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Defendant fled at high speed across city boundaries from Cleveland to Lakewood City, and officers from the latter actually arrested him. Jurisdictional limits on police officers are irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes. United States v. King, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5407, 2012 FED App. 0270N (6th Cir. March 12, 2012).

A drug dog was called at the conclusion of the traffic stop, and it took 50 minutes to arrive. Since there was reasonable suspicion, this did not unreasonably extend the stop. Federal cases have permitted such detentions for longer. United States v. Adams, 2012 CCA LEXIS 87 (N.-M. Ct. App. March 15, 2012).*

Pro se defendant didn’t file a motion to suppress, so he couldn’t challenge the search on appeal. State v. Henderson, 2012 Ohio 1040, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 930 (8th Dist. March 15, 2012).

Buccal swab for DNA requires a court order if defendant doesn’t consent. People v Smith, 2012 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1983, 2012 NY Slip Op 1896 (4th Dept. March 16, 2012):

An order compelling an individual to provide corporeal evidence, such as blood or saliva for DNA analysis, constitutes a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment (see Skinner v Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 618; Schmerber v California, 384 U.S. 757, 767; Matter of Abe A., 56 NY2d 288, 295). Although no New York statute expressly authorizes courts to compel uncharged suspects to supply a DNA sample (see Abe A., 56 NY2d at 293-294; cf. CPL 240.40 [2]), the Court of Appeals has held that a court may issue an order to obtain a blood sample from a suspect so long as the People establish: "(1) probable cause to believe the suspect has committed the crime, (2) a clear indication' that relevant material evidence will be found, and (3) the method used to secure it is safe and reliable. In addition, the issuing court must weigh the seriousness of the crime, the importance of the evidence to the investigation and the unavailability of less intrusive means of obtaining it, on the one hand, against concern for the suspect's constitutional right to be free from bodily intrusion on the other. Only if this stringent standard is met ... may the intrusion be sustained" (Abe A., 56 NY2d at 291). Here, the court determined that the People satisfied the requirements of Abe A. set forth above, and defendant does not expressly challenge that determination. Rather, defendant contends that (1) he was denied due process because the second order compelling defendant to provide a buccal swab was not made upon notice to him; and (2) the method of collecting the swab, i.e., the use of the taser, was excessive and objectively unreasonable. We agree with defendant on both counts, and thus that reversal is required.

Placing a GPS on defendant’s car to track him for 26 days violated defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy and required a search warrant under Jones and relying on its lower court decision in Maynard. State v. Zahn, 2012 SD 19, 2012 S.D. LEXIS 19 (March 14, 2012):

[*P22] In this case, the State argues that Zahn could not have had a subjective expectation of privacy in his movements because he voluntarily exposed his movements to the public. We disagree. While a reasonable person understands that his movements on a single journey are conveyed to the public, he expects that those individual movements will remain "disconnected and anonymous." Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 (citation omitted). Indeed, the likelihood that another person would observe the whole of Zahn's movements for nearly a month "is not just remote, it is essentially nil." Id. at 560. The prolonged use of a GPS device in this case enabled officers to determine Zahn's speed, time, direction, and geographic location within five to ten feet at any time. It also enabled officers to use the sum of the recorded information to discover patterns in the whole of Zahn's movements for twenty-six days. The prolonged GPS surveillance of Zahn's vehicle revealed more than just the movements of the vehicle on public roads; it revealed an intimate picture of Zahn's life and habits. We thus believe that Zahn had a subjective expectation of privacy in the whole of his movements. This subjective expectation of privacy was not defeated because Zahn's individual movements were exposed to the public.

. . .

[*P31] We thus hold that the attachment and use of a GPS device to monitor an individual's activities over an extended period of time requires a search warrant. Because the unfettered use of surveillance technology could fundamentally alter the relationship between our government and its citizens, we require oversight by a neutral magistrate. Wright, 2010 S.D. 91, ¶ 9, 791 N.W.2d at 794 (quoting Thunder, 2010 S.D. 3, ¶ 13, 777 N.W.2d at 378). Thus, the warrantless attachment and use of the GPS device to monitor Zahn's activities for nearly a month was unlawful, and the evidence obtained through the use of the GPS device should be suppressed.

