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An officer lawfully in a house shining a flashlight into a bedroom saw a shiny object on a night stand. Suspecting it was a gun, he retrieved it. The gun was in plain view. United States v. Simmons, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54190 (S.D. N.Y. April 16, 2012).

Failing to object to a search as it takes place is implied consent. United States v. Simmons, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54360 (E.D. Mo. April 4, 2012).* [Note: Can’t agree with this because most people are afraid or unwilling to speak at the time of a search. They are submitting to authority, and the police know it.]

The tipster here was a suspicious person, and the officer getting it clearly did not trust the tipster and called a supervisor for advice after getting the tip a second time. In total, the tipster was could not be relied upon for reasonable suspicion. United States v. Melendez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53663 (S.D. Fla. March 30, 2012).*

Police received a child welfare call, and responded to defendant’s residence. He consented to an entry to check on the welfare of the children, and a gun and marijuana were found in plain view. The officers could look anywhere children might be found, so the walk through was within the limits of consent. United States v. McArthur, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52269 (S.D. W.Va. April 13, 2012).*

Defendant consented to a search of his car for drugs, but he did not consent to seizure and then search of his cell phone. He objected, and the government, which had the burden of proof, offered no response, so the cell phone is suppressed. United States v. Smith, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54331 (S.D. Ohio April 18, 2012).

On a remand from the Sixth Circuit, “Defendant's Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence can be disposed of on the grounds that either the Detectives had consent to conduct a search or that the Detectives could conduct a protective sweep.” United States v. Spicer, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54306 (S.D. Ohio April 16, 2012).*

Furtive movements under the seat at the time of stop with one occupant opening and closing the glove compartment and another feigning sleep justified a protective sweep of the car. People v Newman, 2012 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2803, 2012 NY Slip Op 2816 (1st Dept. April 17, 2012).*

The trial court held that the defendant lacked standing to contest a search, and defendant did not show that defense counsel was ineffective for not getting to the merits of the search. State v. Jackson, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 510 (April 17, 2012).*

A wiretap in New York provided probable cause defendant would be picking up drugs in Tennessee. Defendant had a suspended DL, and the owner also consented to the search. United States v. Prater, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53739 (E.D. Tenn. February 17, 2012).*

by Greg Palast – Exclusive for EcoWatch.org
Thursday, 19. April, 2012

Two years before the Deepwater Horizon blow-out in the Gulf of Mexico, another BP off-shore rig suffered a nearly identical blow-out, but BP concealed the first one from the U.S. regulators and Congress.

This week, EcoWatch.org located an eyewitness with devastating new information about the Caspian Sea oil-rig blow-out which BP had concealed from government and the industry.

The witness, whose story is backed up by rig workers who were evacuated from BP’s Caspian platform, said that had BP revealed the full story as required by industry practice, the eleven Gulf of Mexico workers “could have had a chance” of survival. But BP’s insistence on using methods proven faulty sealed their fate.

One cause of the blow-outs was the same in both cases:  the use of a money-saving technique—plugging holes with “quick-dry” cement.

By hiding the disastrous failure of its penny-pinching cement process in 2008, BP was able to continue to use the dangerous methods in the Gulf of Mexico—causing the worst oil spill in U.S. history. April 20 marks the second anniversary of the Gulf oil disaster.

There were several failures in common to the two incidents identified by the eyewitness. He is an industry insider whose identity and expertise we have confirmed. His name and that of other witnesses we contacted must be withheld for their safety.

The failures revolve around the use of “quick-dry” cement, the uselessness of blow-out preventers, “mayhem” in evacuation procedures and an atmosphere of fear which prevents workers from blowing the whistle on safety problems.

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Robert F. Kennedy Jr., president of Waterkeeper Alliance and senior attorney for Natural Resources Defense Council, said, “We have laws that make it illegal to hide this kind of information. At the very least, these are lies by omission. When you juxtapose their knowledge of this incident upon the oil companies constant and persistent assurances of safety to regulators, investigators and shareholders, you have all the elements to prove that their concealment of the information was criminal.”

The first blow-out occurred on a BP rig in the Caspian Sea off the coast of Baku, Azerbaijan, in September 2008. BP was able to conceal such an extraordinary event with the help of the ruling regime of Azerbaijan, other oil companies and, our investigators learned, the Bush Administration.

