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A defendant told he’s going to be frisked is “seized.” Here, the record is devoid of any factual justification for the frisk based on what “other people” said. If they were informants, there was no showing of basis of knowledge or any reason to be truthful. Commonwealth v. Arias, 2012 Mass. App. LEXIS 93 (February 28, 2012)*:

Here, the record reveals nothing about the informants' basis of knowledge or veracity. Hart and Halloran, the MBTA employees who told the police about the defendant, expressly stated that they were passing on information they had obtained from "other people" but said nothing about who the other people were and provided no information about the other people that would enable anyone to determine either their veracity or basis of knowledge. In that regard, we treat the individuals who gave information to Hart and Halloran as unknown informants even though police knew their identities by the time of the hearing. ... Nothing in the record suggests that the police knew who the informants were before they arrested the defendant or that they had any idea how the informants knew of the gun. Moreover, information obtained from known informants receives somewhat greater weight than that received from anonymous informants because known informants expose themselves to "charge[s] of filing a false report or any comparable consequence of providing false information to law enforcement." Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 456 Mass. 385, 397, 923 N.E.2d 1004 (2010). See Commonwealth v. Costa, 448 Mass. 510, 515-517, 862 N.E.2d 371 (2007). Here, the informants faced no such consequences when they made their disclosures to Hart or Halloran. Indeed, nothing in the record suggests that they even knew that Hart or Halloran would relay their information to authorities.

Arizona State Has It Right 4-30-10

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Defendant was not in a “Catch-22” by having to establish standing since it couldn’t be used to prove guilt. The trial court explained it to her. State v. Vu, 2012 Ohio 746, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 650 (9th Dist. February 27, 2012):

[*P23] Vu asserted in the court below that the trial court placed her in a "Catch-22" by insisting that she prove a possessory interest in the properties, as any such proof would aid the State's case. She also avers on appeal that it is illogical that she was barred from seeking suppression on the basis that she lacked a possessory interest, but was found guilty of possession, for which there had to be evidence of a possessory interest. The answer to both arguments lies in the difference between the suppression stage and the trial stage.

[*P24] Although the State bore the burden of proof at trial, it was Vu's burden to prove that she possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy for purposes of suppression. Redding, 2010 Ohio 4286, at ¶ 8, quoting Blackert, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3818, 1992 WL 174642, at *3. Further, any evidence she introduced at the suppression stage to prove that she had a possessory interest would not have been admissible against her at trial on the issue of guilt. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394. The trial court explained both propositions of law to Vu's counsel at the suppression stage. Even so, Vu's counsel maintained that he did not have any testimony to offer, the record spoke for itself, and Vu automatically should be entitled to challenge the applicable search warrants, given that the State intended to pursue possession charges against her. The United States Supreme Court has specifically rejected the notion of "automatic standing," however, and it was Vu's burden to demonstrate a privacy interest. State v. Johnson, 63 Ohio App.3d 345, 347-348, 578 N.E.2d 867 (9th Dist.1989), citing United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-93, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1980). Because she failed to carry her burden, the trial court did not err by concluding that she lacked standing to challenge the warrants issued for the houses at Troon Avenue, Baywood Drive, and Autumnwood Lane and the apartments at Grand Lake Drive and Stoneybrook Lane.

Come on: Simmons is almost 45 years old.

The affidavit was more than just “bare bones,” and the good faith exception was satisfied. The question is not “just lacking” in probable cause, but so lacking that no reasonable officer could rely in it. United States v. Oldaker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25788 (N.D. W.Va. February 16, 2012).*

Officers had reasonable suspicion for a probation search, and probable cause was not the standard. United States v. Bolivar, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4096 (9th Cir. February 29, 2012).*

To satisfy the Fourth Amendment, an inventory did not require watch commander approval. The policy mentions it, but failure to follow is not a Fourth Amendment issue when the inventory is otherwise proper. State v. Stewart, 2012 Ida. App. LEXIS 17 (February 27, 2012).*

Plaintiff overcame qualified immunity in his claim that he was standing in a tree showing his hands when officers were trying to arrest him, having thrown down his rifle. They gave him conflicting orders, and Tasered him and he fell from the tree. Their claim that he could have jumped on them from the tree to grab the gun was dubious at best. Harper v. Perkins, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4064 (11th Cir. February 29, 2012) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s racial motivation for a stop failed here because, after the stop ended and he was told he was free to leave, he continued to talk to the officer and ultimately consented. United States v. Curry, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25803 (D. Neb. February 29, 2012).*

Plaintiff in this FTCA case was caught stealing from the mail, and a body search was conducted with his consent to locate fluorescent powder markings from the mail he tampered with. Thus, his consent and failure to object denies him a claim for this. Pinero v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22376 (D. P.R. February 20, 2012).*

Defendant was arrested at home in her pajamas. She was allowed to reenter to get dressed, but officers were allowed to go in with her for self-protection, and a sawed off shotgun was seen inside leaning against the wall. This observation was lawful. [If she didn’t want them to see the gun, she should not have asked to go back inside. This is just like Christman.] United States v. Reid, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24523 (E.D. Mo. February 7, 2012):

When the deputies arrested Graham at 712 Thrush, she was dressed in her pajamas. Following the arrest and a brief discussion, the deputies allowed Graham to reenter 712 Thrush to change her clothes. Although the deputies had no specific reason to suspect danger to them or that Graham might attempt to escape, the deputies were entitled to enter the residence immediately before or with Graham and to remain with her as she changed clothes. Debuse, 289 F.3d at 1074-75 (holding that where the defendant "chose to reenter his house simply for his own convenience[,] [a]llowing reentry on the condition that the officers accompany him was reasonable"); ....

