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When defendant refuses to be “seized” and ran away, he obviously felt free to leave. Also, “[t]he district court reviews de novo only those portions of a magistrate judge's R&R to which objections are filed.” There is no de novo review to that which the defendant does not object. United States v. Huckabee, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24491 (N.D. N.C. February 27, 2012).*

The district court reviews de novo only those portions of a magistrate judge's M&R to which objections are filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court does not perform a de novo review of those portions to which a party makes only "general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). Absent a specific and timely objection, the court reviews only for "clear error," and need not give any explanation for adopting the M&R. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005); Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 1983). Upon careful review of the record, "the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

. . .

Detective Hunter did not seize defendant when she attempted to question him near the side of the road. After Detectives Becker and Hunter pulled to the side of the road, Detective Hunter approached defendant from the front and asked, in a conversational tone, if she could talk to him. Defendant responded aggressively by saying, "Who the [expletive omitted] are you? You don't know me." Detective Hunter identified herself as a police detective and again asked if she could talk to him. Defendant again responded, "You don't know me," and then fled. The entire encounter lasted about five seconds.

Under these factual circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt himself free to leave. Detective Hunter did not physically contact defendant, nor was her questioning of him intimidating. Her firearm was holstered, and she did not accuse defendant of any criminal activity. Based on these circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt himself free to go about his business. Further, even if Detective Hunter's conduct could somehow be construed as an assertion of authority, defendant never submitted. Rather, he attempted to flee. As stated above, "[a] defendant who flees the police in response to an assertion of authority has not been seized, and thus his Fourth Amendment rights are not implicated." Brown, 401 F.3d at 594.

2255 petitioner’s claim that his defense lawyer failed to fully investigate the apparent authority of the consenter to consent would have added nothing and the motion to suppress still would have been denied. United States v. Livingston, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25558 (W.D. Okla. February 28, 2012).

Even if the curtilage were entered (it wasn’t), purging that information from the affidavit for the search warrant would not nullify the probable cause. Defendant carries the burden on the GFE, and he fails. United States v. Simmons, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25615 (D. Me. February 28, 2012).*

2255 petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim was time barred, and he couldn’t get in the back door via a writ of error coram nobis. Also, WECN is only available if the petitioner is not in custody, and he was. Johnson v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26522 (E.D. Mo. February 28, 2012).*

Officer’s queries with “please” and normal tone of voice, all recorded during the stop of defendant at the El Paso interstate bus terminal, showed defendant’s consent to a search of his person for drugs strapped to him was voluntary. The court concludes it was not an order. United States v. Trujillo, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26580 (W.D. Tex. February 29, 2012).*

Defendant’s conduct was suspicious around a car and indicated either theft, drug dealing, or a car jacking. When the officer stopped with lights, defendant attempted to back away. All this was more than a hunch of criminal activity. United States v. Bady, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26265 (S.D. Ill. February 29, 2012).*

Defendant’s 2255 claim that defense counsel failed to raise a racial motivation issue based on something the officer said during the stop is belied by the DVD of the stop. Defendant’s plea deal to a five year max was a huge benefit, considering where he would have fallen on the guidelines if the government pursued his priors. United States v. Curry, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25803 (D. Neb. February 29, 2012).*

Defendant had to understand that a search of his person for drugs would mean going into the pockets. United States v. Stinson, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4144 (4th Cir. February 28, 2012) (unpublished).*

33 minute delay in the stop here was reasonable and caused by the language barrier and waiting for an interpreter to arrive. United States v. Hernandez-Coria, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24624 (D. Minn. January 25, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped in a taxicab, and marijuana was seen in plain view. People v Souffrant, 2012 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1528, 2012 NY Slip Op 1521 (3d Dept. March 1, 2012).*

A defendant told he’s going to be frisked is “seized.” Here, the record is devoid of any factual justification for the frisk based on what “other people” said. If they were informants, there was no showing of basis of knowledge or any reason to be truthful. Commonwealth v. Arias, 2012 Mass. App. LEXIS 93 (February 28, 2012)*:

Here, the record reveals nothing about the informants' basis of knowledge or veracity. Hart and Halloran, the MBTA employees who told the police about the defendant, expressly stated that they were passing on information they had obtained from "other people" but said nothing about who the other people were and provided no information about the other people that would enable anyone to determine either their veracity or basis of knowledge. In that regard, we treat the individuals who gave information to Hart and Halloran as unknown informants even though police knew their identities by the time of the hearing. ... Nothing in the record suggests that the police knew who the informants were before they arrested the defendant or that they had any idea how the informants knew of the gun. Moreover, information obtained from known informants receives somewhat greater weight than that received from anonymous informants because known informants expose themselves to "charge[s] of filing a false report or any comparable consequence of providing false information to law enforcement." Commonwealth v. Mubdi, 456 Mass. 385, 397, 923 N.E.2d 1004 (2010). See Commonwealth v. Costa, 448 Mass. 510, 515-517, 862 N.E.2d 371 (2007). Here, the informants faced no such consequences when they made their disclosures to Hart or Halloran. Indeed, nothing in the record suggests that they even knew that Hart or Halloran would relay their information to authorities.

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