Our investigation began just days after the explosion and sinking of BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil rig on April 20, 2010 when this reporter received an extraordinary message from a terrified witness—from a ship floating in the Caspian Sea:

“I know how …. Would not be wise for me to communicate via [official] IT system, ….”

When the insider was contacted on a secure line, he stated that he witnessed a blow-out and the panicked evacuation of the giant BP “ACG” drilling platform.

To confirm the witness’ story, British television’s premier investigative program, Dispatches, sent this reporter under cover into Baku, Azerbaijan, with a cameraman. While approaching the BP oil terminal, the Islamic republic’s Security Ministry arrested the crew.

To avoid diplomatic difficulties, we were quickly released. However, two new witnesses suddenly vanished, all communication lost with them, after they confirmed the facts of the 2008 blow-out. Both told us they had been evacuated from the BP off-shore platform as it filled with methane.

Furthermore, witnesses confirmed that, “there was mud (drill-pipe cement) blown out all over the platform.” It appears the cement cap failed to hold back high-pressure gases which, “engulfed the entire platform in methane gas,” which is highly explosive.

In both cases, the insider told us, BP had used “quick-dry” cement to cap their well bores and the cost-saving procedure failed catastrophically.

We have learned this week that BP failed to notify the International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) about the failure of the cement. (British companies report incidents as minor as a hammer dropped.) Notification would have alerted Gulf cement contractor Halliburton that the process of adding nitrogen to cement posed unforeseen dangers.

In fact, this past December, BP attempted to place the blame and costs of the Gulf disaster on Halliburton, the oil services company that injected quick-dry cement into the well under the Deepwater Horizon. BP told a federal court that Halliburton concealed a computer model that would show that, under certain conditions, the cement could fail disastrously.

Following the Deepwater Horizon explosion, it became clear that nitrogen-laced mud can leave “channels” in the cement, allowing gas to escape and blow out the well-bore cap. However, that would have become clearer, and risks better assessed, had Halliburton and regulators known of the particulars of the Caspian blow-out.

We have also just learned that the cement casing itself appears to have cracked apart in the Caspian Sea. The sea, we were told, “was bubbling all around [from boiling methane]. You’re even scared to launch a life boat, it may sink.”

This exposed another problem with deepwater drilling. BP had promoted Blow-Out Preventers (BOPs) as a last line of defense in case of a blow-out. But if the casing shatters, the BOPs could be useless.

BP has gone to extraordinary lengths to conceal the story of the first blow-out, and for good reason:  If the company deliberately withheld the information that it knew “quick-dry” cement had failed yet continued to use it, the 11 deaths on its Gulf rig were not an unexpected accident but could be considered negligent homicide.

Kennedy told me, “This is a critical piece of information. The entire government is basing its policy on the assurances of this company that this process can be done safely and it never failed before. This is what they were telling everybody. Yet, the whole time they knew that this was a process that had failed disastrously in the Caspian Sea.”

Why haven’t these stories come out before? This week our witness explained that in Azerbaijan, “People disappear on a regular basis. It’s a police state.”

But even in the U.S. and Europe, BP and other industry workers are afraid to complain for fear their files will be marked “NRB,” for Not Required Back­­—which will end a workers’ offshore career. Jake Malloy, head of the Offshore Oil Workers Union, reached in Aberdeen, Scotland, independently confirmed statements of the whistleblowers. He noted that companies create an atmosphere of fear for one’s job with the “NRB” system and its latest variants, which discourage reports on safety problems.

BP refused an interview for this investigation, though the company responded to our written questions regarding the Caspian blow-out. Notably, the company does not deny that the blow-out occurred, nor even that it concealed the information from U.S. and UK regulators. Rather, the company says there was a “gas release”—a common and benign event, not a blow-out. As to the accusation of concealment, BP states:

While BP says it issued a press release at the time of the September 2008 Caspian blow-out, the company did not tell the whole truth as reported by workers and witnesses. The BP press release of that day admitted only that, “a gas leak was discovered in the area of” the platform when, in fact, it was an explosion of cement and methane, say our witnesses, “which engulfed the platform.”

