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Officers followed tracks in the snow from the scene of a burglary to defendant’s house, and defendant’s father consented to a search of computers in the house that were likely stolen. His father, a retired police officer, appreciated the significance of what was going on and wanted the computers gone. He had apparent authority to consent to a search of these computers. United States v. Clutter, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6139 (8th Cir. March 26, 2012):

When determining whether a third party exercised actual or apparent common authority over the contents of a computer, courts typically examine several factors -- whether the consenting third party in fact used the computer, whether it was located in a common area accessible to other occupants of the premises, and -- often most importantly -- whether the defendant's files were password protected. See United States v. Stanley, 653 F.3d 946, 950-51 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 232-33 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 399 (2011); Andrus, 483 F.3d at 719-20; United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 554-55 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 913 (2007); United States v. Morgan, 435 F.3d 660, 663-64 (6th Cir. 2006). Clutter argues it was error to deny his motion to suppress because the government presented no evidence "that Joel Clutter used or had electronic access to the computers."

The primary flaw in this argument is that the only Fourth Amendment issue with any factual support is whether the three computers were validly seized at the Clutter home on January 22. There is no evidence that the officers searched the computers before obtaining an unchallenged warrant authorizing the search. The distinction, though often overlooked, is important: ....

[Maybe intentionally] Overlooked is a more fundamental question: Is there a reasonable expectation of privacy in stolen computers?

Business Week: Big Brother Wants Your Facebook Password by Claire Suddath:

If you want to become a state trooper in Virginia, you should probably delete any indelicate information you have on Facebook. During the job interview process, the Virginia State Police requires all applicants to sign into Facebook, Twitter, and any social-networking site to which they regularly post information in front of an administrator.

“You sign a waiver, then there’s a laptop and you go to these sites and your interviewer reviews your information,” says Corinne Geller, spokeswoman for the Virginia State Police. “It’s a virtual character check as much as the rest of the process is a physical background check.” Geller says the practice has been around for only three months and is just one of many ways the state makes sure its law enforcement officials are ethically sound. (Potential troopers also have to submit to a polygraph test).

Officers came to defendant’s house for a knock-and-talk about child pornography traced back to his IP address. He wasn’t home but his parents were. Because the computers were used by all, sitting in the dining room, and his parents paid the internet bill, his parents had apparent authority to consent to a search of the computers. The fact he had an individual profile was not enough to create a reasonable expectation of privacy because it was not password protected. United States v. Trejo, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6113, 2012 FED App. 0315N (6th Cir. March 22, 2012) (unpublished).

Officers found a marijuana patch outside defendant’s curtilage and followed footprints in the mud to defendant’s house. Officers came close to the curtilage, in making their observations, and they actually entered an outbuilding within the curtilage arguing protective sweep because of fresh footprints. That incursion, however, never was revealed to the issuing magistrate, so it was valid under inevitable discovery. United States v. Witherspoon, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6115, 2012 FED App. 0321N (6th Cir. March 23, 2012) (unpublished).*

Compulsory HIV testing of accused sex offenders satisfies the special needs requirement because it is a public health issue, not a criminal law issue. Imposing a probable cause standard would be “entirely impracticable” [not impractical?] because of lack of immediate outward manifestations. State v. Handy, 2012 VT 21, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 22 (March 23, 2012).*

Fourth Amendment law is clear that mobility of a car makes for exigency for the automobile exception. Because the defendant did not argue that the state constitution should be separately considered as in other states where a warrant would be required if there was time, the court declines to do decide case on state constitution. State v. Sanchez-Loredo, 2012 Kan. LEXIS 210 (March 23, 2012).*

The officers observed defendant committing a crime, so there was probable cause for the stop and search of his car. Marked money was in plain view torn up on the floorboard. Therefore, defense counsel couldn’t be ineffective. Cooper v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39826 (C.D. Ill. March 23, 2012).*

Cert. granted today in Florida v. Harris, 11-817.

Issue: Whether an alert by a well-trained narcotics detection dog certified to detect illegal contraband is insufficient to establish probable cause for the search of a vehicle.

Opinion below: Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756 (Fla. 2011) posted here.

Briefs: Cert petition; brief in opposition.

This case will be argued next Term. Read the Florida Supreme Court's decision, the petition, and the BIO before you pass judgment on the oversimplistic issue the state chose to present. The case isn't that easy, unless, of course, the conservative wing has no problem with just saying "this is Place and Caballes and we're done." If it really was, they should have GVR'd it and been done with it.