[*P32] By our holding today, we do not deny police the ability to use this valuable law enforcement tool. We recognize that police must be allowed to use developing technology in the "often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Sweedland, 2006 S.D. 77, ¶ 22, 721 N.W.2d at 415 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2333, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)). The Fourth Amendment "cannot sensibly be read to mean that police [should] be no more efficient in the twenty-first century than they were in the eighteenth" century. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 883 (2007). But police must obtain a warrant before they attach and use a GPS device to monitor an individual's activities over an extended period of time.

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While inventory does not permit forcing open locked compartments in a car, the finding of ammunition in this car justified a further search for a gun. That was inevitable discovery. Essentially, where there's ammunition there's probably a gun. United States v. McCullum, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5584 (4th Cir. March 15, 2012) (unpublished):

Although the policy did not permit officers to force open a locked glove compartment during an inventory search, the ammunition discovered in the trunk would have provided probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle for the gun associated with the seized ammunition. See Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 260-62 (1982) (explaining that evidence seized during an inventory search of a vehicle can provide probable cause to search elsewhere in the vehicle for additional contraband). The scope of that warrantless search would have included "every part of the vehicle and its contents that may [have] conceal[ed] the object of the search." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). Because a glove box can conceal a gun, the glove box of the Cadillac was obviously within the scope of the warrantless probable cause search. The fact that the glove box was locked would not prevent us from upholding the lawfulness of its search. "[I]f the police have probable cause to believe that there is contraband . . . anywhere in the car they can search for it even if it is in a ... locked compartment such as the glove compartment ...." United States v. Mazzone, 782 F.2d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Ross, 456 U.S. at 823 ("The scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no narrower ... than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause."). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of the motion to suppress because the marijuana, the clip of ammunition, and the gun would have been inevitably discovered.

A consent to search for firearms includes checking clothing hanging in a closet. The consent was obtained for a parole search. United States v. Anderson, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5506 (8th Cir. March 16, 2012)*:

Even assuming a reasonable officer would have interpreted the consent as limited in scope to a search for firearms, the search was within the scope of such consent. United States v. Dinwiddie, 618 F.3d 821, 831 (8th Cir. 2010) ("The scope of consent for a search is limited to what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the investigating officer and the person to be searched."). Firearms easily could be located in clothing hanging in a closet, particularly in outerwear such as a coat, jacket, or vest, and most particularly in a blaze orange hunting vest. See United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d 861, 867 (8th Cir. 2010) ("The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object ..."). Further, the testimony supports the conclusion that the searching officer identified the ammunition without delving into spaces, pockets, or containers smaller than might hold a firearm.

NYPost.com: Law office of accused madam's upstate neighbor raided by cops by Jeane MacIntosh, Laura Italiano and Antonio Antenucci:

The probe of accused madam Anna Gristina widened today as cops descended on the downtown offices of a criminal defense lawyer who is her upstate neighbor — and the registered agent for Gristina's pig rescue farm house.

The lawyer, David Jaroslawicz, confirmed this afternoon that several cops were in his office at 225 Broadway, going through files.

Asked what they were looking for, he said, "I have no idea."

Prosecutors have claimed that Gristina had a "lawyer friend" who helped her invest and launder her money.

Law office searches are scary for both the target and the police because they're so easy to screw up. If you're a law enforcement officer reading this, get a special master involved ASAP, preferably before the search or at least before records are reviewed. In this case, the key is the fourth paragraph referring to money laundering. Lawyers are not immune from searches for money laundering. Clients, however, have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their lawyer's files and they have every right to challenge the PC and the execution.

My servers experienced some trouble, as you may have noticed, resulting in the loss of some posts and comments over the past month. Things seem to be settled down and mostly backup and running. Feel free to repost any comments that got lost and I apologize for the crash and burn. Ironically, it happened right after I made backup but before I had downloaded the backup to my local computer which is why as much was lost as there was.

-Walter

[New York Monday March 19]

Our photographer ZD Roberts was beaten by New York City cops with nightsticks while covering Occupy Wall Street's attempt to re-take Zuccotti Park Saturday night.

Zach yelled several times, “I’m PRESS! PRESS!” yet was slammed on the head twice after he’d been thrown to the ground when the police shoved back the protesters. Zach, whose photos of Occupy Wall Street have been seen all over the world on the front page of The Guardian, showed his press badge, an act for which his hair was grabbed, head pulled back and slammed again with a club.