BP later stated that all operations on the platform were suspended as a “precautionary measure,” suggesting a distant, natural leak. In fact, the workers themselves said that, like the workers on the Deepwater Horizon, they were one spark away from death, with frightened minutes to escape.

While BP called the evacuation a by-the-textbook procedure, in fact, said our witness, “It was total mayhem,” and that a lifeboat rammed a rescue ship in the chaos. U.S. government investigators in the Gulf cite BP’s confused and chaotic evacuation procedures for possibly adding to the Deepwater Horizon’s death toll. Information about the 2008 blow-out should have led to improved procedures and possibly could have saved lives.

More seriously, BP PLC’s official filing to the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission, which requires reporting of all “material” events in company operations, again talked about a “subsurface release,” concealing that the methane blew out through its drilling stack.

Both the safety of quick-dry cement (which some drillers won’t use) and deep water drilling itself were in contention before the April 20, 2010 Gulf blow-out. In fact, the U.S. Department of Interior was refusing BP, Chevron and Exxon the right to expand the area of their deep water drilling in the Gulf over safety questions.

However, BP and the industry conducted a successful lobbying campaign to expand deep water drilling. BP’s Vice-President for operations in the Gulf, David Rainey, testified before Congress in November 2009, five months before the Deepwater Horizon explosion that, “Releases from oil and gas operations are rare.” Rainey assured Congressmen that reliable “well control techniques” such as cement caps will prevent a deep water disaster. Rainey made no mention to Congress of the blow-out in the Caspian Sea which occurred a year before his testimony.

BP itself states that if not for Halliburton’s quick-dry cement failures, the Deepwater Horizon would never have blown out.  Halliburton defends itself by saying that BP’s methods created air channels in the cement that caused it to fail. Notably, BP’s court Motion states, “Halliburton has deprived the Court and parties of uniquely relevant evidence.” BP claims that hiding the information about problems with the cement caused the loss of lives.

Kennedy suggests that if Halliburton’s withholding evidence was deadly, so was BP’s concealment of the cement failure in the Caspian. Stefanie Penn Spear, editor of EcoWatch.org, says that BP’s hiding evidence ultimately led to, “The biggest oil spill in U.S. history. It entirely turned the Gulf Coast economy upside down and threatened—and continues to threaten—the health and livelihoods of the people in the Gulf region.”

How is it that a major oil disaster, a blow-out that shut down one of the world’s biggest oil fields and required the emergency evacuation of 211 rig workers could be covered up, hidden from U.S. regulators and Congress?

The answer:  pay-offs, threats, political muscle and the connivance of the Bush Administration’s State Department, Exxon and Chevron.

For that story, read Part 2 of Greg Palast’s investigation BP Covers up Blow-Out—Bush, Big Oil and WikiLeaks.

——–

Re-prints permitted with credit to EcoWatch.org and the author.

Greg Palast is the author of Vultures’ Picnic (Penguin 2011), which centers on his investigation of BP, bribery and corruption in the oil industry. Palast, whose reports are seen on BBC-TV and Britain’s Channel 4, will be providing investigative reports for EcoWatch.org.

You can read Vultures' Picnic, "Chapter 1: Goldfinger," or download it, at no charge: click here.

Subscribe to Palast's Newsletter and podcasts.

Follow Palast on Facebook and Twitter.

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The affiant police officer misled the issuing magistrate on the question of probable cause, and that nullified the good faith exception. United States v. Albury, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53645 (M.D. Fla. January 19, 2012):

Beginning with Leon, the Supreme Court "recalibrated" the cost-benefit analysis under the exclusionary rule "to focus the inquiry on the 'flagrancy of the police misconduct' at issue." Davis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011). Thus, "[w]hen the police exhibit 'deliberate,' 'reckless,' or 'grossly negligent' disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs. But when the police act with an objectively 'reasonable good-faith belief' that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct involves only simple, 'isolated' negligence, the 'deterrence rationale loses much of its force,' and exclusion 'cannot pay its way.'" Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2427-28 (citations omitted)..

Here, Off. Waker acted with deliberate indifference to Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights in connection with his search of room 332. The affiant's plain-view sighting of suspected cocaine in that room is the fruit of that illegality. Even if the affiant's representations were not deliberately false on his part, in the circumstances of this case and given Blackwell's unrefuted testimony, they were made with reckless indifference of the truth and misleaded the state judge on the matter of probable cause. In the circumstances, the government may not claim the benefit of an exception to the exclusionary rule under Leon.