A face-to-face meeting better the affiant for a search warrant and the issuing magistrate is not required. Here, they recognized each other’s voices, the affiant swore over the phone and faxed the affidavit to the magistrate who faxed back the signed search warrant. Clay v. State, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 2298 (Tex. App. – Waco March 21, 2012):

The second statement relied upon by Clay is a comment by the Court that, while recognizing innovations such as telephonic search warrants should not be foreclosed by the requirement of a signed affidavit, "[w]e leave those potential future changes to the Texas Legislature...." Smith v. State, 207 S.W.3d 787, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). This statement, Clay believes, is an acknowledgment that a procedure to obtain warrants by telephone and facsimile has not been authorized by statute, does not exist under Texas law, and therefore cannot be a valid practice in Texas at the present time. We believe it is not such an acknowledgement and certainly is not such a prohibition. As the Court stated, it is important for the law to retain some flexibility in the face of technological advances. Id. at 792. Had there been no flexibility in the statute, the Smith Court would have been compelled to hold that a signed affidavit was required. It did not. And thus, the statute is also flexible so as to allow for the taking of an oath over the telephone or by some other electronic means of communication under certain circumstances. That is the nature of the development of the common law. We must decide only the issue presented—in this case, is the affidavit invalid because it was not made on an oath administered face-to-face.

Officers somehow ended up at defendant's house based on an investigation that his IP address had been used for credit card fraud. They came to do a knock-and-talk for his computers and he refused to consent to a search. They came back with a search warrant, and he requested to delete files from one of the computers when one made an off-hand remark about child pornography, which they denied. Then they sought a second search warrant for child pornography based on the request to delete files. That was not an additional factor in probable cause, and the trial court was correct in suppressing the search and in finding no good faith exception. State v. Sprunger, 283 Neb. 531, 2012 Neb. LEXIS 40 (March 23, 2012):

The Fourth Amendment contains a particularity requirement, stating that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ... and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (Emphasis supplied.) The Founding Fathers’ abhorrence of the English King’s use of general warrants—which allowed royal officials to engage in general exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings —was the impetus for the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.10 Simply put, the Fourth Amendment prohibits “fishing expeditions.”

...

[12] To allow a search based only on the fact that Sprunger wanted to hide something would sanction the type of general exploratory rummaging the Founders wished to prohibit. As we have stated before, “‘[a] general search for evidence of any crime,’” such as the one that would be issued based solely on this fact, is unconstitutional.

It is true that the fact Sprunger asked to delete some files might have raised a suspicion. But this suspicion did not amount to a fair probability that child pornography would be found on his computers. Based solely on this fact, the deputies would have no idea what would be found. Their search would have amounted to a rummaging through a treasure trove of information. “‘[T]he modern development of the personal computer and its ability to store and intermingle a huge array of one’s personal papers in a single place increases law enforcement’s ability to conduct a wide-ranging search into a person’s private affairs.’” It thus makes the particularity and probable cause requirements all the more important. To sanction a search based solely on Sprunger’s request to delete some unknown files would trivialize the protections of the Fourth Amendment.

. . .

Moreover, not only would a reasonable officer know that a general search warrant was illegal, a reasonable officer would also know that telling a person that he had “nothing to worry about” if he had no child pornography on his computer would lead that person to believe he was being investigated for child pornography. T The deputy had effectively planted the idea in Sprunger’s head. Given this, we do not see how the deputies could have objectively relied on the warrant. The deputies knew—or certainly should have known—that the only fact showing any connection to child pornography was of their own making.

While the application for the search warrant failed to show nexus to defendant’s car, the arrest warrant application presented to the magistrate just five minutes earlier did. Therefore, it was apparent the search warrant application omission was a mere oversight, and the magistrate apparently considered both in issuing the warrant, and this was not improper. The good faith exception would apply in any event. State v. Cunningham, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 370 (La. App. 4th Cir. March 21, 2012):

In sum, we find that Detective Matthews' failure to include information in the affidavit for the search warrant linking the residence to the Mustang used in the shooting was an apparent oversight. Nonetheless, the magistrate was aware of this link because it was contained in the affidavit for Williams' arrest warrant, which the magistrate read and signed mere minutes before reading the affidavit for the search warrant for the residence. Detective Matthews and the other officers were not unreasonable in relying on the validity of the search warrant for the residence. Nor is there evidence of any police misconduct on Detective Matthews' part. Given these circumstances coupled with the fact that the magistrate was in possession of the information linking the residence to the Mustang before he signed the search warrant for the residence, none of the exceptions to the good faith doctrine applies to this case. Thus, the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the evidence seized from the residence. Accordingly, the Relator's writ application is denied.

