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The officer had reasonable grounds to detain defendant. Tasering him was a seizure because the barbs in the Taser connected them. United States v. Davis, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54346 (E.D. Tenn. March 29, 2012).* [Remember, Taser® is a trademark.]

Defendant’s 2255 argument that defense counsel was ineffective for not arguing invalid inventory rather than search incident wouldn’t work because there was justification for an inventory, too. Brunick v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55096 (D. Ore. April 19, 2012).*

Even if defendant’s car was blocked on a parking lot, it didn’t rise to a seizure. But, the USPS Postal Inspectors had reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in the theft of mail from their observations. United States v. Hampton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54421 (N.D. Ga. March 5, 2012).*

Searching a vehicle to “secure” it absent exigent circumstances was unreasonable. State v. Cleveland, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 3070 (Tex. App. – Houston (14th Dist.) April 19, 2012):

Likewise, here, the plain-view exception does not apply because, as in Keehn, the officers had no lawful right to access the object in appellee's truck absent exigent circumstances. See id. Our review of the record reveals no exigent circumstance capable of supporting Jones's seizure of the pills. Jones stated that at the time he entered the vehicle to seize the pills, "everyone was secured" and in police custody. Thus, there was no opportunity for any of the people at the scene to drive the vehicle away or dispose of any evidence while the officers were securing a search warrant. The State asserts that the "exigent circumstance" present here was the automobile exception. But as discussed above, this ground was not raised in the trial court. Thus, we may not consider it for the first time on appeal as a basis to reverse the trial court's orders. See Martinez, 91 S.W.3d 331. Under these circumstances, we overrule the State's sole issue on appeal.

Officers were questioning two others about bring money to Puero Rico to allegedly by drugs. Defendant interjected himself into that conversation and raised reasonable suspicion as to himself. United States v. Hammonds, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54466 (M.D. Pa. April 18, 2012).*

Officers had probable cause for defendant’s vehicle stop, so whether there was a traffic stop was irrelevant. United States v. Sierra-Rodriguez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54069 (E.D. Mich. April 17, 2012).*

There was a serial rapist working the town, and the police were on the look out because he may have been spotted. Defendant’s car was the only car in the area late at night. State v. Burdick, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 229 (April 18, 2012).*

Daily Sentinel: Juror: Fourth Amendment played minor role in Lawyer case: Trooper's actions reasonable under the circumstances, he says by Paul Shockley:

Two jurors who sat in judgment of Colorado State Patrol Trooper Ivan “Gene” Lawyer said Fourth Amendment principles had either too much emphasis by the prosecution, or little bearing on the main issues at play in the trooper’s trial.

Lawyer was acquitted Thursday on four counts, including criminally negligent homicide and first-degree criminal trespass. Two other counts, including second-degree assault with recklessness, were left undecided by a deadlocked jury.

Defendant worked for a business as a bookkeeper and he kept records on his work computer and one the company provided at this house. While he was on a trip, the company received mail that suggested that defendant was embezzling from it. They checked the work computer and did not find records for a whole year. They went to his house and asked for the work computer which his wife provided. Back and work they looked through the computer using the company password and found the evidence of embezzlement, which they gave to the government. This was all a private search not governed by the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Brown, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54382 (S.D. Ind. April 18, 2012).*

It was reasonable to impound a vehicle that would have had to be left in a high crime area and was at risk of being broken into. There was not need to give the car to a present potential driver when there was no showing of insurance to drive it and the registration was expired. United States v. McKinnon, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7806 (5th Cir. April 18, 2012)* [Note: The court almost lost me with the insurance comment because that would be shifting the burden. They should have left that out.]

There was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop and frisk because it was a high crime area, defendant was walking funny like he had a gun on him, and when he “bladed” the officer could see the outline of a gun. United States v. Carson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54372 (D. N.J. April 18, 2012).*

An officer lawfully in a house shining a flashlight into a bedroom saw a shiny object on a night stand. Suspecting it was a gun, he retrieved it. The gun was in plain view. United States v. Simmons, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54190 (S.D. N.Y. April 16, 2012).

Failing to object to a search as it takes place is implied consent. United States v. Simmons, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54360 (E.D. Mo. April 4, 2012).* [Note: Can’t agree with this because most people are afraid or unwilling to speak at the time of a search. They are submitting to authority, and the police know it.]