Uncorroborated anonymous tip did not provide reasonable suspicion. United States v. Melendez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53663 (S.D. Fla. April 4, 2012).*

Civil case over search that led to revocation was not barred by Heck because the evidence was admissible, illegal search or not. Henderson v. Davis, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7646 (11th Cir. April 17, 2012).*

Search warrant after controlled buy was not stale because the collective information showed a continuing operation. United States v. Tisdale, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53294 (D. Kan. April 16, 2012).*

“[A]ny ordinary visitor to Defendant's apartment would have understood Defendant's actions to constitute assent to Officer Jordan's entry into Defendant's apartment.” United States v. Murphy, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52246 (E.D. Tenn. April 13, 2012).*

Defendant lived in the basement of Flynn’s house in St. Louis, and Flynn discovered a meth lab. Flynn called the police and consented to their entry and search. Defendant’s relationship to the basement was difficult and uncertain, so the court assumes standing, but more than one person stayed down there, and it wasn’t clear what his privacy relationship was to the basement. It seemed that it wasn’t sufficiently private that Flynn couldn’t consent. United States v. Hendrix, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53823 (E.D. Mo. March 30, 2012):

In the circumstances of this case, Officer Page and the other officers acted reasonably. When they arrived at 3232 California, they knocked on the front door and it was opened by a man who said he was Thomas Flynn who had phoned them earlier about a meth lab in his basement, operated by a friend of his. He then led the officers to the basement door, which was already open. Flynn had not asked anyone for permission to admit the officers into the residence nor to take the officers to the doorway leading to the basement stairs. His actions reasonably led the officers to believe that, like the woman in the doorway with the baby on her hip in Matlock, Flynn showed he belonged in the residence and had sufficient authority over it, including the basement area, to further authorize the police to enter not only the residence generally but also to go downstairs to investigate the possibly criminal activity about which he had called them. United States v. Almeida-Perez, 549 F.3d 1162, 1170-71 (8th Cir. 2008). The officers' entry into the basement room of defendant was constitutionally authorized by the consent of Thomas Flynn.

Inconsistencies in the officers’ testimony led the court to conclude that consent was not given after a knock-and-talk. United States v. Miranda-Cortez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53402 (D. Utah April 16, 2012)*:

Because of these inconsistencies and the government's failure to acknowledge or otherwise convincingly explain them, the court concludes that the testimony of the officers involved in this operation is not sufficient to sustain the government's burden to prove it had freely obtained consent to search the basement apartment. The court wants to be clear that it is not impugning the testimony of the officers. Nothing before the court suggests that the officers have intentionally attempted to mislead the court or give knowingly false testimony. Indeed, it is more likely that the officers were distracted by their roles in continuing their deception to gain access to the house and were so overly concentrated on finding the drugs once they entered the basement, that they failed to appreciate all the details of what was occurring.

The officers may well have concluded that they had sufficient evidence to proceed without a warrant. Uncertainty, however, must weigh in favor of the constitutional protections. A pretext pursued with the stated objective of gaining entrance without a warrant may prematurely lead officers to believe they have succeeded in obtaining sufficient concessions from the home occupant to claim it was consent. With no exigencies evident here to justify a departure from the constitutional requirement, the officers rely on the consent exception, which is cluttered with uncertainties and contradictions.

Defendant objected to the alleged consent given by the lady who opened the door and let the police in. That was essentially a moot argument because, once the police were inside, he said he owned the place, and he consented and cooperated with the police. All this happened before the officers saw any evidence of crime. “Mr. Lucas's consent to the officers' presence and search was sufficient to dissipate any taint caused by an illegal initial entry. See U.S. v. Jarvi, 537 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2008).” United States v. Lucas, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7746 (10th Cir. April 17, 2012).*

The state showed that the inventory search of defendant’s car was necessary to log the valuables, and defendant did not show that it was in bad faith, so he does not prevail. Boykin v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 274 (April 18, 2012).* [Note: Is the court shifting the burden of proof here? Should the state bare the burden of good faith inventory searches since they always carry the burden?]

