Issues

MS: Co-tenant consented to entry that led to defendant's arrest

FourthAmendment.com - News - Thu, 2024-11-28 20:39

Co-tenant consented to entry that led to defendant’s arrest. Kleckner v. State, 2012 Miss. App. LEXIS 302 (May 22, 2012).*

Bean bag shooting as excessive force was fact dependent, so no qualified immunity. Smith v. Smith, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10498 (5th Cir. May 24, 2012).*

Seizure of cash after detention for suspicious conduct in a casino and finding a Texas parole warrant on defendant was supported by probable cause. Adams v. State, 2012 Ind. App. LEXIS 236 (May 21, 2012).*

LA5: Plain view exception to Gant

FourthAmendment.com - News - Thu, 2024-11-28 20:39

The stop and detention of the defendant was justified. Plain view of the interior of the car supported seizure of drugs, not Arizona v. Gant. State v. Burton, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 714 (La. App. 5 Cir. May 22, 2012).*

The CI’s statement was entitled to credit on the probable cause determination by the issuing magistrate because it was based on first hand information and the CI was reliable in the past. State v. Banks, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 713 (La. App. 5 Cir. May 22, 2012).*

Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity was created by defendant and his passenger giving inconsistent explanations regarding their travels, they were obviously nervous, there was a strong odor of air freshener and defendant had a criminal record. State v. Burney, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 684 (La. App. 2 Cir. May 23, 2012).*

CA3: Mirandizing and consent form made consent voluntary

FourthAmendment.com - News - Thu, 2024-11-28 20:39

When doing a knock-and-talk, officers smelled ammonia and this was probable cause of meth production and exigency. “The existence of ammonia has been recognized as constituting exigent circumstances due to its explosive nature.” State v. Cortez, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 701 (La. App. 5 Cir. May 22, 2012).*

Defendant was Mirandized and signed a consent form when the officers talked in a conversational tone, so the record supports the conclusion that the consent was voluntary. United States v. Ortiz, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10482 (3d Cir. May 24, 2012).*

The affidavit for the search warrant showed probable cause. In executing warrant, officers were found to have knock-and-announced. The trial court credited the officers rather than somebody inside. The doors were not locked. State v. McDivitt, 2012 Ohio 2243, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1980 (11th Dist. May 21, 2012).*

Officers responding to a 911 call saw a person on a child’s toy scooter and stopped him thinking that he was a juvenile out after curfew. When stopped, defendant was shocked to see the officer and highly nervous and shaking. That was reasonable suspicion and then he consented to a search of his person. Mwangi v. State, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 479 (May 23, 2012).*

N.D.Ind.: Dog sniff on porch violated privacy interests under Jones

FourthAmendment.com - News - Thu, 2024-11-28 20:39

GPS was used to follow defendant to his home and then a dog sniff on the front porch violated his privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Peter, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72485 (N.D. Ind. May 24, 2012):

While the precedent clearly teaches that a canine sniff-whether of a suitcase, an automobile, or a residence-is not itself a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and therefore does not require any independent justification, the overall police action is still subject to constitutional constraints. Thus, in Place, although the dog sniff of the defendant's luggage did not constitute an unlawful search, the 90-minute detention of that luggage "went beyond the narrow authority possessed by police to detain briefly luggage reasonably suspected to contain narcotics." 462 U.S. at 710. In Caballes, the Court "accept[ed] the state court's conclusion that the duration of the stop ... was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop," and held that the dog sniff did not transform the otherwise lawful traffic stop into an unlawful search. 543 U.S. at 408. And in Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), although the use of a drug-detection dog at drug interdiction checkpoints was not a search, the checkpoint program itself was unconstitutional because it was justified neither by road-safety concerns nor individualized suspicion. Similarly, in Brock, the Seventh Circuit reiterated that dog sniffs that detected only contraband were insignificant for Fourth Amendment purposes but stressed that "critical to our holding that the dog sniff in this case was not a Fourth Amendment search is the fact that police were lawfully present inside the common areas of the residence with the consent of Brock's roommate." 417 F.3d at 697.

In this case, Peter's front porch was unquestionably his private property, and the police came onto that property without express consent or a search warrant. As noted above, before the Supreme Court's recent decision in Jones, this fact would simply have been one factor among many relevant to determining whether the police action infringed the reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. Although the origins of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence lie in the law of trespass, and at one time its protections were thought to limit only searches of tangible property, the Supreme Court long ago rejected "the premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize" and has developed a more expansive protection for a person's "reasonable expectation of privacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967). Following Katz, the prevailing assumption of the courts was that the new privacy-based formulation replaced the older property-based one, such that "privacy [came] not merely to supplement but to eclipse property as the interest protected by the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Redmon, 138 F.3d 1109, 1131 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). While property rights remained a relevant, even important, consideration in determining Fourth Amendment rights, property's role was "relegated to that of furnishing evidence of the reasonableness of a defendant's expectation of privacy." Id.

Whatever basis that assumption had, however, it did not survive the holding in Jones that the Katz reasonable expectation-of-privacy test supplemented, but did not replace, the older understanding that the Fourth Amendment "embod[ies] a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas ('persons, houses, papers, and effects') it enumerates." Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 950. ...

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