Truth News

D.Mass.: Discovery of GPS related information premature until motion to suppress filed

FourthAmendment.com - News - Wed, 2024-11-27 22:50

Defendant’s discovery request for GPS trade information was denied as was his request for information which would support the government’s claim of Davis good faith until he files a motion to suppress the GPS information. United States v. Rose, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68095 (D. Mass. May 16, 2012).*

Delay in seeking a search warrant for a computer was not unreasonable where the delay was caused by the government thinking that defendant was going to cooperate. United States v. Armstrong, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68429 (M.D. Pa. May 15, 2012)*:

The fact that an earlier application was presented to a Magistrate Judge is not dispositive, particularly because the Magistrate Judge was concerned about the timing of the warrant in light of the imminent trial. Although the timing of the request for authorization, almost one year after the initial seizure of the laptops, is of concern, I am willing to accept the Government's representation that it did not immediately request an authorization to search the computers because it believed Armstrong intended to cooperate with the Government and plead guilty.

Where body language allegedly belied the defendant’s denial he had drugs in the car, a frisk was reasonable. United States v. Acosta, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67551 (W.D. Mo. April 27, 2012).*

D.N.M.: Does Brady apply to suppression hearings?

FourthAmendment.com - News - Wed, 2024-11-27 22:50

If Brady likely applies to suppression motions, there was no showing that the evidence was sufficiently impeaching to change the outcome. United States v. Harmon, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67260 (D. N.M. May 10, 2012).*

Circuit courts have split on the issue whether Brady v. Maryland's restrictions apply to suppression hearings, although it is not likely that a prosecutor must disclose impeachment evidence before a suppression hearing in light of the Supreme Court's conclusion in United States v. Ruiz that a prosecutor does not have to disclose impeachment evidence before the entry of a guilty plea. In an unpublished opinion, the Tenth Circuit, without discussing whether Brady v. Maryland applies to a suppression hearing, rejected a defendant's argument that the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose impeachment evidence before a suppression hearing on the basis that the evidence was not impeachment evidence and not material. See United States v. Johnson, 117 F.3d 1429, 1997 WL 381926 at *3 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision). ...

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has recognized that "it is hardly clear that the Brady line of Supreme Court cases applies to suppression hearings," because "[s]uppression hearings do not determine a defendant's guilt or punishment, yet Brady rests on the idea that due process is violated when the withheld evidence is 'material either to guilt or to punishment.'" United States v. Bowie, 198 F.3d 905, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Without deciding the issue and in an unpublished opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit quoted with approval this language from United States v. Bowie. See United States v. Bullock, 130 F.App'x 706, 723 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) ("Whether the suppression hearing might have come out the other way, however, is of questionable relevance to the Brady issues at stake here."). The Fifth Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, before the Supreme Court issued its United States v. Ruiz decision, that Brady v. Maryland restrictions apply to suppression hearings. See United States v. Barton, 995 F.2d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e hold that the due process principles announced in Brady and its progeny must be applied to a suppression hearing involving a challenge to the truthfulness of allegations in an affidavit for a search warrant."); Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 965-66 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Timing is critical to proper Brady disclosure, and objections may be made under Brady to the state's failure to disclose material evidence prior to a suppression hearing."), vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S. 930 (1992)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that, under its precedent and the law from other circuits, it was not "obvious" for clear-error purposes that "Brady disclosures are required prior to suppression hearings." United States v. Scott, 245 F.3d 890, 902 (7th Cir. 2001).

OH9: Common computer in house was subject to apparent authority of any of them to consent

FourthAmendment.com - News - Wed, 2024-11-27 22:50

After defendant was arrested for touching her children, the woman of the house delivered two laptops used by the entire family to the police to look for evidence on the computers. She had apparent authority to consent to a search of the computers because all that the police knew was that the computers were used by everybody in the house. State v. Rice, 2012 Ohio 2174, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1909 (9th Dist. May 16, 2012).*

The car had no trunk, and a dog alert to the interior was to the whole interior. The state proved that the dog was a well trained dog. State v. Duran, 2012 Ohio 2114, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1857 (9th Dist. May 14, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped with reasonable suspicion based on a detailed call from a citizen informant who called to report an erratic driver in front of him. He gave his first name and stayed on the phone until police caught up. State v. Bunn, 2012 Ohio 2151, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1868 (12th Dist. May 14, 2012).*

The vehicle defendant was a passenger in was stopped for a lane change violation, and the driver said that he had drugs. On the floor in front of him was paraphernalia in plain view. Coupled with his furtive movements, a search was reasonable. State v. Jackson, 2012 Ohio 2123, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1861 (11th Dist. May 14, 2012).*

NYTimes Editorial: "Reform Stop-and-Frisk"

FourthAmendment.com - News - Wed, 2024-11-27 22:50

NYTimes Editorial: Reform Stop-and-Frisk:

Judge Shira Scheindlin of Federal District Court spoke up for the constitutional rights of blacks and Hispanics on Wednesday by granting class-action status to a lawsuit that accuses the New York Police Department of using race as the basis for stopping and frisking hundreds of thousands of citizens a year.

The decision opens the door to potential claims by an enormous number of people who may have been illegally stopped, and any remedy would be applied citywide. In a fierce defense of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, Judge Scheindlin was profoundly critical of the police program. The city’s arguments, she wrote, “do not withstand the overwhelming evidence that there, in fact, exists a centralized stop-and-frisk program that has led to thousands of unlawful stops.” She allowed the class-action status because “the vast majority of New Yorkers who are unlawfully stopped will never bring suit to vindicate their rights.”

rt.com: "Judge Napolitano: Shoot down a drone, become an American hero"

FourthAmendment.com - News - Wed, 2024-11-27 22:50

Judge Napolitano: Shoot down a drone, become an American hero:

Fox News commentator Judge Andrew Napolitano has found a novel approach to handling the whole drone surveillance dilemma that has Americans worried that the government will soon watch their every move from the sky.

Speaking out against the future of aerial eavesdropping in America, Judge Napolitano said on Fox on Tuesday, “The first American patriot that shoots down one of these drones that comes too close to his children in his backyard will be an American hero.”

[He's not a judge. He resigned to make more money as a Fox flack. Kenneth Starr insisted that his minions continually refer to him as Judge, like it was a title of nobility, as he did with Webb Hubbell, who was a judge for all of four months by appointment. You resign, judge goes away with the job. And, isn't shooting a gun into the air from one's backyard kind of a bad idea?]

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