VoteKansas.org

“This is an appeal asking that we overrule State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992), and hold that the Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to violations of Article I, section 17, of the Idaho Constitution. Because the State has not shown any ground for doing so, we decline to overrule that case and affirm the order of the district court suppressing evidence obtained incident to an arrest pursuant to a wrongly issued warrant.” Considering state case law, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule in State v Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927), and the good faith exception was not adopted in Guzman. State v. Koivu, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 54 (March 1, 2012).

Officers responded to an alleged burglary call, but they found that a tenant was removing stuff, and there was no burglary. Defendant asked to get a cigarette, and the officer said no because of “officer safety,” but she reached into her purse and pulled out a cigarette pack which the officer took away from her and laid it down for. After awhile the officer looked in the cigarette pack and found a glass pipe, so he then searched her purse. The search of the cigarette package could not be justified for officer safety which, the officer said, was based on his experience with prostitutes and drug addicts having sharp objects in there, which this case wasn’t. Also, his casual after-the-fact search of the cigarette package belied the “officer safety” rationale. Finally, the state’s failure to raise an expectation of privacy argument in the trial court is a waiver on appeal [not that it would have worked anyway]. State v. Johnson, 2012 Kan. LEXIS 148 (March 2, 2012).

Officers approached an already parked car, and they did not need reasonable suspicion to do that. When defendant got out of the car and reached for his pocket, officers were justified in a patdown because of information from an informant. State v. Ray, 2012 Ohio 840, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 733 (2d Dist. March 2, 2012).*

Plaintiff was “confined” when she was strip and body cavity searched, so the state one year limitations applied, and this suit was not timely. Bing v. Haywood, 2012 Va. LEXIS 40 (March 2, 2012).*

There was actual authority to consent to a search by the consent, although she did not have a working key to the front door, she did to the back. Alternatively, the court finds that it was reasonable for officers to believe in her apparent authority to consent. Finally, even if the information derived from that entry were excised from the application for the search warrant, there still would be probable cause for issuance. United States v. Taitano, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27489 (D. Guam February 17, 2012).*

Defendant’s guilty plea waived his illegal search claim, so defense counsel was not shown to be ineffective for not challenging the search before the guilty plea. Schniepp v. State, 2012 Ark. 94, 2012 Ark. LEXIS 108 (March 1, 2012).*

Neither defendant had standing to challenge the search of the car: the passenger because he was a passenger and the driver showing no connection to having it with permission of the owner. They did have standing to challenge the stop, and there was cause for the stop for wandering within a lane. United States v. Perez-Guerrero, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27365 (D. Kan. March 2, 2012).*

A dog alert on a car justifies a search of the trunk. A new Fourth Amendment issue raised in a reply brief is waived. United States v. Greene, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4407 (4th Cir. February 29, 2012) (unpublished):

Greene's second argument — that the search of the trunk was outside the scope of a warrantless search — is likewise meritless. See Kelly, 592 F.3d at 589-90 ("The scope of a search pursuant to [the automobile] exception is as broad as a magistrate could authorize. Thus, once police have probable cause, they may search 'every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.'") (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (citation omitted)).

Information from Medivac crew was sufficient to provide probable cause defendant was under the influence when he was taken to the hospital after a wreck. Crowe v. State, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 227 (March 2, 2012).*

A Wii stolen in a burglary had the victim’s Netflix account, and the police were able to track the Netflix use back to defendant’s IP address. That was sufficient nexus for a search warrant for the premises, and it also was not stale. United States v. Medel, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27410 (C.D. Cal. February 29, 2012).*

The protective sweep here was legal. But, even if it wasn’t, the person consenting didn’t know about it, so the consent was tainted by the sweep. United States v. Gomez-Rivero, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26867 (N.D. Ga. January 20, 2012).*

As a mere passenger, defendant had no standing to challenge the inventory search of the car. State v. Parker, 2012 Ohio 839, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 730 (2d Dist. March 2, 2012).*

Officers saw a van parked in an industrial area around noon on Sunday, and they approached because that was unusual. Defendant would not roll down the window and reached under the seat, and that justified a protective search of where he was reaching. State v. Rose, 2012 Iowa App. LEXIS 167 (February 29, 2012).*