AJC.com: Op-ed: Poor people not excluded from Constitution by Jay Bookman:

Here we go again.

On April 15, 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Georgia law that required candidates to be tested for illegal drugs before they could run for public office. In “Chandler v. Miller”, the court ruled that the tests amounted to an unreasonable, unjustified search of a person’s body that is forbidden under the Fourth Amendment.

“However well-meant, the candidate drug test Georgia has devised diminishes personal privacy for a symbol’s sake,” Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in the 8-1 decision, joined by justices such as Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.

NYTimes.com: No Savings Are Found From Welfare Drug Tests by Lizette Alvarez:

Ushered in amid promises that it would save taxpayers money and deter drug users, a Florida law requiring drug tests for people who seek welfare benefits resulted in no direct savings, snared few drug users and had no effect on the number of applications, according to recently released state data.

Many states are considering following Florida’s example, and the new data from the state shows they shouldn’t,” said Derek Newton, communications director for the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, which sued the state last year to stop the testing and recently obtained the documents. “Not only is it unconstitutional and an invasion of privacy, but it doesn’t save money, as was proposed.”

Officers’ alleged failure knock before entry was entitled to qualified immunity or was constitutionally justified. The officers knew that a gun was likely involved, and the search warrant included weapons. Under Richards and Wilson, this was sufficient to dispense with announcement for officer safety. Youngbey v. March, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7630 (D.C. Cir. April 17, 2012).*

Defendants were moving around from room to room in a hotel, and vacated two rooms. The police had probable cause to search the rooms they were in as well as the abandoned rooms for firearms. A gun was actually abandoned in one of the vacated rooms. United States v. Albury, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53644 (M.D. Fla. April 17, 2012).*

Officers searching a computer hard drive had the benefit of the plain view doctrine when they came upon obvious chat logs and foreign travel information. United States v. Johnston, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53323 (E.D. Cal. April 16, 2012).*

The traffic stop of car defendant was in was justified by occupants not using seatbelts. Defendant refused to submit and fled, and he was never seized. United States v. Lindsey, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52250 (E.D. Tenn. February 3, 2012):

Because the Fourth Amendment governs actual seizure, not attempted seizures, the government need not justify Officer Fielden's attempt to stop Defendant. United States v. Smith, No. 10-1551, 2012 WL 181393 (6th Cir. Jan. 24, 2012) (holding that police need not justify their attempt to stop a defendant who evades their attempt). If a suspect is not seized because he evades the police, the Fourth Amendment is simply not implicated. Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 254; United States v. George, No. 10-6159, 2012 WL 128402, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 17, 2012) ("Without actual submission, 'there is at most an attempted seizure.'") (quoting Jones, 562 F.3d at 774 and Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 254); United States v. Smith, 594 F.3d 530, 535-36 (6th Cir. 2010) ("In order for a seizure to occur, the encounter must not be consensual and the officers must use physical force or the individual must submit to the officers' show of authority.").

The government does not dispute that Officer Fielden engaged in a show of authority. Defendant does not appear to contest that he failed to submit to Officer Fielden's show of authority; instead, Defendant contends he was seized, perhaps by physical force, the moment Officer Fielden's gun was drawn and pointed at him. The case law simply does not support Defendant's position.

Defendant was seen at the scene of four controlled buys and was believed involved himself, and the totality gave probable cause. Thus, the search incident of his person and car were supported by probable cause. Defendant initially denied any connection to the premises, disclaiming an ability to consent. Officers then went to the door and talked to the occupant and got consent. Defendant made no effort to show standing, so he can’t object to the consent of another. United States v. Sayles, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53070 (S.D. Ill. April 16, 2012).*

Defendant was arrested for carjacking, and keys were found on his person. The officer could remove the keys as a potential weapon or because there was probable cause to connect him to the carjacking under the search incident doctrine. United States v. Yancy, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52394 (W.D. Tenn. April 13, 2012).*

Defendant’s detention was legal, so that did not change the government’s burden of showing consent, which the court finds to be voluntary. United States v. Armenta, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52729 (D. Utah April 12, 2012).*

Police came to defendant’s house on a child welfare call and asked to come in, and they were permitted. The court discusses the "hierarchy among tenants" for apparent consent. United States v. MacArthur, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52269 (S.D. W.Va. April 13, 2012):

