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Mitt Romney scored a major victory by taking Ohio, but Rick Santorum continued to defy the odds by winning several contests on Super Tuesday as the race for the GOP presidential nod now moves to Kansas, Alabama, Mississippi and beyond.

In a year when electability consistently tops Republican primary voters' lists of candidate qualities, Mitt Romney has made the sale. However, exit polls suggest he may have some issues during the general election.

Warrant was vague as to a search for “further analysis” of the digital media, so the subsequent searches were suppressed. The first searches are enough for the case to proceed. United States v. Salceda, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28211 (C.D. Cal. February 27, 2012):

The government conducted searches of defendant's digital media in September and October 2011 based on the following language of the original search warrant:

If, after conducting such an initial search [within 60 days from the date of the execution of the search warrant], the case agents determine that a digital device is an item to be seized or contains any data falling within the list of items to be seized pursuant to this warrant, the government will retain the digital device for further analysis; otherwise, the government will return the digital device.

. . .

The Court finds that any evidence discovered during the September and October 2011 forensic searches is inadmissible. The original warrant's "further analysis" language is ambiguous as to whether it permits the government to analyze defendant's digital devices for additional evidence of contraband, or whether it merely permits additional analysis of previously discovered contraband. Given this ambiguity, suppression of the evidence is appropriate. See Transfiguracion, 442 F.3d at 1228 (construing ambiguities in plea agreements in favor of a defendant because the government, as drafter of the agreement, bears the "responsibility for any lack of clarity") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Wilhelm, 425 F.3d at 463 (finding fourth amendment violation because officer "recognized the warrant as ambiguous before the execution of the warrant, but failed to immediately stop execution and seek the necessary clarification of a warrant in order to make certain the warrant particularly described the place to be searched. ..."). The Court's decision is informed by the fact that the government sought—and was denied—a new warrant from Judge Zarefsky, and thereafter sought ex parte relief from this Court before conducting the subsequent searches. At the very least, the government's conduct demonstrates its acknowledgment that the "further analysis" language is ambiguous. In denying the government's ex parte application, the Court directed the government to seek clarification from the issuing judge to cure any ambiguities. Because the government chose to proceed with the searches without clarification or without securing a new search warrant, that evidence must be suppressed. See Wilhelm, 425 F.3d at 463.

GOP presidential candidates urge one another to drop out of the race. CNN's Jim Acosta reports.

Arrest of capital murder suspect on an outstanding traffic warrant was valid, and pretext was not a valid argument. Johnson v. State, 2012 OK CR 5, 2012 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 4 (March 2, 2012):

[*P12] Appellant first asserts that his arrest on outstanding warrants was illegal because it was solely a pretext to hold him for questioning about the homicides. However, if police have a valid right to arrest an individual for one crime, it does not matter if their subjective intent is in reality to collect information concerning another crime. Bland v. State, 2000 OK CR 11, ¶ 48, 4 P.3d 702, 718. "Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, 'turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time, ... and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.'" Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2783, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136-39 n. 13, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1722, 1724 n. 13, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 98 (1996) (Supreme Court reiterated its position that it was unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based upon the actual motivations of individual officers); Phillips v. State, 1999 OK CR 38, ¶ 41, 989 P.2d 1017, 1031. If the police action could have been taken against an individual "even absent the 'underlying intent or motivation,' there is no conduct which ought to have been deterred and thus no reason to bring the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule into play for purposes of deterrence." See 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.4(e) (4th ed. 2004). In other words, if the alleged pretextual arrest could have taken place absent police suspicion of Appellant's involvement in another crime, then the arrest is lawful. In the present case, Appellant was arrested on outstanding warrants which were issued before the murders occurred. The officers legally executed the valid arrest warrants and their subjective intent does not make this otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional.

I wouldn't have raised this argument, but it's a capital case and defense counsel has to pursue issues that seem weak anyway. At least in my state we can raise it in trial court and not bother to argue it on appeal, but, by rule and statute, the issue is deemed decided on the merits for post-conviction purposes without cluttering the appeal with seems to be a frivolous issue.