Defendants failed to show a connection to the car they were driving, so they did not have standing to challenge the search. They did, however, have standing to challenge their stop. The stop, however, was justified by crossing the fog line three times in a couple of miles. United States v. Perez-Guerrero, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27365 (D. Kan. March 2, 2012).*

In this circuit the good faith exception in considered first, and the affidavit for the warrant is not so lacking in probable cause that the good faith exception would not apply. United States v. Oldaker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25788 (N.D. W.Va. February 16, 2012).*

by Greg Palast
for TheMudflats

See Greg Palast on Democracy Now! with Amy Goodman on the BP Settlement.

Following the Deepwater Horizon explosion, Greg Palast led a four-continent investigation of BP PLC for Britain's television series Dispatches. From 1989-91, Palast directed the investigation of fraud charges in the Exxon Valdez grounding for Alaska Native villages.

Some deal. BP gets the gold mine and the public gets the shaft.

On Friday night, the lawyers for 120,000 victims of the Deepwater Horizon blow-out cut a deal with oil company BP PLC which will save the oil giant billions of dollars. It will also save the company the threat of a trial that could expose the true and very ugly story of the Gulf of Mexico oil platform blow-out.

I have been to the Gulf and seen the damage — and the oil that BP says is gone.  Miles of it.  As an economist who calculated damages for plaintiffs in the Exxon Valdez oil spill case, I can tell you right now that there is no way, no how, that the $7.8 billion BP says it will spend on this settlement will cover that damage, the lost incomes, homes, businesses and boats, let alone the lost lives — from cancers, fetal deformities, miscarriages, and lung and skin diseases.

Two years ago, President Barack Obama forced BP to set aside at least $20 billion for the oil spill's victims.  This week's settlement will add exactly ZERO to that fund.  Indeed, BP is crowing that, adding in the sums already paid out, the company will still have spent less than the amount committed to the Obama fund.

There's so much corrosion, mendacity and evil covered up by this settlement deal that I hardly know where to begin.

So, let's start with punitive damages.

I was stunned that there is no provision, as was expected, for a punishment fee to by paid by BP for it's willful negligence. In the Exxon Valdez trial, a jury awarded us $5 billion in punitives - and BP's action, and the damage caused in the Gulf, is far, far worse.

BP now has to pay no more than proven damages. It's like telling a bank robber, "Hey, just put back the money in the vault and all's forgiven."

This case screamed for punitive damages. Here's just a couple of facts that should have been presented to a jury:

For example, the only reason six hundred miles of Gulf coastline has been slimed by oil was that BP failed to have emergency oil spill containment equipment ready to roll when the Deepwater Horizon blew out. BP had promised the equipment's readiness in writing and under oath.

And here's the sick, sick part. This is exactly the same thing BP did in the Exxon Valdez case. It was BP, not Exxon, that was responsible for stopping the spread of oil in Alaska in 1989. In Alaska, decades ago, BP told federal regulators it would have oil spill "boom" (the rubber that corrals the spreading stuff) ready to roll out if a tanker hit. When the Exxon Valdez struck Bligh Reef, BP's promised equipment wasn't there: BP had lied.

And in 2010, BP did it again. Instead of getting the oil contained in five hours as promised as a condition of drilling, it took five days to get the equipment in place (and that was done by the US Navy on orders of the President).

This was more than negligence: it was fraud, and by a repeat offender. Now BP is laughing all the way to the bank.

And there's more. BP mixed nitrogen into the cement which capped the well-head below the Deepwater Horizon. BP claimed to be shocked and horrified when the cement failed, releasing methane gas that blew apart the rig. BP accused the cement's seller, Halliburton, of hiding the fact that this "quick-set" cement can blow out in deep water.

But, in an investigation that took me to Central Asia, I discovered that BP knew the quick-set cement could fail - because it had failed already in an earlier blow-out which BP covered up with the help of an Asian dictatorship.

The lack of promised equipment, the prior blow-out — it all could have, should have, come out in trial.

Think about it: BP knew the cement could fail but continued to use it to save money. Over time, the savings to BP of its life-threatening methods added up to billions of dollars worldwide. BP will get to keep that savings bought at the cost of eleven men's lives.

