VoteKansas.org

Apparently some New York, Connecticut, and Arkansas police agencies have decided that seat belt checks are a good idea for a roadblock. They aren't constitutional because the true safety rationale of Sitz is missing, and they are only going to end up giving taxpayer dollars to the civil rights lawyer that sues them first. The point, of course, is what else is swept up, like drug arrests, which will lead to a motion to suppress.

Defendant’s statement during an investigative detention was not the subject of flagrant police conduct warranting suppression under Brown. State v. Buford, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 342 (May 24, 2012)*:

Consequently, a weighing of the Brown factors leads to the conclusion that the defendant's statements were sufficiently the product of his own free will so as to purge the taint of any illegal arrest. Moreover, in this case, the legal conclusion dictated by Brown is confirmed by the presence of additional facts. The record reflects that the defendant never requested to leave at any point during the time period he was in police custody. Furthermore, the statements that the defendant made to police were intended to be exculpatory. While the principle that exculpatory statements may be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree is a concept as old as the doctrine itself, see Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487 (rejecting the government's argument that certain statements should be admissible because they were ostensibly exculpatory), the overarching picture painted by this record is not one of a defendant coerced into making an involuntary confession - or indeed any sort of statement at all--to the police as a result of some pressure or trauma resulting from an illegal detention.

A burglary suspect told the police that he saw marijuana in defendant’s house when he burglarized it. The police used that as a justification for a knock-and-talk, and defendant let them in. They saw marijuana in plain view, and this was valid. Defendant argued pretext for the knock-and-talk, but that was unavailing. State v. Seiler, 2012 La. LEXIS 1428 (May 25, 2012):

In this instance, defendant's home was the subject of a recent burglary. Upon information received from the burglary suspect there was contraband in the home, police officers from both the New Orleans Police Property Crimes Unit and officers from the Narcotics Unit traveled to defendant's home to investigate. When the officers knocked on the defendant's door, they requested and were granted entry into his home by the defendant himself. As a result, we do not find the officers were unlawfully in that place at that time.

The trial court, to justify its ruling suppressing evidence, stated in its per curiam the officers used a "pretext" to gain entry to the defendant's home, in that the officers attempted to enter the defendant's home under the guise of a continuing burglary investigation, and not a narcotics investigation. However, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978), "the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action." In other words, if the officers had an objective right to knock on the defendant's door and ask to be admitted, it is of no moment the reason they were admitted may not have been the full reason they were at the defendant's home in the first place. Here, detectives knocked on the defendant's door, informed him they were there to investigate the burglary, and they were granted entry voluntarily by the defendant. See, Sanders, 374 So. 2d at 1188.

Moral to the story? Don't report a burglary at your house if you keep dope there. Grin and bear it. The number of times I've seen that in reported decisions is significant. You never know when the police will show up thereafter.

Backyard of mobile home with a gravel driveway that ended at front yard and brush all around that blocked view from road was curtilage. Going to the backyard by following the garden hose violated the curtilage for a knock-and-talk. State v. Draper, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 346 (May 24, 2012)*:

The "knock and talk" procedure does not justify Deputy Hamby's incursion into the curtilage of the Defendants' home. Deputy Hamby was very clear in his testimony at the suppression hearing that he did not approach the Defendants' front door and made no attempt to contact them at the front door. Deputy Hamby could not recall if any of the water company employees attempted to contact the Defendants at their front door. Deputy Hamby also could not recall whether there were any other cars in the driveway when he arrived. Deputy Hamby testified that he bypassed the front door and simply followed the water hose into the Defendants' backyard. As such, Deputy Hamby left the area where the public was impliedly invited, exceeded the scope of the implied invitation, and intruded upon a constitutionally protected area. Furthermore, Deputy Hamby was aware that the Defendants had posted "no trespassing" signs on their property, effectively revoking the implied invitation of the front door. Accordingly, we conclude that Deputy Hamby made no attempt to institute a "knock and talk" procedure and that the procedure provides no justification for his warrantless entry into the Defendants' backyard.