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Reuters | Wall street takes a plunge to its lowest in 2 months waiting to see if Europe will be able to fend of deep economic crisis.

Daily Mail | U.S. Border Patrol unveiled it's new strategy Tuesday that moves its emphasis away from long fences to unmanned aerial vehicles and helicopters.

Steve Watson | Agents then demanded pat-down to make sure fruit juice, insulin was "not an explosive".

LA Times | TV Show 'Bait Car' catches officer in a lie, claiming he read full Miranda rights to perpetrator when show footage shows evidence to the contrary.

Before Its News | Rush has finally decided to challenge Obama's stolen CN SS number.

Red Ice Creations | NY's Rockefeller University reveals successful cellular manipulation of lab mice by using low-frequency radio waves.

Wahington Post | At this rate, the patent trolls may turn Silicon Valley into a rendition of 1930s Chicago.

Paul Joseph Watson | Forensic technician died from suspected arsenic poisoning last month.

Neema Enriquez | Obama declares himself President for Life as our 'Julia' is coddled by the Dear Leader from cradle to grave.

Kurt Nimmo | "Hate crime" suspects appear to have been produced by central casting at the FBI.

A.M. Freyed
 | When it comes to the elite dialectic and Money Power, there is likely no difference at all between the genders.

Aaron Dykes | Hip hop fantasy envisions sipping on signature cognac while watching female passengers getting a close inspection from power grabbing TSA agents.

Steve Watson | Footage shows Texas Rep. swatting screener's hand away from his genitals.

The video showed defendant crossing the centerline repeatedly. There was probable cause for his stop, despite his contention that state law was not violated. “Additionally, as noted by the officer and demonstrated by the video, the defendant's driving pattern indicated that he might be impaired, also warranting an investigatory stop.” United States v. Benitez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62913 (N.D. Ala. April 4, 2012).*

Defendant probationer consented to a search of his cell phone and pictures of him holding guns were revealed, and that justified a probation search of where he lived. United States v. Peila, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63036 (D. Nev. April 3, 2012).*

Defendant filed a general motion to suppress which was heard before trial, but only statements made at the time of arrest were discussed. A gun was also seized in Tennessee, and it was never mentioned. At trial, the gun was not objected to. On appeal, the issue of the seizure of the gun was waived. Rockholt v. State, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 446 (May 7, 2012).*

Drug officers stopped defendants based on a request to stop him so used the fact that one of three taillights was out. But, Arizona law just says that “a stop light” needs to work, and this is a mistake of law because defendants otherwise were committing no traffic violation. The subsequent consent derived from the illegal stop, and it’s all suppressed. United States v. Pro, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63058 (D. Ariz. May 3, 2012).*

LA Times editorial: The secret life of your cellphone; In a threat to the 4th Amendment, law enforcement is using location data as a crime-fighting tool:

Concerned that mobile phone networks are becoming surveillance tools, the American Civil Liberties Union recently asked hundreds of local law enforcement agencies whether they've tracked people's movements through their cellphones. Most of those that responded said they had, usually obtaining the information from mobile phone companies without a warrant. The practice has become so routine, the ACLU found, that phone companies are sending out catalogs of monitoring services with detailed price lists to police agencies. The alarming findings should persuade Congress to clarify that the government can't follow someone electronically without showing probable cause and obtaining a warrant.

Allegations of excessive force used during defendant’s arrest did not justify suppression of the search where there was no causal connection. United States v. Collins, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63214 (N.D. Ind. May 4, 2012):

The Defendant's primary objection to the admission of the evidence against him is his claim that Officers Ealing and Johnson used unreasonable force to effectuate his arrest. The Defendant cites a Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Ankeny, for the proposition that a Fourth Amendment excessive force violation requires suppression of the evidence seized. 502 F.3d at 836. However, the Defendant also cites to United States v. Watson, where the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the Ankeny court. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit declined to apply the Ankeny court's reasoning, holding: "We thus disagree with the dictum in United States v. Ankeny ... that the use of excessive force in the course of a search can require suppression of the evidence seized." 558 F.3d at 705. Rather, if a defendant proves excessive force, "his remedy would be a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (or state law) rather than the exclusion from his criminal trial of evidence that had been seized in an otherwise lawful search." Id. at 704. Therefore, under a plain reading of Watson, suppression would not be appropriate even if the Defendant could establish that Officers Ealing and Johnson used excessive force against him. Rather, the Defendant's appropriate remedy would be a § 1983 civil suit against the Officers for use of excessive force.