If you remember, Zach was arrested while covering the story three months ago. His trial is coming up (he refused to cop a plea).

We’ve covered the world … but who thought that the toughest combat assignment would be New York?

Here’s Zach story and comment in his own words and photos:

My head hurts. The NYPD did this to me.

3 months after my arrest during an Occupy Wall St. protest on #D17 and two days away from my meeting with the Assistant DA about said arrest - I got beaten by cops just outside of Zuccotti Park.

I wasn't the only one, and I have no doubt I won't be the last. The NYPD has complete authority in this town - I hate using the word police state, but when I saw a girl thrown from a bus, in handcuffs, having a seizure being tossed to the ground - I really am at a loss for any other words.

Cameras documented it. Here's one of the photos I took. There's tons of video. I can tell you from being there that there wasn't a single police officer with a look of concern on his/her face as the girl continued having a seizure on the hard pavement of Broadway.

It took 15 minutes for an ambulance to arrive. I'm told 5 minutes is the usual response time in this part of town.

This is Commissioner Ray Kelly's city, we just live here.

There was no ambulance needed for me. I was lucky… or maybe just stupid.

After the second cleansing of Zuccotti Park, Saturday night, the police continued their pushback under the guise of 'safety concerns' - basically a standard operating procedure to keep protesters and journalists from being allowed to witness arrests and to disperse the crowd in different directions.

It works quite well, that is until it doesn't. The thing is, when you're pushing back with billy clubs and metal barricades, sometimes people can't move back quick enough. Or sometimes, people refuse to move from a public sidewalk. Well as a photographer, I get caught in the middle quite often - usually I'm deft enough to get out of the way - this time I wasn't.

I fell back, and while trying to get up - there was another push from the police - they saw me fall, mind you. Just didn't care.

Two or three people made it over me without falling as well, using me as their sidewalk (they didn't have any other choice) - but then came the rush - four or five people fell on top of me.

The police kept pushing. Then came the batons. I couldn't see if the people that were on top of me previously got hit at all but I certainly did, twice to the back and once on the head.

I'm not quite sure what the logic is of literally beating a man when he's down. But once he saw that his baton beating wasn't getting me going he decided to try to pick me up by my hair. That didn't work either - but by then I was up enough to get my footing under me as I continued screaming "PRESS!!! PRESS!!!" That was enough to get the beating to stop - but I still was pushed/thrown back into the crowd, again almost losing my footing as I had to leap over a pile of garbage into the street.

Checking my bag and camera for damage I moved outside of the crowd to compose myself before pushing back in.

Read the rest at SuicideGirlsblog.com later tomorrow and visit our facebook page for some exclusive photos from the raid.

Please support our kickstarter campaign to support the research and filming of a DVD and book on Billionaires and Ballots.

Greg Palast is the author of Vultures' Picnic: In Pursuit of Petroleum Pigs, Power Pirates and High-Finance Carnivores.

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When the officer approached this stopped vehicle, he smelled marijuana. When defendant was ordered out of the car, the officer saw hollowed out blunts and loose tobacco which told him that the blunts were to be packed with marijuana. That justified a search of the trunk because that’s a place marijuana could be kept. State v. Morris, 2011 S.C. App. LEXIS 419 (November 2, 2011), substituted for opinion filed August 17, 2011.

The defendant juvenile’s car was stopped because of the pointing of a rifle at a law enforcement officer. The police used a dog to sniff the trunk to see if a person was hiding there, but they stopped because the dog was distracted. Finally, they just opened the trunk as “SOP.” There were no exigent circumstances justifying a search of the trunk under New Mexico law. The search of the trunk also failed as a “protective sweep” looking for a person, but the evidence did not support that either. State v. Leticia T., 2012 N.M. App. LEXIS 12 (March 13, 2012).*

One officer was writing a traffic ticket for the defendant when another officer asked for consent to search the car. Since the request did not extend the stop any, it was valid. State v. Nims, 2012 Ore. App. LEXIS 266 (March 14, 2012).* [Oregon website has no March cases posted yet.]

Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense, and he had a bandana with a marijuana leaf design hanging from the mirror. The officer asked for consent to search his person and then called for back up. He then asked for consent to search the car. The court holds there is no right under state law to have the Fourth Amendment read more broadly to require that juveniles get a warning of a right to refuse a search of a car. State v. Carlos A., 2012 N.M. App. LEXIS 13 (March 13, 2012).*

Police stopped behind defendant’s car which was double parked in front of a garage at 3 a.m. They had a CI’s report, and the car matched a radio call of it being involved in an incident. The occupant made a furtive movement toward the floor. On the totality, they had reasonable suspicion. United States v. Parker, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5509 (3d Cir. March 16, 2012) (unpublished).*

Defendant failed to show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room of another that was searched. He was neither the renter nor the additional guest, but he had a key. It was not shown that the key was to that room. “In any event, as he concedes, possession of a key to a hotel room, without more, does not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. Cooper, 203 F.3d at 1286 n.7 (citing United States v. Conway, 73 F.3d 975, 980 (10th Cir. 1995)). Nor did Bushay prove that the vehicle he was operating was a vehicle that was ‘registered’ for room 308.” He was not an overnight guest, and he lacked standing to contest a search that produced a gun associated with him. United States v. Bushay, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33653 (N.D. Ga. January 24, 2012).*

The warrant application specified a car and the residence as the target of the search. The warrant, however, did not mention the car. Since warrants for houses include vehicles parked on the curtilage, the car could be searched. State v. Washington, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 322 (La. App. 5th Cir. March 13, 2012):

Although the affidavit on which the warrant was based refers several times specifically to the Monte Carlo, the warrant itself does not refer to any vehicles. However, a warrant authorizing the search of a particularly described premises permits the search of a vehicle located on the premises targeted for the search and subject to the authority of the warrant. State v. Smith, 02-1842, p. 1 (La. 9/20/02), 827 So. 2d 1122, 1123 (per curiam); State v. Carter, 10-973, p. 8 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/30/11), 75 So.3d 1, 5. The rationale behind this holding is that the vehicle is capable of concealing the sought-after contraband. Id. Accordingly, the search of defendant's vehicle was valid pursuant to the warrant since it was parked in front of the residence which was the target of the search and which was particularly described in the warrant. This assignment of error is without merit.

Defendant’s traffic stop was unlawful and was suppressed. Information from that stop ended up in a search warrant application. Excising it, the remainder still showed probable cause. Defendant had been under investigation for quite sometime and a lot of information had been developed. State v. Williams, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 328 (La. App. 2d Cir. March 14, 2012).*

The CI’s tip of a group smoking marijuana was corroborated by plain smell on the officer’s arrival, providing reasonable suspicion. State v. Pineda, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 324 (La. App. 5th Cir. March 13, 2012).*

Seeing a firearm on defendant’s person justified a patdown. While Florida is a concealed carry state, the officer does not have to exclude the possibility of a permit before the frisk. Mackey v. State, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 4063 (Fla. 3d DCA March 14, 2012):

Mackey contends the arresting officer had no reasonable suspicion to detain him for carrying a concealed firearm. He begins by noting that it is generally not illegal to possess a firearm in Florida. Mackey then argues in his brief, relying again upon Regalado, that "since, under Florida law, carrying a concealed firearm is illegal only if the individual does not have a permit and since the officer had no information suggesting that defendant did not have a permit, the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him for carrying a concealed firearm." Whether, as a general proposition, mere possession of a firearm is not illegal in Florida, it is beside the point. Mackey was not observed in mere possession of a firearm; rather, he was observed in possession of a concealed firearm, and the officer testified that he observed a "piece of the handle sticking out" of Mackey's pocket, enabling the officer to identify it as a firearm. It is the concealment of the firearm, not merely its possession, which rendered Mackey's conduct illegal, and authorized the officer's actions in this case. Moreover, Mackey's argument necessarily overlooks the difference between an essential element of the crime and an exception, or affirmative defense, to the crime.

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O'Reilly Factor: Drug testing for unemployment benefits? Transcript:

O'REILLY: "Kelly File" segment tonight. Two very hot topics, a call for the U.N. to investigate U.S. voting laws. What?

But first, the Arizona Senate approves a measure requiring a drug test for anyone applying for unemployment benefits in that state. Here now, attorney and Fox News anchor, Megyn Kelly. All right so tell me about Arizona. What do they want?

MEGYN KELLY, FOX NEWS ANCHOR: So they want to test unemployment recipients for drug use.

O'REILLY: Why?

KELLY: But they only want to test those whom they have a reasonable suspicion about, if they have reasonable cause to believe you might be on drugs. And if you got arrested…