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That defendant may have had a pocket knife didn’t mean he was false when he said he had no weapons on him because small pocket knives are not considered weapons to most people. Defendant’s frisk was without reasonable suspicion he was armed. United States v. House, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6081 (10th Cir. March 23, 2012) (unpublished):

It is likely that many law-abiding citizens would not consider themselves armed with a weapon, while carrying a folded pocket knife, when approached on the street and questioned unexpectedly by an officer. To allow a search based on the hunch that a citizen walking down the street is illegally carrying a firearm, without more, serves to erode the precious protections of the Second and Fourth Amendments. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 ("[I]ntrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches [are] a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction.").

An officer is free to initiate a consensual encounter without any articulable suspicion. Such an encounter may develop previously unconfirmed suspicions of criminal behavior and/or result in genuine concerns for officer safety. United States v. Jones, 606 F.3d 964, 968 (8th Cir. 2010). The difficulty in this case is that the consensual encounter did neither; in the absence of which, the evidence must be suppressed as violative of the Fourth Amendment.

A commercial vehicle safety stop was valid, and defendant’s lack of knowledge about his load, where he got it, and exactly where he was going was reasonable suspicion to detain him for a dog sniff. The USMJ concluded that the trailer was unlawfully searched but a drug dog alert after that was inevitable discovery because that was probable cause. United States v. Rendon, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5974 (11th Cir. March 22, 2012) (unpublished).*

The testimony of consent was conflicting, but the credibility determination of the trial court is binding on appeal. State v. Reglus, 2012 Ohio 1174, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1033 (9th Dist. March 21, 2012)* (sustaining consent); State v. Durden, 2012 Ohio 1194, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1048 (8th Dist. March 22, 2012) (finding consent involuntary).

The trial court concluded that the officer’s car blocked defendant’s car and was a stop, but it was with reasonable suspicion. State v. Spradlin, 2012 Ohio 1211, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1071 (5th Dist. March 12, 2012).*

An affidavit for search warrant that showed utterly no connection to the place to be searched lacked probable cause. And, it was so lacking in probable cause that the good faith exception did not apply. United States v. Bautista, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39222 (W.D. Ky. March 22, 2012):

To establish probable cause, the affidavit must have indicated why evidence of illegal activity would be found at the particular place to be search-Lot #78. The affidavit does not do so. Like in Laughton, the affidavit in this case neither indicated that Lot # 78 was Bautista's residence nor indicated that the drug sales described by Copeland occurred at Lot # 78. Instead, the affidavit states only that the drug sales occurred at Bautista's residence, and then lists Lot # 78 as the place to be searched. The government contends that, given all the circumstances of Copeland's information and the detailed description of the place to be searched, the inference can be made Lot #78 is Bautista's residence. However, the government's argument is to no avail because the affidavit contains no evidence from which such an inference could be made. The single paragraph setting forth the factual details fails to even mention Lot #78. Accordingly, probable cause to search the residence located at Lot #78 was not established because the affidavit submitted to obtain the warrant did not explain the significance or the relevance of searching the home located at this particular location. See United States v. Hove, 848 F.2d 137, 139 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding no probable cause where the affidavit failed to provide any nexus between the residence and the illegal activity).

. . .

Likewise, here, the affidavit simply lists an address of the premises to be searched, and states Copeland's allegations regarding the fact that he regularly purchased methamphetamine from Bautista at his home. There is not even a "modicum of evidence" linking the criminal activity described by Copeland and Lot #78. Cf. United States v. Van Shutters, 163 F.3d 331, 337 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying good faith exception where affidavit for search warrant neglected to indicate why the affiant believed the defendant had any connection to the residence, but did state that the rooms in the residence were available to the defendant). Importantly, the affidavit did not state any evidence linking Bautista to Lot #78 and did not even state that Bautista resided at Lot #78. No reasonable officer could have believed that the affidavit was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to be reliable. Although the Court does not find that the law enforcement officers acted in bad faith, it nonetheless must conclude that the Leon good faith exception does not apply.

A citizen informant’s report that his store was a crime victim was a sufficient basis for a stop. State v. Wiggins, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 178 (March 20, 2012).

Factual disputes on excessive force as shown by the video was enough to deny qualified immunity. Staten v. Tatom, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5991 (5th Cir. March 22, 2012).*

Appellate counsel’s decision not to appeal the alleged lack of probable cause for the search warrant was justified because it was a loser issue. Ford v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38296 (E.D. Mo. March 21, 2012).*

It was reasonable to arrest plaintiff with probable cause on a controlled delivery because he signed for the package with a fictitious first name for him. This was more than mere acceptance of the package known by the police to carry drugs. He left the house with the package and got into a car with the package, and that gave probable cause to search the car [citing search incident cases, which was wrong; automobile exception applied]. Johnson v. United States, 2012 D.C. App. LEXIS 130 (March 22, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped for a seat belt violation, and reasonable suspicion developed from numerous factors, one of which was that defendant was a known drug trafficker who made a five hour trip to a store and didn’t buy anything. State v. Fisher, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 386 (March 20, 2012).*

Fourth Amendment issue raised on direct appeal and rejected was not a proper subject of a 2255. Martinez v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36781 (D. S.D. March 19, 2012).*