Other investigators have uncovered more penny-pinching, life-threatening failures by BP and its drilling buck-buddies, Halliburton and TransOcean. These include bogus "blow-out preventers" and a managerial system that could be called, "We-Don't-Care Chaos."

BP partners and contractors will have to pay $5.4 billion as part of the deal — and BP, not the victims, will keep the entire $5.4 billion. If TransOcean and Halliburton follow suit, BP could walk without paying another dime to victims.

BP had no choice but to pay proven damages and conceded as much. I have learned from inside the plaintiffs' legal team that this judge was just not going to allow punitive damages; and the Bush-burdened US Supreme Court is just as hostile. (The Supremes cut the Exxon Valdez punitive award by 90%.)

So BP walks without the civil punishment that tort law should provide and justice demands, grinning and ready to do it again: drill on the cheap with the price paid by its workers and the public.

But stopping a trial denies the public more than the full payment due: it denies us the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. There are 72 million pages of evidence from inside BP and industry files obtained by legal discovery in the case which are now likely to follow the rig to the bottom of the sea.

That's not good. We need the real story.

The lawyers for plaintiffs got all they could get for their clients given the rightward march of the law. Also, there is no doubt that the control of the “$20-billion” spill fund by Kenneth Feinberg, known here in New York as “The Reptile,” the back room choice of Obama and BP, shafted victims by the thousands. Getting the Fund out of his saurian hands is probably the best part of the settlement deal.

But we need to widen the idea of “victim” to beyond those measurably harmed individuals. We are all BP’s victims: because of BP’s and the industry’s addiction to safety fakery from Alaska to the Caspian.

The President has just opened up the arctic waters of Alaska for drilling, has reopened the Gulf to deepwater platforms, and is fiddling with the idea of allowing the XL Pipeline to slice America in half.

So we need to know: Can we trust this industry?

The states of Louisiana and Mississippi could still haul BP into court. Fageddaboudit: neither Louisiana's Governor Bobby Jindal nor Mississippi's Phil Bryant, both of the Grand Oil Party, will expose BP. The Obama Administration must be pushed to bring the case to trail in the public interest. Though the history of federal complicity and Obama's fear of looking like a whale-hugging drill buster suggests a sell-out is in the offing.

Without a trial in the Deepwater Horizon case, we may never get the answer, never get the full story of the prior blow-outs, the fakery in the spill response system, and other profits-first kill-later trickery that bloats the bottom line of BP and the entire drill-baby-drill industry.

***

For more on Palast's worldwide investigation of BP and the industry in Central Asia, the Gulf, Alaska and the Amazon, read Palast's new book, Vultures' Picnic: In Pursuit of Petroleum Pigs, Power Pirates and High-Finance Carnivores at www.VulturesPicnic.org.

You can read Vultures' Picnic, "Chapter 1: Goldfinger," or download it, at no charge: click here.

Support the Palast Investigative Fund and keep our work alive.
Subscribe to Palast's Newsletter and podcasts.
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The patdown down was reasonable based on the strong smell of marijuana coming from defendant’s department. The feel of a baggy in the pocket was plain feel. State v. Banks, 2012 Iowa App. LEXIS 173 (February 29, 2012):

At the suppression hearing, Officer Younie testified he felt the crunch or crinkle of plastic in Banks's front pants pocket. Based on his experience he knew marijuana is routinely packaged in plastic baggies. He smelled the odor of burnt marijuana, and therefore, he opined the item in Banks's pocket was packaged marijuana. Officer Younie acknowledged that it was possible the baggie may have contained something other than marijuana, but as stated above, absolute certainty is not required. In addition, in his police report Officer Younie stated that he felt something in the pocket during the pat-down and that it felt like a plastic bag with a soft substance inside. We believe this evidence provided Officer Younie with probable cause to believe the item he felt in Banks's pocket was contraband, justifying his seizure of the item during the Terry pat-down.

