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Issuance of a search warrant in Wisconsin is not purely a judicial function under state law or the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, court commissioners can issue search warrants. State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59 (May 30, 2012):

¶3 Throughout Wisconsin's history, including before the ratification of the Wisconsin Constitution, non-judges have been authorized by statute to issue search warrants. Therefore, we conclude that the issuance of a search warrant is not an exercise of "[t]he judicial power," as that phrase is employed in Article VII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Instead, issuance of a valid search warrant requires that the individual be authorized by law to issue the warrant, that he or she be neutral and detached, and that the warrant be issued only upon a showing of probable cause.

¶4 Because we also conclude that Wis. Stat. § 757.69(1)(b), which allocates the power to issue search warrants to circuit court commissioners, does not impermissibly intrude upon "[t]he judicial power" granted to the courts by Article VII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution, we hold that § 757.69(1)(b) is constitutional. Therefore, the circuit court commissioner's search warrant was validly issued. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's denial of Williams' motion to suppress.

. . .

¶26 Therefore, we recognize that Article I, Section 11's warrant requirement has not mandated a determination of probable cause by a judge or a court of record. Non-judges who are "neutral and detached" and are able to ascertain whether probable cause exists have been expected to issue search warrants in the past, provided that they are authorized by statute to do so. Accordingly, issuance of a search warrant does not require an exercise of the judicial power that is vested exclusively in courts under Article VII, Section 2. Although issuing a search warrant may require some exercise of
quasi-judicial power, it is something less than and distinguishable from the power vested in courts and elected judges.

I remember the briefs in Leon pointing out the large number of non-trained judicial and quasi-judicial officers (like state JPs) who could issue warrants. Leon didn't address this, and this case doesn't cite Leon, but it doesn't have to. If the warrant is valid, good faith doesn't matter.

h/t to a reader

Defendant company and its principal were accused of false statements on toxic waste reports. The state EPA got a search warrant from the judge overseeing a statewide grand jury, and the search warrant clearly contemplated digital documents which were reasonably seized via seizure of the hard drives rather than an onsite inspection. Other technical arguments were moot, including sealing the search warrant materials for a while. United States v. Blue Marsh Labs., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73544 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped by the police for DUI when the motorist behind him at a McDonald’s drive-thru at 4 am called the police that he was “drunk as hell,” giving the vehicle make, color, and license number. The officer corroborated the tip with the McDonald’s employee. That was cause for a stop. State v. Steinbrunner, 2012 Ohio 2358, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2083 (3d Dist. May 29, 2012).*

Where officer could not articulate a facial legal basis for the stop, it was unreasonable as a matter of law. In addition, the trial court made a finding of fact [likely to help the officer] that was never in the testimony at the hearing. State v. Haas, 2012 Ohio 2362, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 2080 (3d Dist. May 29, 2012):

[*P27] In light of the relevant case law from this and other districts, we hold that when a defendant's conduct does not facially violate the traffic statute which provides the sole basis for the officer's alleged reasonable articulable suspicion, the stop is unconstitutional.

. . .

[*P33] The State argues that it would be unreasonable to expect our law enforcement officers to know the details of every traffic offense and to make an accurate determination of the statute's applicability. Such requirements, the State explains, would hamper law enforcement to the extent it would cause "paralysis by analysis." We aver that knowledge of the traffic laws is the very essence of a patrol officer's job. To require any less than an accurate, working knowledge of the traffic offenses and to fail to ensure that the one being seized at least reasonably appeared to have violated a statute on its face gravely deprives citizens of their constitutional right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures.

[*P34] This is the unfortunate scenario in the present case. Officer Wymer unconstitutionally seized Haas under the suspicion that Haas violated a law. However, the officer's own testimony revealed that he did not know the requirements of this very law. Haas was not and could not have been engaged in the specific criminal activity testified to by Officer Wymer. Yet he was seized and arrested due to the officer's lack of knowledge of the very law he was enforcing.