The tipster here was a suspicious person, and the officer getting it clearly did not trust the tipster and called a supervisor for advice after getting the tip a second time. In total, the tipster was could not be relied upon for reasonable suspicion. United States v. Melendez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53663 (S.D. Fla. March 30, 2012).*

Police received a child welfare call, and responded to defendant’s residence. He consented to an entry to check on the welfare of the children, and a gun and marijuana were found in plain view. The officers could look anywhere children might be found, so the walk through was within the limits of consent. United States v. McArthur, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52269 (S.D. W.Va. April 13, 2012).*

Defendant consented to a search of his car for drugs, but he did not consent to seizure and then search of his cell phone. He objected, and the government, which had the burden of proof, offered no response, so the cell phone is suppressed. United States v. Smith, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54331 (S.D. Ohio April 18, 2012).

On a remand from the Sixth Circuit, “Defendant's Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence can be disposed of on the grounds that either the Detectives had consent to conduct a search or that the Detectives could conduct a protective sweep.” United States v. Spicer, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54306 (S.D. Ohio April 16, 2012).*

Furtive movements under the seat at the time of stop with one occupant opening and closing the glove compartment and another feigning sleep justified a protective sweep of the car. People v Newman, 2012 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2803, 2012 NY Slip Op 2816 (1st Dept. April 17, 2012).*

The trial court held that the defendant lacked standing to contest a search, and defendant did not show that defense counsel was ineffective for not getting to the merits of the search. State v. Jackson, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 510 (April 17, 2012).*

A wiretap in New York provided probable cause defendant would be picking up drugs in Tennessee. Defendant had a suspended DL, and the owner also consented to the search. United States v. Prater, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53739 (E.D. Tenn. February 17, 2012).*

The affiant police officer misled the issuing magistrate on the question of probable cause, and that nullified the good faith exception. United States v. Albury, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53645 (M.D. Fla. January 19, 2012):

Beginning with Leon, the Supreme Court "recalibrated" the cost-benefit analysis under the exclusionary rule "to focus the inquiry on the 'flagrancy of the police misconduct' at issue." Davis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011). Thus, "[w]hen the police exhibit 'deliberate,' 'reckless,' or 'grossly negligent' disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs. But when the police act with an objectively 'reasonable good-faith belief' that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct involves only simple, 'isolated' negligence, the 'deterrence rationale loses much of its force,' and exclusion 'cannot pay its way.'" Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2427-28 (citations omitted)..

Here, Off. Waker acted with deliberate indifference to Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights in connection with his search of room 332. The affiant's plain-view sighting of suspected cocaine in that room is the fruit of that illegality. Even if the affiant's representations were not deliberately false on his part, in the circumstances of this case and given Blackwell's unrefuted testimony, they were made with reckless indifference of the truth and misleaded the state judge on the matter of probable cause. In the circumstances, the government may not claim the benefit of an exception to the exclusionary rule under Leon.

Uncorroborated anonymous tip did not provide reasonable suspicion. United States v. Melendez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53663 (S.D. Fla. April 4, 2012).*

Civil case over search that led to revocation was not barred by Heck because the evidence was admissible, illegal search or not. Henderson v. Davis, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7646 (11th Cir. April 17, 2012).*

Search warrant after controlled buy was not stale because the collective information showed a continuing operation. United States v. Tisdale, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53294 (D. Kan. April 16, 2012).*

“[A]ny ordinary visitor to Defendant's apartment would have understood Defendant's actions to constitute assent to Officer Jordan's entry into Defendant's apartment.” United States v. Murphy, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52246 (E.D. Tenn. April 13, 2012).*

Defendant lived in the basement of Flynn’s house in St. Louis, and Flynn discovered a meth lab. Flynn called the police and consented to their entry and search. Defendant’s relationship to the basement was difficult and uncertain, so the court assumes standing, but more than one person stayed down there, and it wasn’t clear what his privacy relationship was to the basement. It seemed that it wasn’t sufficiently private that Flynn couldn’t consent. United States v. Hendrix, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53823 (E.D. Mo. March 30, 2012):