Defendant was stopped for his license plate being out near his house, and a bag of marijuana was in plain view between his feet. Defendant asked if he could put his dog in the house, and the officer let him, and the officer could see a small quantity of marijuana and a grinder in the living room. There was no reason to believe anyone else was inside, and the entry for a protective sweep was unreasonable. State v. Alihassan, 2012 Ohio 825, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 718 (10th Dist. March 1, 2012):

[*P22] We disagree with the state's contentions. There was no evidence presented that the marijuana and grinder were in danger of destruction or removal. Although Leighty testified he knew there had been prior disturbance calls to the apartment regarding appellant and his girlfriend, he never said that he believed appellant's girlfriend lived at the apartment, and he admitted that people can have domestic disturbances when they do not live together. Leighty also admitted he heard no voices coming from inside the apartment, the television was not on, and there were no indications that a person was in the apartment. Although Leighty first testified that he heard no noises coming from inside the apartment, he later said he heard "noises" inside, and the noises were from an aquarium. Importantly, Leighty never testified that he believed the noises were made by people inside the apartment.

[*P23] With no evidence of any third parties present in the apartment, there was no risk of destruction of the evidence. Although, conceivably, the dog could have ingested the small amount of marijuana on the table, the grinder would not have been easily destroyed. ...

[I resisted the temptation.]

Defendant was stopped for having a headlight out and was given a warning. Immediately after he was told he was free to leave, the officer went into asking whether he had any drugs, firearms or knives on him. In the meantime, a second officer showed up to observe. The consent to search his person was a mere submission to authority at that point. State v. Dieckhoner, 2012 Ohio 805, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 699 (8th Dist. March 1, 2012):

[*P22] We find no legal distinction between Robinette and the case before this court. Just as the Ohio Supreme Court was in Robinette, we are also troubled by the timing of Comerford's immediate transition from giving Dieckhoner the warning for the improperly working headlight to questioning him about contraband and then requesting to search his person.

[*P23] Comerford gave Dieckhoner a verbal warning for the improperly working headlight and told Dieckhoner that "he was all set and to have a good night." As Dieckhoner turned to walk toward his car, Comerford then asked, "[b]y the way, do you have anything illegal; guns, knives, bombs, anything[?]" Unlike the facts in Robinette, there was no departmental or "drug interdiction policy" that required Comerford to question Dieckhoner about weapons or drugs. With the second officer standing five feet away, Dieckhoner denied having any contraband. Comerford immediately asked for consent to search him and Dieckhoner agreed.

[*P24] Comerford testified that he asks everyone he stops if they have any weapons, drugs, or guns on their person, and that he had no particular reason for asking Dieckhoner to search his person. In fact, Comerford testified that Dieckhoner was not acting suspicious in any way and that Dieckhoner was free to leave.

[*P25] Although Detective Leanza testified that Dieckhoner stated he consented to the search because he did not think Comerford would find the drugs in his pocket, the test for whether consent was voluntary depends on the totality of the circumstances at the time consent was given. Dieckhoner's reasoning for consenting to the search given after being arrested and to another law enforcement officer while in police custody does not withstand the State's burden of clearly demonstrating that Dieckhoner's consent was voluntary.

[*P26] After considering the totality of circumstances in the instant case, including Comerford's testimony that Dieckhoner appeared calm, the seamless transition between the detention and the request for consent, the fact that Comerford had no reasonable suspicion that Dieckhoner was involved or engaging in criminal activity, and the presence of another uniformed police officer, this court finds there was a sufficient show of authority such that Dieckhoner would not believe at the time that he was free to get in his car and drive away. Under these circumstances, any reasonable person would have felt compelled to submit to the officer's search, rather than consenting as a voluntary act of free will. See Robinette at 244-245.

The officer lacked reasonable suspicion for a stop in a high crime area, but the officer then saw that the license for the vehicle was expired. When defendant was stopped, he made furtive movements under the dashboard, and that justified the officer handcuffing him when defendant was removed from the vehicle. This was still not an arrest. State v. Walker, 2012 Ohio 847, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 739 (2d Dist. March 2, 2012):

{¶ 25} Considering the totality of the circumstances, the detective's actions of drawing his gun and handcuffing Walker did not constitute an arrest. Given Walker's frantic movements below the dashboard upon being stopped by the police, his failure to comply when ordered to show his hands, and their location in a high crime area, House took reasonable actions to ensure his safety while initiating an investigatory detention.