Co-tenant consent may also be limited where a hierarchy among tenants in authority over the premises makes the consent of one insufficient to validate a search of the entire premises. For example, although a short-term guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his temporary quarters, Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 109 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1990), his control over all portions of the home where he stays may not be as extensive that of the owner, or a more permanent co-tenant. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 99 ("From the overnight guest's perspective, he seeks shelter in another's home precisely because it provides him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions will not be disturbed by anyone but his host and those his host allows inside.") (emphasis added); see also State v. Grant, 614 N.W. 2d 848, 853 (Iowa App. 2000) ("an overnight guest's legitimate expectation of privacy does not vitiate the homeowner's ability to consent to a search of his home.") (collecting cases).

Herald American: School wants to test all students for drugs by Christopher O'Donnell:

SARASOTA COUNTY - Students as young as 11 years old would be tested for use of marijuana, pills, cocaine and heroin under a proposal by a North Port charter school that wants to institute the region's most aggressive student testing program.

Imagine School at North Port hopes to begin drug testing students at its junior high school campus next school year, including sixth-graders. Students would be required to pass a drug test to attend the school and pass at least one random drug test per year to remain enrolled.

Another drug testing program that can't survive even minimal Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Why do the legislatures want to make civil rights lawyers money?

Karl Rove has you by the ballots.  With a $200 million war chest from a coven of billionaires, don't count on getting your vote counted.

There's only one thing to stop him:  A COMIC BOOK.

Please help us raise the cash to get this printed. The nation’s top elections-heist investigators can publish our new voter-protection comic book, BILLIONAIRES & BALLOT BANDITS.

Donate $99 today and we'll list your name in the special thanks of the book for the 99% - plus a signed copy!

Or, if you can't swing that, at least get a signed DVD which you can pre-order.

In 2008, you helped us put out the amazing Steal Back Your Vote comic book which went to over a quarter million threatened voters.  We are proud that one is in the Native-American museum in Santa Fe, New Mexico.

Genius pen-man Ted Rall, crusading voting rights attorney Bobby Kennedy Jr., gonzo photographer Zach Roberts (Friday is his trial date from his arrest covering the Occupation for us) and the rest of the Palast Investigation crew will be putting together another comic book PLUS a film short series PLUS a booklet.

The comic book, films and booklet will combine our investigation of vote theft with the names and blood-soaked sources of the super-PACs.

We know the billionaires, open and hidden, behind Restore Our Future, the Kochs and Rove’s Crossroads GPS. Shouldn’t you know who’s buying the White House and how they got their loot?

Help us get out the story right now.

We are a not-for-profit project and strictly non-partisan: it’s about saving our democracy from a coup d’état of moneyed ballot-burglars.

We MUST get this information out and soon. Help us right now and get your name in the film credits and in the book.

Are you an Angel?  We need heavenly agents to donate $1,000 each -- and get film co-producer credits and book co-publish credit ... 20 copies to give to the Occupation, civil rights or non-profit group of your choice.

Since 1996, when I was the first journalist to film a documentary exposé on the Koch Brothers, I've been building the files that no one has yet seen.  HELP ME GET OUT THE EVIDENCE.

In 2000, we uncovered how Katherine Harris purged 56,000 African-Americans from Florida’s voter rolls.  It's gotten worse––I kid you not––and we need to expose the Right's latest ballot burglary scheme.

And we got it to the activists: we made it available for free and published it in The Nation. All from donations.

Our publisher, Seven Stories Books, is willing to put the book/comic out for a dirt cheap price, online and in print. We need to get this onto the streets and into the media before the election.

Not one dime goes to Greg Palast.  I will donate my time and files.  But we can’t get to the scenes of the ballot-box crimes by flapping our arms.  We need travel money.

We already have hair-raising film in the can. That too needs editing so we can shine it on those who wreck our civil rights.

By the way: If you have ever donated to our Fund and NOT received the expected gift, please let us know immediately.  Everyone of our supporters is our soulmate.

You know I don't ask often.  But now I have to. Join me in supporting this defense of our democracy.

There are many levels at which you can support us - even for as a little as a $1.

