VoteKansas.org

In a search warrant for “guns, drugs, and ammunition,” officers searched a box and opened folded papers finding child pornography. This was valid as a plain view because the officers have the authority to look in folder papers for drugs. United States v. McManaman, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5341 (8th Cir. March 14, 2012):

Under a warrant to search McManaman's home for guns, drugs, and ammunition, officers would have had the authority to search in any closet, container, or other closed compartment in the building large enough to contain the possible contraband. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982). We have applied the plain view doctrine in similar circumstances where a search warrant "authorized the police to seize, among other things, drugs and drug paraphernalia, either of which could have been stored in a box in a closet. The police were, therefore, acting within the scope of the warrant when they opened the box containing [incriminating] photos." United States v. Evans, 966 F.2d 398, 400 (8th Cir. 1992). Even if the pictures in the present case were folded up in the box, it seems reasonable to conclude, as the magistrate judge did, that "officers would have had reason to unfold the documents to determine whether they contained drugs, which often are contained within folded pieces of paper." United States v. McManaman, No. CR10-4024-MWB, 2010 WL 3717288 at *7 n.2 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 15, 2010).

The officers came across the photographs and the videotape with McManaman's step-daughter's name on it within the scope of a search that would have been proper had they obtained a search warrant. Because the incriminating nature of this evidence was immediately apparent to the officers, they were entitled to seize it under the plain view doctrine. Therefore the district court did not err in denying McManaman's motion to suppress because of the inevitable discovery doctrine.

The CIs gave detailed information that indicated a pattern of drug dealing from defendant’s house, and that was probable cause and overcame staleness. The district court did not err in denying a hearing on the motion to suppress where the motion only presented questions of law on PC, nexus, staleness, and good faith exception. United States v. Lawson, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5374, 2012 FED App. 0278N (6th Cir. March 13, 2012):

Lawson's motion, contending that the warrant was based on stale information insufficient to amount to probable cause, set forth purely legal questions. As in Abboud, Lawson "argued that the facts were insufficient to support probable cause" and that there was insufficient corroboration, both of which "contest[] a legal conclusion." 438 F.3d at 577. Similarly, he "argued that the probable cause was stale[, which] too was a challenge to a legal conclusion." Id. Finally, Lawson challenged Leon's applicability to the case, which is also a pure legal question. The issues before that court at the time of its denial were all purely legal questions and, therefore, we do not find that the district court abused its discretion in denying Lawson's request.

Three people trying to tow away a vehicle without proper towing gear was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Boone, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33915 (W.D. N.C. February 1, 2012).*

Cultural Climatology 5-13-10

Illegal Immigration: Displacing us From our Civilization 5-13-10

Profane Pulpits 12-23-10

Wandering Sheep 9-2-10

Christmas Celebration of the Heart 12-23-10

Secular Pharisees 4-14-11

New Haven Register: Bill would let Connecticut towns seek search warrants to inspect properties by Jordan Fenster:

A bill up for legislative review would grant municipalities the right to seek a search warrant if zoning officials believe there has been an ordinance violation.

The pending legislation, requested by state Rep. Susan Johnson, D-Windham, is the result of a state Supreme Court ruling that affirmed the right of citizens to, in the words of the court’s decision, “be free from unreasonable searches.”

In the case of the town of Bozrah v. Anne D. Chmurynski, town zoning official Thomas Weber had been asked to examine private property because, according to the court record, “he intended to inspect the property for ‘junk.’”

And the beat goes on:

GPB News: Welfare Drug Testing Bill Revised by Jeanne Bonner:

Georgia lawmakers are revising a bill that opponents say is almost certain to land in federal court. It would require welfare recipients to take a drug test before receiving benefits. Its sponsor says the measure would save taxpayers money but others say it’s unconstitutional.

Sen. John Albers, a Roswell Republican, is the bill’s sponsor. He modeled it on a Florida law, now blocked by a federal judge because it violates the Fourth Amendment’s protection from unlawful search.

When these clowns pass such bills, they just make money for the plaintiffs' civil rights bar that files the case in attorneys fees. They are clueless.

Inventory policy that allows the vehicle to go with somebody “immediately available,” not otherwise defined, does not require the police to allow somebody to be called and the police wait for that person to show up. The person essentially has to be there already. If the inventory is conducted in “good faith,” that’s enough. United States v. Reyes-Vencomo, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34141 (D. N.M. February 13, 2012):

The officers initiated the search in compliance with standardized police procedures and the requirement that the officers make a post-search notation regarding the decision to search adds little to the protections that the Fourth Amendment and Supreme Court precedent seeks to impose. The Fourth Amendment is satisfied so long as an officer conducts an inventory search in good faith. See United States v. Battle, 370 F.App'x at 430 (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374). Holfelder and Ortega conducted an orderly inventory search, documenting and photographing the items in the vehicle as they went, and were not "general[ly] rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence." United States v. Martinez, 512 F.3d at 1274. Holfelder explained that he understood the policy's purpose to be to protect the department and the driver's property, and nothing indicates that he was acting in bad faith. See United States v. Maraga, 76 F.App'x at 228 ("An impoundment must either be supported by probable cause, or be consistent with the police role as 'caretaker' of the streets and completely unrelated to an ongoing criminal investigation."); United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d at 636 ("When the police acquire temporary custody of a vehicle, a warrantless inventory search of the vehicle does not offend Fourth Amendment principles so long as the search is made pursuant to 'standard police procedures' and for the purpose of 'protecting the car and its contents.'"). Failing to make a notation in the police report regarding the tow decision was a minor deviation from procedure, and an understandable one given the circumstances, and does not render the inventory search invalid.

