SearchSupport ReformAny amount helps!
Reform NewsTopicsUser loginVote ReformOrganizationNavigationEvents
Upcoming eventsActive forum topicsNew forum topicsBrowse archives
PollWho's onlineThere are currently 0 users and 13 guests online.
Who's new
Recent blog posts
|
IssuesRepublicans feud over nominating calendarCantor, Coburn endorse RomneyStories of survival emerge from tornado victimsEAST BERNSTADT, Ky. (AP) — The stories from tornado survivors across the South and Midwest were remarkable: Schoolchildren took cover under desks; people hunkered down in a church basement or hid out in a bank vault; one family even piled on top of one another for protection. One of the ... Shooting outside Ariz. club leaves 14 woundedTEMPE, Ariz. (AP) — Hundreds of concert-goers waiting outside an Arizona nightclub for a hip-hop show fled in panic as shooting erupted involving three gunmen, leaving at least 14 people wounded. Police arrested one suspect and were hunting two others. "People were running in all different directions, and some people ... IA: Baggy of marijuana in the pocket was plain feelThe patdown down was reasonable based on the strong smell of marijuana coming from defendant’s department. The feel of a baggy in the pocket was plain feel. State v. Banks, 2012 Iowa App. LEXIS 173 (February 29, 2012): At the suppression hearing, Officer Younie testified he felt the crunch or crinkle of plastic in Banks's front pants pocket. Based on his experience he knew marijuana is routinely packaged in plastic baggies. He smelled the odor of burnt marijuana, and therefore, he opined the item in Banks's pocket was packaged marijuana. Officer Younie acknowledged that it was possible the baggie may have contained something other than marijuana, but as stated above, absolute certainty is not required. In addition, in his police report Officer Younie stated that he felt something in the pocket during the pat-down and that it felt like a plastic bag with a soft substance inside. We believe this evidence provided Officer Younie with probable cause to believe the item he felt in Banks's pocket was contraband, justifying his seizure of the item during the Terry pat-down. Romney rides high toward Super TuesdayOlympia Snowe to retire from SenateOH10: The possibility the dog might eat marijuana was not an exigent circumstanceDefendant was stopped for his license plate being out near his house, and a bag of marijuana was in plain view between his feet. Defendant asked if he could put his dog in the house, and the officer let him, and the officer could see a small quantity of marijuana and a grinder in the living room. There was no reason to believe anyone else was inside, and the entry for a protective sweep was unreasonable. State v. Alihassan, 2012 Ohio 825, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 718 (10th Dist. March 1, 2012): [*P22] We disagree with the state's contentions. There was no evidence presented that the marijuana and grinder were in danger of destruction or removal. Although Leighty testified he knew there had been prior disturbance calls to the apartment regarding appellant and his girlfriend, he never said that he believed appellant's girlfriend lived at the apartment, and he admitted that people can have domestic disturbances when they do not live together. Leighty also admitted he heard no voices coming from inside the apartment, the television was not on, and there were no indications that a person was in the apartment. Although Leighty first testified that he heard no noises coming from inside the apartment, he later said he heard "noises" inside, and the noises were from an aquarium. Importantly, Leighty never testified that he believed the noises were made by people inside the apartment. [*P23] With no evidence of any third parties present in the apartment, there was no risk of destruction of the evidence. Although, conceivably, the dog could have ingested the small amount of marijuana on the table, the grinder would not have been easily destroyed. ... [I resisted the temptation.] OH8: Consent here was mere submission to authorityDefendant was stopped for having a headlight out and was given a warning. Immediately after he was told he was free to leave, the officer went into asking whether he had any drugs, firearms or knives on him. In the meantime, a second officer showed up to observe. The consent to search his person was a mere submission to authority at that point. State v. Dieckhoner, 2012 Ohio 805, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 699 (8th Dist. March 1, 2012): [*P22] We find no legal distinction between Robinette and the case before this court. Just as the Ohio Supreme Court was in Robinette, we are also troubled by the timing of Comerford's immediate transition from giving Dieckhoner the warning for the improperly working headlight to questioning him about contraband and then requesting to search his person. [*P23] Comerford gave Dieckhoner a verbal warning for the improperly working headlight and told Dieckhoner that "he was all set and to have a good night." As Dieckhoner turned to walk toward his car, Comerford then asked, "[b]y the way, do you have anything illegal; guns, knives, bombs, anything[?]" Unlike the facts in Robinette, there was no departmental or "drug interdiction policy" that required Comerford to question Dieckhoner about weapons or drugs. With the second officer standing five feet away, Dieckhoner denied having any