In the circumstances of this case, Officer Page and the other officers acted reasonably. When they arrived at 3232 California, they knocked on the front door and it was opened by a man who said he was Thomas Flynn who had phoned them earlier about a meth lab in his basement, operated by a friend of his. He then led the officers to the basement door, which was already open. Flynn had not asked anyone for permission to admit the officers into the residence nor to take the officers to the doorway leading to the basement stairs. His actions reasonably led the officers to believe that, like the woman in the doorway with the baby on her hip in Matlock, Flynn showed he belonged in the residence and had sufficient authority over it, including the basement area, to further authorize the police to enter not only the residence generally but also to go downstairs to investigate the possibly criminal activity about which he had called them. United States v. Almeida-Perez, 549 F.3d 1162, 1170-71 (8th Cir. 2008). The officers' entry into the basement room of defendant was constitutionally authorized by the consent of Thomas Flynn.

Inconsistencies in the officers’ testimony led the court to conclude that consent was not given after a knock-and-talk. United States v. Miranda-Cortez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53402 (D. Utah April 16, 2012)*:

Because of these inconsistencies and the government's failure to acknowledge or otherwise convincingly explain them, the court concludes that the testimony of the officers involved in this operation is not sufficient to sustain the government's burden to prove it had freely obtained consent to search the basement apartment. The court wants to be clear that it is not impugning the testimony of the officers. Nothing before the court suggests that the officers have intentionally attempted to mislead the court or give knowingly false testimony. Indeed, it is more likely that the officers were distracted by their roles in continuing their deception to gain access to the house and were so overly concentrated on finding the drugs once they entered the basement, that they failed to appreciate all the details of what was occurring.

The officers may well have concluded that they had sufficient evidence to proceed without a warrant. Uncertainty, however, must weigh in favor of the constitutional protections. A pretext pursued with the stated objective of gaining entrance without a warrant may prematurely lead officers to believe they have succeeded in obtaining sufficient concessions from the home occupant to claim it was consent. With no exigencies evident here to justify a departure from the constitutional requirement, the officers rely on the consent exception, which is cluttered with uncertainties and contradictions.

Defendant objected to the alleged consent given by the lady who opened the door and let the police in. That was essentially a moot argument because, once the police were inside, he said he owned the place, and he consented and cooperated with the police. All this happened before the officers saw any evidence of crime. “Mr. Lucas's consent to the officers' presence and search was sufficient to dissipate any taint caused by an illegal initial entry. See U.S. v. Jarvi, 537 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2008).” United States v. Lucas, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7746 (10th Cir. April 17, 2012).*

The state showed that the inventory search of defendant’s car was necessary to log the valuables, and defendant did not show that it was in bad faith, so he does not prevail. Boykin v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 274 (April 18, 2012).* [Note: Is the court shifting the burden of proof here? Should the state bare the burden of good faith inventory searches since they always carry the burden?]

AJC.com: Op-ed: Poor people not excluded from Constitution by Jay Bookman:

Here we go again.

On April 15, 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Georgia law that required candidates to be tested for illegal drugs before they could run for public office. In “Chandler v. Miller”, the court ruled that the tests amounted to an unreasonable, unjustified search of a person’s body that is forbidden under the Fourth Amendment.

“However well-meant, the candidate drug test Georgia has devised diminishes personal privacy for a symbol’s sake,” Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in the 8-1 decision, joined by justices such as Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.

NYTimes.com: No Savings Are Found From Welfare Drug Tests by Lizette Alvarez:

Ushered in amid promises that it would save taxpayers money and deter drug users, a Florida law requiring drug tests for people who seek welfare benefits resulted in no direct savings, snared few drug users and had no effect on the number of applications, according to recently released state data.

Many states are considering following Florida’s example, and the new data from the state shows they shouldn’t,” said Derek Newton, communications director for the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, which sued the state last year to stop the testing and recently obtained the documents. “Not only is it unconstitutional and an invasion of privacy, but it doesn’t save money, as was proposed.”