[I had to go read these cases on good faith, and both appear to just be throw-away lines as to what the government's burden of proof is:

Battle: "Rather, he acted in good faith as he undertook to identify, secure and protect valuable property."

Bertine: "We conclude that here, as in Lafayette, reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different procedure."

So, don't see there being a "good faith exception" to inventory searches. Good faith inventory and not a rummaging is something that the government has to prove in every case.]

Why Are Most Democrats Congenital Open Border Advocates? 4-14-11

Tolerance and Diversity: America's Achilles Heel 8-4-11

Attenuation was found with a two hour delay, (unnecessary) Miranda warnings, defendant counseling with his father on his cell phone who told him not to cooperate, and finally thinking about his predicament for at least an hour. United States v. Conrad, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5285 (7th Cir. March 14, 2012)*:

If ordered, suppression of unconstitutionally obtained evidence can permit "[t]he criminal ... to go free because the constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.). Given a blunder that the Government does not dispute here, Defendant David Conrad argues that the district court should have suppressed all the evidence of child pornography that was recovered following an illegal entry into his father's home. As we explain below, however, the district court correctly denied exclusion of evidence obtained from Mr. Conrad's own home—an hour's drive away from the home that had been illegally entered and which Mr. Conrad authorized the Government to search. That evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the original illegal entry so as to have been purged of the unconstitutional taint.

. . .

Consistent with existing precedent, the district court identified intervening circumstances that favored attenuation: Mr. Conrad's repeated consents to search and his waiver of Miranda rights (which law enforcement was not even required to give because he was not in custody), about two hours after the underlying constitutional violation and in a completely different location. As for the different location, we note that in contrast to cases where no attenuation was found after the defendant was taken, for example, to a police station, e.g., Taylor, 457 U.S. 687, here Mr. Conrad volunteered to go from his family home, a location where, according to the unchallenged findings of the district court, he "was undoubtedly comfortable," Conrad, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1037, to a location that was as yet unknown to the agents, the Chicago Apartment. He was likely as or more comfortable there, and thus in a better position to decide whether to stand on his constitutional rights there. Furthermore, because the Chicago Apartment was independently protected under the Fourth Amendment, extending the scope of the exclusion would have little additional deterrent effect. Cf. Harris, 495 U.S. at 20 ("Even though we decline to suppress statements made outside the home following a Payton violation, the principal incentive to obey Payton still obtains: the police know that a warrantless entry will lead to the suppression of any evidence found, or statements taken, inside the home. If we did suppress statements like Harris', moreover, the incremental deterrent value would be minimal.").

Although the district court did not explicitly rely on it for this second factor, we also attach particular significance to another, rather unusual, circumstance. Mr. Conrad not only could use his cell phone to obtain advice about his predicament, but he actually did—and was, as the district court found, specifically told by his father "not to talk to the officers." Conrad, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1025. While he suggests that his decision to ignore that advice was in recognition that he had already confessed to so much that he had no choice but to continue, the district court found, and he does not contest, that his statements were voluntary. Id. at 1036-37. The voluntariness of his statements—made despite superfluous Miranda warnings, a specific warning from his father, and after an hour to think in the car and twenty minutes to think while tending to his cats and showing off music equipment—help establish that his conduct at the Chicago Apartment was "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963) (footnote omitted).

Trashing America: Container trash litters the landscape, Part 2, 11-24-11

Officer’s waiting for backup to arrive before doing frisk of occupants of the car was not a separate seizure requiring a new analysis of reasonable suspicion. United States v. Boone, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33914 (W.D. N.C. March 8, 2012).

This started as a motorist assist and ended up as a warning ticket. The whole thing took nine minutes, which was not unreasonably long. As defendant was leaving, the officer asked if he could ask some additional questions, and that led to a valid consent. The granting of the motion to suppress was reversed. People v. Kats, 2012 Ill. App. LEXIS 158, 2012 IL App (3d) 100683 (March 9, 2012).*

“The 911 hang-up call, combined with the lack of answer on the return and Defendant's overtly aggressive and hostile behavior and refusal to answer basic questions, provided a reasonable basis for the officers to conduct a protective sweep of the house to ensure that no one inside was in need of immediate help. While Defendant had a right to respond as he did, this nevertheless did not dispel the officers' concern for the safety of the occupants.” United States v. Obbanya, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33627 (N.D. Cal. March 13, 2012).*

America Has No Caesar! 4-14-11

The Birth Of Christ And The Birth Of America Are Linked 12-23-10

Raising The Debt; Lowering The Boom 8-4-11

A police request to “take a look” in a car or to “check” it for contraband does not include looking in locked containers. Here, the officer did take a look, then took the keys and unlocked the glove compartment finding a gun. That exceeded the consent. The state's burden in a consent case is "heavy," and here not met. People v. McFarlane, 2012 NY Slip Op 01754, 2012 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1767 (1st Dept. March 13, 2012):

Here, the officer's request to "take a look" into the car or "check" it for contraband could reasonably have been understood to be a request to search the vehicle, possibly to include closed containers, but it did not reasonably imply a request for permission to open the locked glove compartment (cf. People v Gomez, 5 NY3d 416, 418-419, 838 N.E.2d 1271, 805 N.Y.S.2d 24 [2005] [general consent to search car did not authorize breaking into hidden compartment]). That the officer subjectively intended to search the glove compartment when he made the request is not determinative. Normally, a locked container can only be opened by breaking into it or using a key. A reasonable person in defendant's situation would have assumed that if the officer wanted to open the glove compartment with defendant's consent he would have asked for the key or asked defendant to open it. The officer did neither; after checking the seats and the center console, he simply took the keys from the ignition and opened the glove compartment.