The Court notes that even under Ankeny, suppression would not be appropriate in this case. The Ankeny court held that it did not need to determine whether unreasonable force had been used because there was no "causal nexus" between the allegedly unreasonable force and discovery of the evidence. Ankeny, 502 F.3d at 837; see also Watson, 558 F.3d at 702 ("There was no causal connection ... between the alleged police misconduct and the obtaining of the evidence."). The bag containing cocaine was obtained not because of any allegedly unreasonable force used by the Officers, but because the Defendant threw it away from his person before Officer Ealing used any force. As the Government urges, "[a]n arrest does not occur until a police officer lays hands on a subject or the subject voluntarily submits to a show of authority." United States v. Britton, 335 Fed. Appx. 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2009); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) ("An arrest requires either physical force ... or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority."). The exclusionary rule is only triggered where evidence is obtained "following an unlawful arrest." United States v. Howard, 621 F.3d 433, 451 (6th Cir. 2010). Because the facts indicate that the Defendant threw the bag away from his person before Officer Ealing touched him, the bag was not obtained "following" an arrest at all, and so there can be no nexus between the alleged unreasonable force and finding the bag. For that matter, it appears that the Defendant placed the bag in a publicly exposed place, suggesting that the Government's retrieval of the bag did not constitute a search at all within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Eubanks, 876 F.2d 1514, 1516 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[U]nder the fourth amendment no governmental 'search' occurs if the place or object examined is publicly exposed such that no person can reasonably have an expectation of privacy.").

Defendant was stopped based on a search warrant for the apartment of another. In the search, officers found no drugs, but they found keys. It turned out that a key fit the apartment door. At the time of the search of his person, the officers did not have probable cause to detain him because there was no known connection to the keys and the apartment. Defendant was taken from the place of his seizure to the apartment. People v. Hill, 2012 Ill. App. LEXIS 332, 2012 IL App (1st) 102028 (May 4, 2012):

[**P22] We note that the finding of probable cause to support the search warrant does not permit us to assume that there was probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify the continued detention and transportation of defendant. These are related, but different, inquiries, and "[e]ach requires a showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances." 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.1(b), at 8-9 (4th ed. 2004). "In the case of arrest, the conclusion concerns the guilt of the arrestee, whereas in the case of search warrants, the conclusions go to the connection of the items sought with crime and to their present location." Id. at 10. The same holds true for the State's Terry argument: the search warrant does not, by its mere existence, give rise to reasonable suspicion that justifies the continued detention and transportation of defendant. While this information supporting the search warrant is now part of the record, the State has never argued—in the motion to supplement the record, in its brief, or at oral argument—that the specific facts in the complaint for the search warrant support an independent finding of probable cause or reasonable suspicion that would justify the seizure. Instead, the State simply argues that because police had a reason to believe there were drugs in the Flournoy apartment (i.e., they had probable cause for the search warrant), they also had probable cause, or at least reasonable suspicion, that allowed for defendant's continued detention and transportation. Where the search of defendant revealed no narcotics and police had not yet found any narcotics or contraband at the apartment, the mere expectation that police would find drugs in the apartment, without more, cannot justify defendant's continued detention and transportation to the apartment.

Volokh Conspiracy: The Fourth Amendment and Video Recording in Bathrooms, in Civil Commitment Units for Sex Offenders by Eugene Volokh:

Arnzen v. Palmer (N.D. Iowa Apr. 12, 2012) deals with an interesting and unusual questions: To what extent, if any, does the Fourth Amendment restrict searches in civil commitment units for sex offenders?

Paul Joseph Watson | Refuses to buy stock over privacy concerns.

Infowars.com | The CIA has thwarted a new plot that sought to blow up an American airliner using a new, more sophisticated underwear bomb.