"Journalism is just a gun. It's only got one bullet in it, but if you aim right, that's all you need. Aim it right, and you can blow a kneecap off the world." - Warren Ellis

Load our weapon.

With respect,

Greg Palast

******

Greg Palast is the author of Vultures' Picnic: In Pursuit of Petroleum Pigs, Power Pirates and High-Finance Carnivores.

Subscribe to Palast's Newsletter and podcasts.

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New American: Mich. State Agents Raid Pig Farms to Kill So-called "Invasive Species" by Raven Clabough:

Michigan's Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) has reportedly violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting two armed raids on pig farms in the state's Kalkaska and Cheboygan Counties. The incursions, which included six vehicles and 10 armed men, were apparently for the purpose of shooting all the farmers' pigs under the new “Invasive Species Order” (ISO) that has much of declared traditional livestock to be an invasive species.

In 2010, the Michigan DNR outlawed feral swine — pigs classified as non-native, invasive, and said to be carriers of disease and overall harmful to the environment. Though groups fought adamantly to overturn the ban, it went into effect April 1.

Exigency to stop a pig pandemic?

News and Insight: Judge allows expert witness in 'stop and frisk' case against NYPD:

NEW YORK, April 16 (Reuters) - The New York Police Department has lost a bid to prevent an expert witness from testifying at a trial about the controversial crime-fighting tactic known as "stop and frisk."

Manhattan federal court Judge Shira Scheindlin on Monday said Columbia University professor Jeffrey Fagan, a criminology expert, would be allowed to testify about his "stop and frisk" research showing that police were more likely to stop blacks and Hispanics than whites.

The Free Speech Coalition’s case against the Attorney General for searches under pornography manufacturer’s recordkeeping requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 2257 stated a First and Fourth Amendment claim because of unannounced FBI visits to search records. On remand, the district court should consider the trespass implications ofJones. Free Speech Coalition Inc. v. Attorney General of the United States, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7543 (3d Cir. April 16, 2012):

There are two ways in which the government’s conduct may constitute a “search” implicating the Fourth Amendment. First, a Fourth Amendment search occurs when “the person invoking its protection can claim a justifiable, a reasonable, or a legitimate expectation of privacy that has been invaded by government action.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001) (“[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied ... and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). Determining whether one’s expectation of privacy is justifiable involves two separate inquiries: (1) whether the individual demonstrated an actual or subjective expectation of privacy in the subject of the search or seizure; and (2) whether this expectation of privacy is objectively justifiable under the circumstances. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (quotation marks omitted); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 994 (3d Cir. 1985).

Second, as the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Jones makes clear, a Fourth Amendment search also occurs where the government unlawfully, physically occupies private property for the purpose of obtaining information. See 132 S. Ct. at 949-52 (stating that the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test set forth in Katz was “added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test”) (emphasis in original). Under this analysis, we must determine whether the government committed common-law trespass when obtaining the information. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949-52; see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (explaining the common-law-trespass test employed prior to Katz). If such a trespass occurs, then the government’s actions constitute a search implicating the Fourth Amendment. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949-52.

Here, the District Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, as sought to be amended. Courts generally must consider the concrete factual context when determining the constitutional validity of a warrantless search. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968) (declining to hold whether a particular statute was facially invalid under the Fourth Amendment because the “constitutional validity of a warrantless search is pre-eminently the sort of question which can only be decided in the concrete factual context of the individual case”); United States ex rel. McArthur v. Rundle, 402 F.2d 701, 704-05 (3d Cir. 1968) (stating that in the case of warrantless searches, courts are required to consider the concrete factual context); see also United States v. $291,828.00 in United States Currency, 536 F.3d 1234, 1238 (11th Cir. 2008). Plaintiffs’ complaint, as amended, would allege that government officials searched and/or seized without a warrant—and in violation of the Fourth Amendment—the premises and effects of certain FSC members and others. The record, however, is not clear as to: which specific members of FSC were searched; when and where the searches of the FSC members and others occurred (i.e., offices or homes); and the conduct of the government during the search (e.g., what specific information the government reviewed and whether the government exceeded its authority under the applicable regulations).

This factual context is necessary for determining whether the government’s conduct was a “search” under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to either the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test set forth in Katz or the common-law-trespass test described in Jones. ...