Truth News

CA1: No joint venture with DEA in Aruba wiretap in drug investigation

FourthAmendment.com - News - Wed, 2024-11-27 20:40

An American DEA officer in Aruba working on a drug investigation ultimately indicted in Puerto Rico was not on a joint venture with Aruba. The Aruba investigation was underway before he got there, and they got the wiretap on their own without U.S. participation and then excluded the DEA officer from having anything to do with it while it was conducted. United States v. Valdivia, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9876 (1st Cir. May 16, 2012).

Officer’s knowledge of an arrest warrant for person is reason for a stop. United States v. Nelson, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9839 (3d Cir. May 16, 2012).*

The stop of the car here was justified because of a license plate light being out, even though there was a temporary paper tag in the rear window. Once an arrest was made of the driver, it was proper to impound and inventory the car at 4:30 am, and there is no constitutional requirement to impose lesser intrusive measures on the police to find the unidentified and unregistered alleged owner. United States v. Cubillos, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68984 (N.D. Ga. March 20, 2012).*

DE rejects de minimus continuation of pretextual highway stop

FourthAmendment.com - News - Wed, 2024-11-27 20:40

Defendant’s car was stopped for a traffic offense and a pretext for a drug investigation. There was justification for the traffic stop but no reasonable suspicion for anything else. A de minimus Fourth Amendment violation is rejected as inconsistent with Arizona v. Johnson which had reasonable suspicion. Murray v. State, 2012 Del. LEXIS 266 (May 14, 2012):

This case, then, involves baseless police investigation after the conclusion of a traffic stop. The dissent nevertheless defends this continuing investigation, describing it as a de minimis intrusion. The first problem with this conception is that the relevant United States Supreme Court precedent focuses on whether police extended the traffic stop's duration "measurably," not on whether police extend the stop "significantly" or "substantially." In Arizona v. Johnson, the Court said that "[a]n officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of a traffic stop." In Johnson, the Court permitted an officer who suspected criminal activity on the strength of gang clothing, tattoos, and the presence of a police scanner radio to perform a protective patdown at the start of a traffic stop. That is, the 'unrelated matters,' in Johnson, were not matters that the officer dealt with after the traffic stop, but measures taken for self-protection at the very start of the traffic stop. None of the officers in this case spotted items in the car that provided a reasonable basis to think the car's occupants posed a threat, nor did they conduct protective patdowns at the start of the encounter.

NYTimes.com: "Kelly Reacts After Stop-and-Frisk Ruling"

FourthAmendment.com - News - Wed, 2024-11-27 20:40

NYTimes.com: Kelly Reacts After Stop-and-Frisk Ruling:

A day after a federal judge issued a ruling fiercely criticizing the New York Police Department’s stop-and-frisk tactics, Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly unveiled new measures on Thursday intended to reduce the frequency of illegitimate stops.

The measures, which were outlined in a three-page letter sent to the City Council speaker, Christine C. Quinn, include a re-emphasis on an existing departmental order banning racial profiling. The order is to be incorporated in routine training sessions for officers beginning next month.

CA6: Eight individually weak factors of RS collectively were enough

FourthAmendment.com - News - Wed, 2024-11-27 20:40

Eight factors of reasonable suspicion cited by the government were individually quite weak but collectively were reasonable suspicion. United States v. Stepp, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9883, 2012 FED App. 0140P (6th Cir. May 17, 2012).*

“While the totality of the circumstances may include innocent activity, the innocent factors must collectively eliminate ‘a substantial portion of innocent travelers before the requirement of reasonable suspicion will be satisfied,’ as Defendant's actions do. United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 781 (4th Cir. 2004).” United States v. Stacks, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67422 (W.D. N.C. May 14, 2012).*

There was [clearly] probable cause for a search warrant for defendant’s house when the police were able to credibly link him to a bank robbery. United States v. Allen, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68902 (W.D. Mo. April 24, 2012).*

41(g) motion for return of property is denied because the government doesn’t have the property. Also, the claimant has an adequate remedy under state law for the same thing. Bennett v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68298 (N.D. W.Va. April 13, 2012), adopted 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67925 (N.D. W.Va. May 16, 2012).*

Huge Explosions And Tracers: Alex Jones Reports

TruthNews.US - News - Wed, 2024-11-27 20:40
Infowars | Here, a few "bitter clingers" are defending the 2nd Amendment by exercising their 1st Amendment right to promote the fun of guns.
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