: Lacking GPS Data, Prosecutors Turn To Cell Tower Information:

Earlier this year the U.S. Supreme Court said federal prosecutors in Washington will not be able to use global positioning system information in an upcoming drug conspiracy trial here.

...

The Jones case is back in Washington federal district court, and it now turns out that the authorities may not need the GPS data to try to link Jones to the drug house.

Prosecutors said they intend to use cell tower data in place of the GPS information, court records show. Cell tower data was not used in either of the first two trials involving Jones.

Jones’ attorney, A. Eduardo Balarezo, late Thursday filed court papers (PDF) in the case challenging the prosecution’s planned use of tower data to show Jones’ movement in the Washington metropolitan area.

Cell tower information is less reliable than GPS because of the ability of a cell phone to leapfrog over cell towers to others less close, but most persons who claim to be experts on this will admit the failings.