Officers found defendant in an apartment being searched under a search warrant, and they had probable cause as to him on the premises. This was unlike the unwitting bar patron in Ybarra. A patdown of defendant produced car keys, and keys were subject to the warrant. It was immediately apparent what they were by feel, unlike Dickerson. United States v. Cowan, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6051 (8th Cir. March 23, 2012):

Cowan’s presence in Booth’s apartment, unlike the patron in the public tavern in Ybarra and more like the passenger in the private car in Pringle or the hotel room occupant in Romero, could lead a reasonable officer “to infer [Cowan was part of] a common enterprise” among the people in the apartment. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373. Although an apartment “is a larger and more multipurpose space,” Romero, 452 F.3d at 618 n.2, than the hotel room in Romero, Detective Canas had additional reason to suspect Cowan was involved in the drug trafficking activity. After breaking down the exterior door to the building and before entering the apartment, the officers saw someone running inside, which reasonably suggested people present in the apartment were trying to conceal evidence of drug trafficking activity. When Cowan stated he was from Chicago—the reputed source of the crack cocaine used in the suspected drug trafficking operation occurring in the apartment—Cowan gave Detective Canas particularized suspicion that Cowan himself was involved in the drug trafficking. The present case is further distinguishable from Ybarra because Detective Canas frisked Cowan’s outer clothing pursuant to Terry, and the search of Ybarra was not a valid Terry frisk. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92-93. Detective Canas did not violate Cowan’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by patting down Cowan’s pockets and seizing the keys.

Defendant failed to show standing in a hotel room that he was not registered to that he was only a casual visitor to. United States v. Bushay, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37935 (N.D. Ga. March 12, 2012)*:

First, Judge Baverman concluded that Bushay lacked standing to challenge the agents' search of the hotel room because he did not establish that he had a subjective or objective expectation of privacy in the hotel room. As to Bushay's subjective expectation of privacy, the magistrate judge concluded that Bushay did not show that he had an unrestricted right of occupancy or custody and control of the premises as distinguished from occasional presence on the premises as a mere guest or invitee. Specifically, Bushay failed to establish that the room was rented in his name, that he paid for the room, or that he was the registered additional guest.

In reaching this conclusion, Judge Baverman found significant that Bushay described his presence in the area as having "met friends"; referred to "the" hotel room rather than "his" hotel room; never proved that the two plastic keys were in fact the keys to room 308; did not prove that the vehicle he was operating at the time of his arrest was a vehicle registered for room 308; was not using the hotel for lodging; and kept no personal items in the room other than the gun. Although Bushay argued that the fact that the agents believed that he was staying in the room helped prove his standing, Judge Baverman found this argument unpersuasive because a defendant may not establish standing by relying on the government's theory of the case. Because he could not establish that the hotel room was his, nor could he establish that he was an overnight guest, Judge Baverman found that Bushay had not established that he had a subjective expectation of privacy. Further, he concluded that Bushay had also failed to establish an objective expectation of privacy in the hotel room because at most he was only a casual visitor.

Cell phone pictures might have evidence of crime in drug cases. I've been seeing for years in search warrant affidavits that officers want to see pictures on computers or in a house because of the propensity of drug traffickers to take pictures of their scores. And, I've seen them in evidence: all the plants of the grow operation, the bounty from the big score, the pound of coke before it is parceled out. See Mail Online: Driving his Porsche in pants, posing with stacks of cash and beating up his rivals: Photos found on lost phone of 'Chinese gangster' show his bad-boy lifestyle. Besides the stacks of cash, there's a picture of torture with a pair of pliers and a foot to the neck.

NetworkWorld: You consent to a search if a camera sees you? Facial Recognition vs 4th Amendment:

When you go outside or go to other public places such as a bank or a mall, have you automatically given up your Fourth Amendment rights and consented to a search? When it comes to tracking you via facial recognition technology, what if the government or other law enforcement were to use that argument, that by simply being in a place where there are security cameras, you waived your Fourth Amendment rights and consented to a search?

The FBI and DOD sponsored a legal series about the U.S. government using facial recognition; the latest forum was titled "Striking the Balance - A Government Approach to Facial Recognition Privacy and Civil Liberties." Whenever the word 'balance' is used, privacy and civil liberties are usually about to be kicked in the name of 'security.' When it comes to surveillance via facial recognition technology, federal law enforcement, intelligence personnel and national security agencies are looking into the "gaps in legal/policy authority that may result in privacy and civil liberties vulnerabilities if left unaddressed."

The Future of Privacy Forum (FPF) Senior Fellow Peter Swire, also a law professor at Ohio State University, spoke about "Facial Recognition by the Government: Privacy and Civil Liberties Issues." Since using "one's facial image, with or without knowledge or consent," can identify and be used to track a person "an inherent tension exists between privacy and facial recognition." The forum was to "examine where the appropriate balance lies between crime and terrorism prevention using facial recognition and robust privacy safeguards." Swire started with two different perspectives about facial recognition, according to FPF.

Failure to file a suppression motion is not a ground for IAC without showing how it would have been granted. Just alleging one wasn't filed doesn't cut it. People v. Johnson, 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 519 (March 20, 2012).*

Defendant’s claim defense counsel was not ineffective for not moving to quash the arrest warrant fails because there was clearly probable cause. People v. Lambert, 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 499 (March 20, 2012).*

The CI was not shown to be reliable except by corroboration by an “extensive” police investigation, and that was adequate. The triggering conditions of the anticipatory warrant here satisfied Grubbs. United States v. Donnell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36487 (D. Minn. February 2, 2012).*