contraband. Comerford immediately asked for consent to search him and Dieckhoner agreed. [*P24] Comerford testified that he asks everyone he stops if they have any weapons, drugs, or guns on their person, and that he had no particular reason for asking Dieckhoner to search his person. In fact, Comerford testified that Dieckhoner was not acting suspicious in any way and that Dieckhoner was free to leave. [*P25] Although Detective Leanza testified that Dieckhoner stated he consented to the search because he did not think Comerford would find the drugs in his pocket, the test for whether consent was voluntary depends on the totality of the circumstances at the time consent was given. Dieckhoner's reasoning for consenting to the search given after being arrested and to another law enforcement officer while in police custody does not withstand the State's burden of clearly demonstrating that Dieckhoner's consent was voluntary. [*P26] After considering the totality of circumstances in the instant case, including Comerford's testimony that Dieckhoner appeared calm, the seamless transition between the detention and the request for consent, the fact that Comerford had no reasonable suspicion that Dieckhoner was involved or engaging in criminal activity, and the presence of another uniformed police officer, this court finds there was a sufficient show of authority such that Dieckhoner would not believe at the time that he was free to get in his car and drive away. Under these circumstances, any reasonable person would have felt compelled to submit to the officer's search, rather than consenting as a voluntary act of free will. See Robinette at 244-245. United States-People's Republic of China Education Agreement 5-1-10United States-People's Republic of China Education Agreement 5-1-10
OH2: Removal from car at gunpoint and handcuffing after furtive movements still not an arrestThe officer lacked reasonable suspicion for a stop in a high crime area, but the officer then saw that the license for the vehicle was expired. When defendant was stopped, he made furtive movements under the dashboard, and that justified the officer handcuffing him when defendant was removed from the vehicle. This was still not an arrest. State v. Walker, 2012 Ohio 847, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 739 (2d Dist. March 2, 2012): {¶ 25} Considering the totality of the circumstances, the detective's actions of drawing his gun and handcuffing Walker did not constitute an arrest. Given Walker's frantic movements below the dashboard upon being stopped by the police, his failure to comply when ordered to show his hands, and their location in a high crime area, House took reasonable actions to ensure his safety while initiating an investigatory detention. Officers responded to a shooting call at defendant’s premises, and a cursory review of the premises revealed bags of marijuana. Even opening a closet door was not unreasonable. State v. Smith, 2012 Ohio 845, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 737 (2d Dist. March 2, 2012).* WA: No expectation of privacy in a bar's public areaA bar had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the public area of its establishment under Barlow’s. “Even if, as Dodge City argues, it had a subjective reasonable expectation of privacy to exclude persons under 21 years old, which it did not, Dodge City lost that interest when it voluntarily admitted [the minor] onto the premises.” Dodge City Saloon, Inc. v. Liquor Control Bd., 2012 Wash. App. LEXIS 386 (February 28, 2012). [Update: The Washington courts website has not worked in four days.] Just because a judge denies a motion to suppress does not mean that the judge is biased against the defendant. United States v. Harris, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26578 (W.D. Mo. January 24, 2012).* In an Anders brief, the search warrant was valid. State v. Jones, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 207 (La. App. 5th Cir. February 28, 2012).* Here the officers had an arrest warrant for defendant and performed a “protective sweep” to corral the children in the house so they would be attended to when the officers left with defendant. This was reasonable. Defendant consented to retrieving his ID from the bedroom and the seizure of his cell phones. United States v. Rivero, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26867 (N.D. Ga. January 20, 2012).* Doctors Continue to Kill and Injure with Horse Urine Estrogen 12-11-10Doctors Continue to Kill and Injure with Horse Urine Estrogen 12-11-10
Hundreds honor student killed in Ohio shootingCHARDON, Ohio — Hundreds of people stood shoulder to shoulder along the street on a cold, windy Saturday morning to honor one of three teenagers killed in a high school shooting. The service in Chardon for 16-year-old Daniel Parmertor is the first of the three funerals. Services for 16-year-old Demetrius ... The Other War Powers Act, 4-2-11The Other War Powers Act, 4-2-11
Categories: Christianity, Conservative, Devvy Kidd, Family, Issues, New World Order / Globalism, News, Politics, Pro-Life, Truth News, US, www.NewsWithViews.com