Officers responded to a shooting call at defendant’s premises, and a cursory review of the premises revealed bags of marijuana. Even opening a closet door was not unreasonable. State v. Smith, 2012 Ohio 845, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 737 (2d Dist. March 2, 2012).*

A bar had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the public area of its establishment under Barlow’s. “Even if, as Dodge City argues, it had a subjective reasonable expectation of privacy to exclude persons under 21 years old, which it did not, Dodge City lost that interest when it voluntarily admitted [the minor] onto the premises.” Dodge City Saloon, Inc. v. Liquor Control Bd., 2012 Wash. App. LEXIS 386 (February 28, 2012). [Update: The Washington courts website has not worked in four days.]

Just because a judge denies a motion to suppress does not mean that the judge is biased against the defendant. United States v. Harris, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26578 (W.D. Mo. January 24, 2012).*

In an Anders brief, the search warrant was valid. State v. Jones, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 207 (La. App. 5th Cir. February 28, 2012).*

Here the officers had an arrest warrant for defendant and performed a “protective sweep” to corral the children in the house so they would be attended to when the officers left with defendant. This was reasonable. Defendant consented to retrieving his ID from the bedroom and the seizure of his cell phones. United States v. Rivero, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26867 (N.D. Ga. January 20, 2012).*

This district court follows the majority and does not require probable cause for historical cell site location data. United States v. Graham, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26954 (D. Md. March 1, 2012):

Some courts, most notably the Eastern District of New York and the Southern District of Texas, have concluded that, under certain circumstances, applications seeking cell site location data must be granted only after a showing of probable cause, and not the lower statutory standard of "specific and articulable facts" contained in the Stored Communications Act. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States, 809 F. Supp. 2d 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (Garaufis, J.); In re Application of the United States, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (Smith, Mag. J.), appeal docketed, No. 11-20554 (5th Cir. Dec. 14, 2011); In re Application of the United States, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (Orenstein, Mag. J.), rev'd No. 10-MC-0550 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011) (unpublished order noting written opinion to follow). Those courts have essentially held that a government application for cell site location records does not implicate the Fourth Amendment if the request is for a discrete, and relatively short period of time. Compare In re Application, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 578-79 (application requesting cell site location data for a period of 58 days required warrant based on probable cause); In re Application, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 829 (60 days), with In re Application of the United States, No. 11-MC-0113, 2011 WL 679925, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2011) (application for a period of 21 days required only specific and articulable facts, and not probable cause). In other words, those courts have concluded that the Fourth Amendment is only implicated when the government surveillance of historical cell site location data occurs over a sufficiently long—albeit undefined—period of time so as to implicate a person's legitimate expectation of privacy. None of these decisions have explicitly defined the length of time at which a request for cell site location data must be supported by probable cause, but Magistrate Judge Orenstein of the Eastern District of New York suggested that thirty days might be an appropriate limit. See In re Application, 2011 WL 679925, at *2.

A majority of courts, on the other hand, have concluded that the acquisition of historical cell site location data pursuant to the Stored Communications Act's specific and articulable facts standard does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the time period involved. See, e.g., United States v. Dye, No. 10CR221, 2011 WL 1595255, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 2011); United States v. Velasquez, No. 08-730-WHA, 2010 WL 4286276, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2010); United States v. Benford, No. 09 CR 86, 2010 WL 1266507, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 07-023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8-11 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008); In re Application of the United States, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80-81 (D. Mass. 2007). These courts have primarily relied on a line of Supreme Court cases construing the scope of Fourth Amendment rights relating to business records held by third parties. More specifically, these courts have concluded that because people voluntarily convey their cell site location data to their cellular providers, they relinquish any expectation of privacy over those records. See Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8 (finding no expectation of privacy in records kept by third parties) (citing, inter alia, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976)).