Defendant was free to go when she consented to a search of her purse, despite her language difficulties and she was outnumbered by the police. The “asked” “rather than commaned[ed].” United States v. Nieto-Rojas, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4500 (9th Cir. March 5, 2012) (unpublished)*:

The district court held that Appellant was not in custody when her purse was searched, reasoning that the officers were deferential and protective rather than commanding, that they asked rather than demanded to search her purse, that they did not physically control her at any time or display their weapons, and that they told her multiple times that she was free to go when her ride arrived. Appellant argues she was in custody because there were three officers on the scene, she was cited for traffic violations, English was not her native language, she watched the officers conduct an inventory search of the car, her passenger was searched in front of her, and she was told that she could leave when her ride came but she was not told she could leave before. We agree with the district court that Appellant was not in custody. Appellant was told several times she would be free to leave when her ride came. She did not ask to leave before her ride came. It was not unreasonable for the officer to stay with Appellant and her passengers while she waited for a ride, given the dangers of the busy highway.

If the district court had found consent involuntary, likely that would have been affirmed on appeal, given the standard of review.

Tuesday night was super to some degree for every Republican presidential candidate except Rep. Ron Paul of Texas.

A look back at how the Republican campaign has shaped up since the Iowa caucus. Who has won and who has lost?

John Avlon, CNN and Newsweek/Daily Beast contributor, on the job Mitt Romney still has to do to convince voters.

CNN's John King looks at the GOP candidates' race to reach 1144 delegates and grab the presidential nomination.

In what is a footnote to the GPS case, Jones’s claim previously barred by Heck can conceivably be resurrected by F.R.C.P. 60(b)(5), not by mandamus, but qualified immunity may be a problem [it will]. In re Jones, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4575 (D.C. Cir. March 6, 2012)*:

Two years after the district court dismissed Jones’ civil case¸ this Court reversed Jones’ conviction. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The Supreme Court recently affirmed that ruling. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). Because Jones can now show that the dismissal of his civil suit was “based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated,” he might consider filing a motion in district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). See Robinson v. Connell, No. 9:05-CV-1428 (GLS/ATB), 2010 WL 6268444, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2010) (magistrate report and recommendation) (Second Circuit remanded civil claim, which had been dismissed under Heck, to district court to consider motion under Rue 60(b)(5) after criminal sentence was allegedly vacated), on remand from No. 08-1992-pr (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2009). In the alternative, Jones might consider re-filing his complaint. Although Jones expresses concern that re-filing might raise “statute of limitations issues,” Pet. Br. 13–14 n.3, the Supreme Court has implied that, even if Jones’ claims had accrued before the district court dismissed them under Heck, the statutes of limitations should be tolled as long as the bar of Heck prevented Jones’ suit from going forward. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 395 n.4 (2007) (“Had petitioner filed suit upon his arrest and had his suit then been dismissed under Heck, the statute of limitations, absent tolling, would have run by the time he obtained reversal of his conviction. If under those circumstances he were not allowed to refile his suit, Heck would produce immunity from § 1983 liability, a result surely not intended.”).

Plaintiff’s claims for the wrongful towing of his car after his arrest were shown to be Heck barred. Dismissals for Heck bars are without prejudice. Rowell v. Ewing Bros. Towing Co., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4625 (9th Cir. March 6, 2012) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s stop was justified for reasonable suspicion, and that is all the standard is; not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Turrentine, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28511 (W.D. Okla. March 5, 2012)*:

While the defendant's evidence might well be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant committed the traffic violation, that is not the standard here. For present purposes, the question is whether the government has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation occurred, hence justifying the trooper's action. The court concludes it has. Trooper Painter testified that he observed the violation and the court found his testimony to be generally credible. Defendant's suggestion that the trooper's smile shown on the video is inconsistent with observing a traffic violation is speculative and ultimately unpersuasive.

Changing information from the CI served to enhance his credibility. The CI was believable and supported the stop, as did only the information that the police knew. United States v. Pete, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4501 (3d Cir. March 5, 2012) (unpublished).*

Mitt Romney doesn't get nervous on primary days.

The Supreme Court case on college admissions policy is likely to pit Sonia Sotomayor against Samuel Alito

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta testifies before a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the ongoing Syria crisis.

David Gergen says the former governor is using the Woody Hayes school of offense to grind out victories

The campaign of GOP presidential frontrunner Mitt Romney tried Wednesday to put the best possible spin on Super Tuesday's mixed verdict, releasing a memo arguing that it is now nearly impossible for his opponents to catch him in the delegate hunt.

Despite a delegate math challenge ahead, Newt Gingrich vowed to stay in the GOP presidential race after he won Georgia's Super Tuesday primary.

At an address in North Carolina, the president strikes out at Republican candidates who claim they can lower gas prices.

He eked out a few Super Tuesday victories--but with Santorum nipping at his heels and a divided, shrunken party unwilling to fall in behind him. Is this a way to beat Obama?