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Search incident of the call log of defendant’s cell phone was valid. (Maybe that's all that's subject to search incident.) People v. Taylor, 2012 COA 91, 2012 Colo. App. LEXIS 926 (June 7, 2012):

[*P10] For present purposes we assume, as apparently did the trial court, two propositions: First, defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cellular telephone's call history4 and second, the officer's review of the call history constituted a warrantless search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

4 Other courts to consider this issue have found a reasonable expectation of privacy in a cellular telephone's call history. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding legitimate expectation of privacy in call history of cell phone); United States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (S.D. Fla. 2011) ("the weight of authority agrees that accessing a cell phone's call log or text message folder is considered a 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes"); United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D. Mass. 2009) ("It seems indisputable that a person has a subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of his or her cell phone."); United States v. De La Paz, 43 F. Supp. 2d 370, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding legitimate privacy expectation in the fact that calls were received and in the identity of the callers); State v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1080-81 (Conn. 2010) (reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone); but see United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1276 (D. Kan. 2007) (when cell phones were taken from defendant's person but defendant did not assert ownership of cell phones, did not testify as to expectation of privacy in cell phones, and did not present testimony that he had a legitimate possessory interest in cell phones or had taken steps to ensure his privacy in them, defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in content of cell phones).

. . .

[*P17] We conclude that a search of the call history of a cellular telephone on the person of the arrestee is a lawful search incident to arrest. Here, the uncontested evidence at the suppression hearing was that defendant's cell phone was removed from his person after his lawful custodial arrest. The officer then searched defendant's cell phone call history to confirm defendant had called the woman who arrived to sell Investigator J.W. the drugs. This search was a lawful warrantless search incident to arrest. See, e.g., Smallwood, 61 So. 3d at 460.

[*P18] Additionally, applying the narrower view proposed by some courts that officers may not search all data contained in a cell phone, nevertheless the search of the call history of defendant's cell phone was lawful. See Hawkins v. State, 704 S.E.2d 886, 891-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) ("Just because an officer has the authority to make a search of the data stored on a cell phone (that is, just because he had reason to 'open' the 'container') does not mean that he has the authority to sift through all of the data stored on the phone (that is, to open and view all of the sub-containers of data stored therein). Instead, his search must be limited as much as is reasonably practicable by the object of the search.").

Information Liberation | "Click It Or Ticket' Now Applies To Your Cats & Dogs."

The search of defendant’s purse violated the Fourth Amendment, and it was excluded in her criminal case, but that did not make it excludable in her probation revocation proceeding. People v. Lazlo, 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 659 (1st Dist. June 6, 2012):

[T]he exclusionary rule does not apply in probation revocation hearings, unless the police conduct at issue shocks the conscience. (See, e.g., United States v. Vandemark (9th Cir. 1975) 522 F.2d 1019, 1020 [“[t]his accords with the almost unanimous view that the exclusionary rule does not usually apply in probation revocation proceedings”]; People v. Harrison (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 803, 811 [245 Cal. Rptr. 204] (Harrison) [“federal law does not require application of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation hearings”]; People v. Nixon (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 687, 691, 693–694 [183 Cal. Rptr. 878].)

Police were searching woods for a murder suspect and they encountered defendant, whom they asked for identification and why he was in the woods. This was not an investigative detention subject to the Fourth Amendment. He wasn’t the suspect they were looking for. Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 2012 PA Super 118, 2012 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1043 (June 6, 2012).*

The stop was justified based on the testimony even though its basis wasn’t mentioned in the reports. “No extrinsic evidence has been offered to contradict Officer Nelson’s testimony, and ‘[t]he mere fact an incident report omits certain details is not sufficient to render the officer's testimony concerning the underlying action facially implausible.’ United States v. Mendoza, 677 F.3d 822, 828 (8th Cir. 2012).” United States v. Gant, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78853 (D. Minn. June 7, 2012).*

Defendant’s post-conviction claim that his 2007 conviction should be voided because of Gant was rejected, not on Davis grounds, but on the automobile exception. United States v. Carter, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11265 (11th Cir. June 5, 2012).*

Plaintiff stated a claim against officer for procuring an arrest warrant based on name alone when it turned out that there were more than one person in the geographical area with that name. “Basing probable cause solely on a similarity of name could create a substantial risk of error,” and it qualifies as reckless disregard. Parks v. Town of Leicester, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78973 (D. Mass. June 7, 2012)*:

Nonetheless, it is troublesome that Fontaine, in concluding that plaintiff was the assailant, relied on the mere coincidence that the name that the victim provided matched the name in the database. The probability of multiple persons with the same name residing in a single geographic region--at least one as populous as Worcester County--is not negligible. Basing probable cause solely on a similarity of name could create a substantial risk of error. Arguably, an officer who pursued such a practice would be acting in reckless disregard of the truth.

Plaintiff alleged enough facts to stay in court that the police called to aid a repossession of a vehicle converted private action into state action. Morozov v. Howard County, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77767 (D. Md. June 5, 2012).*

JUNCTION CITY, Kan. — A Kansas community is in mourning after a prominent businessman, his wife and their four children were killed Thursday when their small plane crashed into a swampy area of central Florida.

The single-turboprop, fixed-wing plane was heading home to Junction City from the Bahamas when it ...

JUNEAU, Alaska — More than a year after a tsunami devastated Japan, killing thousands of people and washing millions of tons of debris into the Pacific Ocean, the U.S. government and West Coast states don't have a cohesive plan for cleaning up the rubble that floats to American shores.

There ...

Defendant was stopped via a traffic offense that was completely ignored to focus on a drug investigation. Within two minutes they had consent, and it was found not voluntary. United States v. King, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76988 (N.D. Miss. June 4, 2012):

The government argues that the defendant's consent to search is valid because it was given within two minutes of the traffic stop. In looking at the surrounding circumstances, however, it appears that consent was not voluntarily given. As Agent Force requested, Hutchins attempted to make the stop appear normal. Yet, the record shows that the officers were not interested in any alleged traffic violation when they stopped King. They knew the defendant was a suspect in an ongoing drug investigation and the officers acted in furtherance of that investigation when they stopped the defendant. While Hutchins claims King could have left prior to the search, at no time did he or any of the other officers tell the defendant he was free to leave or that he had a right to refuse consent. Hutchins, two police officers, and a K-9 dog were present when King consented to the search. The defendant complied with the officer's requests and told them where money was located inside his truck. Though the defendant was allegedly stopped for violating traffic laws, none of the officers issued a citation prior to asking to search the vehicle. Instead, they held the defendant at the traffic stop without advising him that he was suspected of criminal activity. Looking at these factors, it appears King's consent was not the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice. An objectively reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have felt free to leave the scene or refuse consent.