VoteKansas.org

All Gov | John Brennan, has reportedly taken on the lead role in selecting which accused terrorists will live or die.

The stop and detention of the defendant was justified. Plain view of the interior of the car supported seizure of drugs, not Arizona v. Gant. State v. Burton, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 714 (La. App. 5 Cir. May 22, 2012).*

The CI’s statement was entitled to credit on the probable cause determination by the issuing magistrate because it was based on first hand information and the CI was reliable in the past. State v. Banks, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 713 (La. App. 5 Cir. May 22, 2012).*

Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity was created by defendant and his passenger giving inconsistent explanations regarding their travels, they were obviously nervous, there was a strong odor of air freshener and defendant had a criminal record. State v. Burney, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 684 (La. App. 2 Cir. May 23, 2012).*

KING 5 Seattle | Harris family asks for $3.5 million more in 2009 excessive force incident that left son brain damaged, to be donated to charity.

When doing a knock-and-talk, officers smelled ammonia and this was probable cause of meth production and exigency. “The existence of ammonia has been recognized as constituting exigent circumstances due to its explosive nature.” State v. Cortez, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 701 (La. App. 5 Cir. May 22, 2012).*

Defendant was Mirandized and signed a consent form when the officers talked in a conversational tone, so the record supports the conclusion that the consent was voluntary. United States v. Ortiz, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10482 (3d Cir. May 24, 2012).*

The affidavit for the search warrant showed probable cause. In executing warrant, officers were found to have knock-and-announced. The trial court credited the officers rather than somebody inside. The doors were not locked. State v. McDivitt, 2012 Ohio 2243, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1980 (11th Dist. May 21, 2012).*

Officers responding to a 911 call saw a person on a child’s toy scooter and stopped him thinking that he was a juvenile out after curfew. When stopped, defendant was shocked to see the officer and highly nervous and shaking. That was reasonable suspicion and then he consented to a search of his person. Mwangi v. State, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 479 (May 23, 2012).*

All Gov | Tennessee has posted some shocking numbers with regards to abuse of prescription drugs.

Alexander Higgins | TEPCO says they don’t know what to do if Reactor 4 collapses.

Venture Beat | Star Trek science, meet the real world.

miaminewtimes.com | Rumors of such a number emerged this week.

Venture Beat | Google is moving forward with new hi-tech glasses, exhibiting its first demonstration this week.

Washington Post | From Canada to Colombia to Brazil, oil and gas production in the Western Hemisphere is booming.

Washington Post | From Canada to Colombia to Brazil, oil and gas production in the Western Hemisphere is booming.

Mary Fischer | You gotta be kidding me.

Mary Fischer | You gotta be kidding me.

chicagonow.com | NLG received 70 separate claims of police misconduct from Sunday's events.

chicagonow.com | NLG received 70 separate claims of police misconduct from Sunday's events.

Jack Minor | A study that could result in outlawing certain types of shotguns currently available to citizens.

Jack Minor | A study that could result in outlawing certain types of shotguns currently available to citizens.

GPS was used to follow defendant to his home and then a dog sniff on the front porch violated his privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Peter, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72485 (N.D. Ind. May 24, 2012):

While the precedent clearly teaches that a canine sniff-whether of a suitcase, an automobile, or a residence-is not itself a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and therefore does not require any independent justification, the overall police action is still subject to constitutional constraints. Thus, in Place, although the dog sniff of the defendant's luggage did not constitute an unlawful search, the 90-minute detention of that luggage "went beyond the narrow authority possessed by police to detain briefly luggage reasonably suspected to contain narcotics." 462 U.S. at 710. In Caballes, the Court "accept[ed] the state court's conclusion that the duration of the stop ... was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop," and held that the dog sniff did not transform the otherwise lawful traffic stop into an unlawful search. 543 U.S. at 408. And in Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), although the use of a drug-detection dog at drug interdiction checkpoints was not a search, the checkpoint program itself was unconstitutional because it was justified neither by road-safety concerns nor individualized suspicion. Similarly, in Brock, the Seventh Circuit reiterated that dog sniffs that detected only contraband were insignificant for Fourth Amendment purposes but stressed that "critical to our holding that the dog sniff in this case was not a Fourth Amendment search is the fact that police were lawfully present inside the common areas of the residence with the consent of Brock's roommate." 417 F.3d at 697.

In this case, Peter's front porch was unquestionably his private property, and the police came onto that property without express consent or a search warrant. As noted above, before the Supreme Court's recent decision in Jones, this fact would simply have been one factor among many relevant to determining whether the police action infringed the reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. Although the origins of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence lie in the law of trespass, and at one time its protections were thought to limit only searches of tangible property, the Supreme Court long ago rejected "the premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize" and has developed a more expansive protection for a person's "reasonable expectation of privacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967). Following Katz, the prevailing assumption of the courts was that the new privacy-based formulation replaced the older property-based one, such that "privacy [came] not merely to supplement but to eclipse property as the interest protected by the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Redmon, 138 F.3d 1109, 1131 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). While property rights remained a relevant, even important, consideration in determining Fourth Amendment rights, property's role was "relegated to that of furnishing evidence of the reasonableness of a defendant's expectation of privacy." Id.

Whatever basis that assumption had, however, it did not survive the holding in Jones that the Katz reasonable expectation-of-privacy test supplemented, but did not replace, the older understanding that the Fourth Amendment "embod[ies] a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas ('persons, houses, papers, and effects') it enumerates." Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 950. ...

Warrantless pre-Jones GPS monitoring was illegal, and the good faith exception would not be applied. United States v. Lee, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71205 (E.D. Ky. March 22, 2012), adopted 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71204 (E.D. Ky. May 22, 2012):

The Court, on referral, considers a motion to suppress. In sum, this is a case about legitimate law enforcement objectives pursued in an illegitimate way. Eight months after receiving a tip that Defendant was engaged in marijuana trafficking, law enforcement attached a global positioning tracking device on Defendant's car, believing that the law allowed for the installation of that device without a warrant. That belief turned out to be wrong. Although the Supreme Court held that such a warrantless installation of a tracking device violates the Fourth Amendment after the investigation giving rise to this case, the exclusionary rule applies and requires the suppression of evidence obtained through the installation and use of that tracking device. Unfortunately, the cost of suppression is high—Defendant was found with large quantities of marijuana and made damaging admissions, which support a Class A felony marijuana trafficking charge. Defendant's criminal history category, previously determined by this Court to be the worst possible under the Guidelines, underscores Defendant's propensity for dangerous criminal behavior. Indeed, Defendant admitted to marijuana trafficking while on supervised release from a previous Judgment of this Court.

For a variety of reasons, however, the deterrence benefits of suppression outweigh its heavy costs. This is so primarily because no unequivocal precedent allowed for the warrantless installation of the tracking device. Instead, law enforcement interpreted various cases to support their decision not to seek a warrant. Of course, it is the business of the courts to interpret the law. In the absence of unequivocal precedent allowing for the government's installation of the tracking device, suppression is necessary. Thus, as more fully described below, having reviewed the evidence, briefs, and arguments submitted by counsel, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT the motion to suppress.

Nicole Gaouette | “Honestly, I don’t know where these people make these things up,” Clinton said.