Based on prior wiretaps, officers had probable cause as to defendant. When they saw what appeared to be a hand to hand transaction, they had more probable cause to stop him. United States v. Coria, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24624 (D. Minn. January 25, 2012).*

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Forbes op-ed: The TSA Is Coming To A Highway Near You by Rep. Marsha Blackburn (R-TN):

One of the great honors of my service to Tennessee is having the opportunity to represent Ft. Campbell which is home to the storied 101st Airborne, the 5th Special Forces Group and the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment which piloted Navy SEAL Team Six during the raid on Osama Bin Laden.

Each soldier who calls Ft. Campbell home has gone through some of the most intensive training on the planet which pushed their minds and bodies to their physical limits. In the end, those who make the cut have earned the right to be part of our United States military, are honored to wear its uniform, and are serving on the frontlines in the fight against global terrorism.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for our nation’s Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) who Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano contends are our nation’s last line of defense in fighting domestic terrorism. Unlike “hell week” which faces potential Navy SEALs, becoming a TSO requires a basic level of classroom and on the job training. In many cases this rigorous training is less severe than the requirements of becoming a security guard in most states.

The Dark Side of Illegal Immigration —Part 1, 12-9-10

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Montana Update 12-9-10

The possibility, not even the probability, of remote wiping of a cell phone with applications for nearly all phones, is enough to justify entering the phone to get its number. The question of a more detailed search is saved for another day. United States v. Flores-Lopez, 10-3803 (7th Cir. February 29, 2012):

This appeal requires us to consider the circumstances in which the search of a cell phone is permitted by the Fourth Amendment even if the search is not authorized by a warrant. Lurking behind this issue is the question whether and when a laptop or desktop computer, tablet, or other type of computer (whether called a “computer” or not) can be searched without a warrant—for a modern cell phone is a computer.

. . .

A modern cell phone is in one aspect a diary writ large. Even when used primarily for business it is quite likely to contain, or provide ready access to, a vast body of personal data. The potential invasion of privacy in a search of a cell phone is greater than in a search of a “container” in a conventional sense even when the conventional container is a purse that contains an address book (itself a container) and photos. Judges are becoming aware that a computer (and remember that a modern cell phone is a computer) is not just another purse or address book. “[A]nalogizing computers to other physical objects when applying Fourth Amendment law is not an exact fit because computers hold so much personal and sensitive information touching on many private aspects of life. ... [T]here is a far greater potential for the ‘intermingling’ of documents and a consequent invasion of privacy when police execute a search for evidence on a computer.” United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 178 (6th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999); cf. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1175-77 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009). An iPhone application called iCam allows you to access your home computer’s webcam so that you can survey the inside of your home while you’re a thousand miles away. “iCam—Webcam Video Streaming,” http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/icam-webcam-videostreaming/id296273730?mt=8 (visited Feb. 6, 2012, as were the other web sites that we cite in this opinion). At the touch of a button a cell phone search becomes a house search, and that is not a search of a “container” in any normal sense of that word, though a house contains data.

A complication in this case is that, remarkably, the record does not indicate the brand, model, or year of the defendant’s cell phone, so we do not know how dumb or smart it is. But does that matter? Even the dumbest of modern cell phones gives the user access to large stores of information.

. . .

We said it was conceivable, not probable, that a confederate of the defendant would have wiped the data from the defendant’s cell phone before the government could obtain a search warrant; and it could be argued that the risk of destruction of evidence was indeed so slight as to be outweighed by the invasion of privacy from the search. But the “invasion,” limited as it was to the cell phone’s number, was also slight. And in deciding whether a search is properly incident to an arrest and therefore does not require a warrant, the courts do not conduct a cost-benefit analysis, with the invasion of privacy on the cost side and the risk of destruction of evidence (or of an assault on the arresting officers) on the benefit side of allowing the immediate search. Toting up costs and benefits is not a feasible undertaking to require of police officers conducting a search incident to an arrest. Thus, even when the risk either to the police officers or to the existence of the evidence is negligible, the search is allowed, United States v. Robinson, supra, 414 U.S. at 235, provided it’s no more invasive than, say, a frisk, or the search of a conventional container, such as Robinson’s cigarette pack, in which heroin was found. If instead of a frisk it’s a strip search, the risk to the officers’ safety or to the preservation of evidence of crime must be greater to justify the search. Campbell v. Miller, 499 F.3d 711, 717 (7th Cir. 2007), citing Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983). Looking in a cell phone for just the cell phone’s phone number does not exceed what decisions like Robinson and Concepcion allow.

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