Defendant was virtually strip searched for drugs on the street. He was arrested and face down on the sidewalk, and the arresting officers pulled down his pants to get to the drugs hidden in his buttocks. This was unreasonable. The officers knew that the lump in his pants was not a weapon. Commonwealth v. Morales, 2012 Mass. LEXIS 463 (May 29, 2012):

Here, with regard to the strip search, at the time when Detective Desmarais removed the drugs from between the defendant's buttock area, the police did not, as we suggested in Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra at 409 n.5, conduct the search in a private room or in any private location. The handcuffed defendant was face down on a public sidewalk and surrounded by four police officers. Detective Desmarais had determined that the lump in the rear of the defendant's shorts was not a weapon. Thus, there was no concern that the defendant could have used a weapon against the officers, fled, or destroyed evidence. With no exigency existing, the defendant should have been transported to a private space or location. Doing so would have avoided what followed, namely, the public exposure of his buttocks, an embarrassing and humiliating intrusion of the defendant's privacy. Indeed, the policy of the Lowell police department prohibits strip searches outside the confines of a police station. In the circumstances, the location of this search was inappropriate.

The manner in which the search proceeded, whereby the defendant's buttocks were publicly exposed in the absence of exigent circumstances, was unreasonable. See Paulino v. State, 399 Md. 341, 359 (2007) (instead of reaching into defendant's underwear to retrieve contraband, officer lifted up defendant's underwear and publicly exposed his buttocks, which rendered search unreasonable). There was no explanation in the record why Detective Desmarais was able to inspect the defendant's buttocks area for drugs without public exposure, but was unable to retrieve the drugs without the resulting exposure. If Detective Desmarais could not have retrieved the drugs without exposing the defendant's buttocks, he should not have conducted the search on a public sidewalk. Both the inappropriate location of the search and the manner in which it was conducted rendered the strip search constitutionally unreasonable under both the Federal and State Constitutions. Accordingly, we affirm the judge's order of suppression.

The officer was suspicious of defendant who would not remove his hands from his pockets during an encounter, and he directed defendant to remove his hands, but only one was pulled out. This was reasonable suspicion defendant was armed. United States v. Manuel, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73703 (W.D. Mo. May 8, 2012).*

Defendant was properly seized incident to his arrest, the court finding it was in his hand. Thereafter, a search warrant was issued for the phone, which was valid. United States v. Bass, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73783 (E.D. Mich. May 29, 2012).*

Police responding to a burglary in progress call from a pawnshop’s burglar alarm had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle on the parking lot after hours. United States v. Von Bargen, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73458 (D. Idaho May 25, 2012).*

Waiver of collateral attack in guilty plea was binding on defendant. There was no conditional plea, and defendant knew he was waiving the opportunity to challenge the search. United States v. Hernandez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73728 (E.D. Ky. April 16, 2012).*

Defendant consented to a search of his vehicle and cell phones were seized, and it took a long time for the government to get search warrants for the cell phones, which were evidence of a crime. The delay did not require suppression. United States v. Franklin, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73692 (N.D. Ga. April 27, 2012), adopted in part 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73714 (N.D. Ga. May 25, 2012):

For all of the reasons stated above, Mitchell [United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2009)] is distinguishable from the instant case and does not provide a basis for the suppression of Boykins's cell phones.4 See United States v. Emanuel, 440 F. App'x 881, 885-86 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Because Emanuel gave his voluntary consent to the seizure and search of his computer, Mitchell is inapposite"); United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 235 (3d Cir. 2011) (distinguishing Mitchell because the warrantless seizures in Mitchell were based on probable cause and not consent).

4 Boykins also relies heavily on United States v. Shaw, No. 1:11-cr-239-29-CAP-ECS, 2012 WL 844075 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 10, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 843919 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 12, 2012) [here](granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence where search warrant was not obtained until three months after cell phones were seized). However, Shaw is distinguishable because the seizure in that case was based on a search incident to arrest rather than consent. To the extent that Shaw is not distinguishable, I disagree with it and choose not to follow it. [The USDJ disagrees with this footnote.]

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