For the following reasons, this Court concludes that the Defendants in this case do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the historical cell site location records acquired by the government. These records, created by cellular providers in the ordinary course of business, indicate the cellular towers to which a cellular phone connects, and by extension the approximate location of the cellular phone. While the implications of law enforcement's use of this historical cell site location data raise the specter of prolonged and constant government surveillance, Congress in enacting the Stored Communications Act, has chosen to require only "specific and articulable facts" in support of a government application for such records. Put simply, the Fourth Amendment, as currently interpreted, does not contemplate a situation where government surveillance becomes a "search" only after some specified amount of time.

[Sorry, it was too hard to use Google Scholar to locate all of them. I don't have that much time.]

When defendant refuses to be “seized” and ran away, he obviously felt free to leave. Also, “[t]he district court reviews de novo only those portions of a magistrate judge's R&R to which objections are filed.” There is no de novo review to that which the defendant does not object. United States v. Huckabee, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24491 (N.D. N.C. February 27, 2012).*

The district court reviews de novo only those portions of a magistrate judge's M&R to which objections are filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court does not perform a de novo review of those portions to which a party makes only "general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). Absent a specific and timely objection, the court reviews only for "clear error," and need not give any explanation for adopting the M&R. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005); Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 1983). Upon careful review of the record, "the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

. . .

Detective Hunter did not seize defendant when she attempted to question him near the side of the road. After Detectives Becker and Hunter pulled to the side of the road, Detective Hunter approached defendant from the front and asked, in a conversational tone, if she could talk to him. Defendant responded aggressively by saying, "Who the [expletive omitted] are you? You don't know me." Detective Hunter identified herself as a police detective and again asked if she could talk to him. Defendant again responded, "You don't know me," and then fled. The entire encounter lasted about five seconds.

Under these factual circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt himself free to leave. Detective Hunter did not physically contact defendant, nor was her questioning of him intimidating. Her firearm was holstered, and she did not accuse defendant of any criminal activity. Based on these circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt himself free to go about his business. Further, even if Detective Hunter's conduct could somehow be construed as an assertion of authority, defendant never submitted. Rather, he attempted to flee. As stated above, "[a] defendant who flees the police in response to an assertion of authority has not been seized, and thus his Fourth Amendment rights are not implicated." Brown, 401 F.3d at 594.

2255 petitioner’s claim that his defense lawyer failed to fully investigate the apparent authority of the consenter to consent would have added nothing and the motion to suppress still would have been denied. United States v. Livingston, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25558 (W.D. Okla. February 28, 2012).

Even if the curtilage were entered (it wasn’t), purging that information from the affidavit for the search warrant would not nullify the probable cause. Defendant carries the burden on the GFE, and he fails. United States v. Simmons, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25615 (D. Me. February 28, 2012).*

2255 petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim was time barred, and he couldn’t get in the back door via a writ of error coram nobis. Also, WECN is only available if the petitioner is not in custody, and he was. Johnson v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26522 (E.D. Mo. February 28, 2012).*

Officer’s queries with “please” and normal tone of voice, all recorded during the stop of defendant at the El Paso interstate bus terminal, showed defendant’s consent to a search of his person for drugs strapped to him was voluntary. The court concludes it was not an order. United States v. Trujillo, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26580 (W.D. Tex. February 29, 2012).*

Defendant’s conduct was suspicious around a car and indicated either theft, drug dealing, or a car jacking. When the officer stopped with lights, defendant attempted to back away. All this was more than a hunch of criminal activity. United States v. Bady, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26265 (S.D. Ill. February 29, 2012).*

Defendant’s 2255 claim that defense counsel failed to raise a racial motivation issue based on something the officer said during the stop is belied by the DVD of the stop. Defendant’s plea deal to a five year max was a huge benefit, considering where he would have fallen on the guidelines if the government pursued his priors. United States v. Curry, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25803 (D. Neb. February 29, 2012).*

Defendant had to understand that a search of his person for drugs would mean going into the pockets. United States v. Stinson, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4144 (4th Cir. February 28, 2012) (unpublished).*

33 minute delay in the stop here was reasonable and caused by the language barrier and waiting for an interpreter to arrive. United States v. Hernandez-Coria, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24624 (D. Minn. January 25, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped in a taxicab, and marijuana was seen in plain view. People v Souffrant, 2012 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1528, 2012 NY Slip Op 1521 (3d Dept. March 1, 2012).*