Officers’ alleged failure knock before entry was entitled to qualified immunity or was constitutionally justified. The officers knew that a gun was likely involved, and the search warrant included weapons. Under Richards and Wilson, this was sufficient to dispense with announcement for officer safety. Youngbey v. March, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7630 (D.C. Cir. April 17, 2012).*

Defendants were moving around from room to room in a hotel, and vacated two rooms. The police had probable cause to search the rooms they were in as well as the abandoned rooms for firearms. A gun was actually abandoned in one of the vacated rooms. United States v. Albury, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53644 (M.D. Fla. April 17, 2012).*

Officers searching a computer hard drive had the benefit of the plain view doctrine when they came upon obvious chat logs and foreign travel information. United States v. Johnston, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53323 (E.D. Cal. April 16, 2012).*

The traffic stop of car defendant was in was justified by occupants not using seatbelts. Defendant refused to submit and fled, and he was never seized. United States v. Lindsey, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52250 (E.D. Tenn. February 3, 2012):

Because the Fourth Amendment governs actual seizure, not attempted seizures, the government need not justify Officer Fielden's attempt to stop Defendant. United States v. Smith, No. 10-1551, 2012 WL 181393 (6th Cir. Jan. 24, 2012) (holding that police need not justify their attempt to stop a defendant who evades their attempt). If a suspect is not seized because he evades the police, the Fourth Amendment is simply not implicated. Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 254; United States v. George, No. 10-6159, 2012 WL 128402, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 17, 2012) ("Without actual submission, 'there is at most an attempted seizure.'") (quoting Jones, 562 F.3d at 774 and Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 254); United States v. Smith, 594 F.3d 530, 535-36 (6th Cir. 2010) ("In order for a seizure to occur, the encounter must not be consensual and the officers must use physical force or the individual must submit to the officers' show of authority.").

The government does not dispute that Officer Fielden engaged in a show of authority. Defendant does not appear to contest that he failed to submit to Officer Fielden's show of authority; instead, Defendant contends he was seized, perhaps by physical force, the moment Officer Fielden's gun was drawn and pointed at him. The case law simply does not support Defendant's position.

Defendant was seen at the scene of four controlled buys and was believed involved himself, and the totality gave probable cause. Thus, the search incident of his person and car were supported by probable cause. Defendant initially denied any connection to the premises, disclaiming an ability to consent. Officers then went to the door and talked to the occupant and got consent. Defendant made no effort to show standing, so he can’t object to the consent of another. United States v. Sayles, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53070 (S.D. Ill. April 16, 2012).*

Defendant was arrested for carjacking, and keys were found on his person. The officer could remove the keys as a potential weapon or because there was probable cause to connect him to the carjacking under the search incident doctrine. United States v. Yancy, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52394 (W.D. Tenn. April 13, 2012).*

Defendant’s detention was legal, so that did not change the government’s burden of showing consent, which the court finds to be voluntary. United States v. Armenta, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52729 (D. Utah April 12, 2012).*

Police came to defendant’s house on a child welfare call and asked to come in, and they were permitted. The court discusses the "hierarchy among tenants" for apparent consent. United States v. MacArthur, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52269 (S.D. W.Va. April 13, 2012):

Co-tenant consent may also be limited where a hierarchy among tenants in authority over the premises makes the consent of one insufficient to validate a search of the entire premises. For example, although a short-term guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his temporary quarters, Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 109 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1990), his control over all portions of the home where he stays may not be as extensive that of the owner, or a more permanent co-tenant. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 99 ("From the overnight guest's perspective, he seeks shelter in another's home precisely because it provides him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions will not be disturbed by anyone but his host and those his host allows inside.") (emphasis added); see also State v. Grant, 614 N.W. 2d 848, 853 (Iowa App. 2000) ("an overnight guest's legitimate expectation of privacy does not vitiate the homeowner's ability to consent to a search of his home.") (collecting cases).

Herald American: School wants to test all students for drugs by Christopher O'Donnell:

SARASOTA COUNTY - Students as young as 11 years old would be tested for use of marijuana, pills, cocaine and heroin under a proposal by a North Port charter school that wants to institute the region's most aggressive student testing program.

Imagine School at North Port hopes to begin drug testing students at its junior high school campus next school year, including sixth-graders. Students would be required to pass a drug test to attend the school and pass at least one random drug test per year to remain enrolled.

Another drug testing program that can't survive even minimal Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Why do the legislatures want to make civil rights lawyers money?