Recess appointment challenge suffers setbackSnowe's departure symptom of partisan illnessD.Md. follows majority and does not require PC for historial cell site location dataThis district court follows the majority and does not require probable cause for historical cell site location data. United States v. Graham, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26954 (D. Md. March 1, 2012): Some courts, most notably the Eastern District of New York and the Southern District of Texas, have concluded that, under certain circumstances, applications seeking cell site location data must be granted only after a showing of probable cause, and not the lower statutory standard of "specific and articulable facts" contained in the Stored Communications Act. See, e.g., In re Application of the United States, 809 F. Supp. 2d 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (Garaufis, J.); In re Application of the United States, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (Smith, Mag. J.), appeal docketed, No. 11-20554 (5th Cir. Dec. 14, 2011); In re Application of the United States, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (Orenstein, Mag. J.), rev'd No. 10-MC-0550 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011) (unpublished order noting written opinion to follow). Those courts have essentially held that a government application for cell site location records does not implicate the Fourth Amendment if the request is for a discrete, and relatively short period of time. Compare In re Application, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 578-79 (application requesting cell site location data for a period of 58 days required warrant based on probable cause); In re Application, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 829 (60 days), with In re Application of the United States, No. 11-MC-0113, 2011 WL 679925, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2011) (application for a period of 21 days required only specific and articulable facts, and not probable cause). In other words, those courts have concluded that the Fourth Amendment is only implicated when the government surveillance of historical cell site location data occurs over a sufficiently long—albeit undefined—period of time so as to implicate a person's legitimate expectation of privacy. None of these decisions have explicitly defined the length of time at which a request for cell site location data must be supported by probable cause, but Magistrate Judge Orenstein of the Eastern District of New York suggested that thirty days might be an appropriate limit. See In re Application, 2011 WL 679925, at *2. A majority of courts, on the other hand, have concluded that the acquisition of historical cell site location data pursuant to the Stored Communications Act's specific and articulable facts standard does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the time period involved. See, e.g., United States v. Dye, No. 10CR221, 2011 WL 1595255, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 2011); United States v. Velasquez, No. 08-730-WHA, 2010 WL 4286276, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2010); United States v. Benford, No. 09 CR 86, 2010 WL 1266507, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 07-023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8-11 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008); In re Application of the United States, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80-81 (D. Mass. 2007). These courts have primarily relied on a line of Supreme Court cases construing the scope of Fourth Amendment rights relating to business records held by third parties. More specifically, these courts have concluded that because people voluntarily convey their cell site location data to their cellular providers, they relinquish any expectation of privacy over those records. See Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8 (finding no expectation of privacy in records kept by third parties) (citing, inter alia, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976)). For the following reasons, this Court concludes that the Defendants in this case do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the historical cell site location records acquired by the government. These records, created by cellular providers in the ordinary course of business, indicate the cellular towers to which a cellular phone connects, and by extension the approximate location of the cellular phone. While the implications of law enforcement's use of this historical cell site location data raise the specter of prolonged and constant government surveillance, Congress in enacting the Stored Communications Act, has chosen to require only "specific and articulable facts" in support of a government application for such records. Put simply, the Fourth Amendment, as currently interpreted, does not contemplate a situation where government surveillance becomes a "search" only after some specified amount of time. [Sorry, it was too hard to use Google Scholar to locate all of them. I don't have that much time.] Storms demolish small towns in Ind., Ky.; 38 deadWEST LIBERTY, Ky. — Across the South and Midwest, survivors emerged Saturday to find blue sky and splinters where homes once stood, cars flung into buildings and communications crippled after dozens of tornadoes chainsawed through a region of millions, leveling small towns along the way. At least 38 people were ... |
InfoWars.comTruthNews.US - News
www.NewsWithViews.com
News
|
Recent comments
14 years 46 weeks ago
15 years 25 weeks ago
17 years 11 weeks ago
17 years 22 weeks ago
17 years 23 weeks ago
17 years 23 weeks ago
17 years 23 weeks ago
17 years 23 weeks ago
17 years 29 weeks ago
17 years 29 weeks ago