One defendant’s cell phone was could be seized and searched under his parole search condition, and the other defendants had no standing in his cell phone. United States v. Delvalle, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38547 (C.D. Cal. March 20, 2012).*

There was no reasonable suspicion to extend the stop in this case, and that unlawful detention led to an invalid consent. State v. Wendler, 2012 Kan. App. LEXIS 24 (March 23, 2012)*:

We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances, the duration of the traffic stop was measurably extended after the purpose of the traffic stop—to investigate Wendler's commission of a traffic violation—was concluded. Moreover, during the investigation into the traffic violation, the officer did not gain reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity necessary to lawfully extend the scope and duration of the detention. Finally, we conclude the unlawful detention of Wendler infected or tainted his consent to answer questions and to search the RV. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the district court suppressing the marijuana seized from the RV and the dismissal of charges against Wendler.

The affidavit for the search warrant in this case was signed before a notary public working for the DA, but not one authorized by a judge in violation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. A violation of the Rules was not a Fourth Amendment issue, defendant cannot show he was prejudiced, and the court will not order suppression of the evidence. Copley v. Commonwealth, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 26 (March 22, 2012):

Suppression under this test is not warranted in this case because neither prong is satisfied. Copley was not prejudiced by the violation of RCr 2.02 and 13.10. There was no allegation or proof that the search would not have occurred absent the rule violation or that the search was abusive. Nor is there evidence that law enforcement officials deliberately disregarded the rules. Rather, given that Ms. Hardy was a notary public, was generally qualified to administer oaths and was employed by the Commonwealth Attorney's office, and that all other requirements for securing the warrant were carefully observed, such as complying with KRS 15.725(5) by having the Commonwealth Attorney and the County Attorney certify that no judge or commissioner was available, it appears that the violation of Rules 2.02 and 13.10 was simply inadvertent.

The notion of needing to show prejudice is a death knell to nearly any suppression motion. How can you show prejudice from the wrong notary? You can't. The affidavit was sworn and seemingly truthful, that's all that's really required.

In a FIPF case where the gun was the target of a search warrant, the defendant did not show enough to get access to the CI’s identity under Roviaro. The CI was not central to the charge under the government's theory of constructive possession. Here, it was all speculative what the defense was trying to prove. United States v. Anthony, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38123 (D. N.J. March 20, 2012):

Defendant offers a series of contentions for why disclosure is warranted, including: the need to challenge the basis for the warrant; the fact that the informant is the only person who claims to have seen Defendant in possession of the firearm; and the need to investigate Defendant's theory that the informant played a role in framing Defendant. None of these reasons provides a sufficient basis to overcome the qualified privilege.

First, the validity of the search warrant does not turn on the informant's intentions or mental state. ...

Second, the Government does not intend to introduce the informant's testimony at trial in order to prove possession; instead, the Government will present a case for constructive possession. Therefore, there is no need to cross-examine the informant regarding the informant's claimed observations.

The third and final issue is the question of whether disclosure is necessary because the informant's identity is helpful to Anthony's defense involving the gun having been planted by the informant or the informant's co-conspirator. This is the kind of defense theory that does not rise above mere speculation or hope. ...

Roviaro was decided in 1957, yet I still occasionally see charges where the prosecuting attorney charged the defendant with the underlying CI offense thereby making the CI a material witness. They apparently were not paying attention in law school or when reading the file.

Officers pulled guns on defendants and ordered them to sit down, and this was with reasonable suspicion somebody in the group was armed. The district court erred in suppressing the frisk. United States v. Lewis, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6073 (11th Cir. March 23, 2012):

As the Supreme Court emphasized in Terry itself, a brief stop-and-frisk is permissible, even absent probable cause to arrest, "for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual." 392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added). In fact, the very rationale underpinning Terry -- the protection of officer safety and the safety of others nearby, especially from the dangers posed by firearms -- is presented by the facts of this case. We add that the detention took place at night in a high crime area, which, while surely not dispositive, is still another relevant consideration in the Terry calculus. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124; United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 755-56 (11th Cir. 2000). And we further emphasize that, as in Clark, the defendant here was not some "unrelated bystander," Clark, 337 F.3d at 1288, but rather "an associate of [the] persons being investigated for criminal activities," id.

In short, under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the officers were entitled to control the scene and exercise command over the situation in the course of briefly detaining McRae for further investigation. A brief detention of all four associated individuals was reasonable, in light of the substantial risks to the officers' safety. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court's order granting Lewis's motion to suppress, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

That defendant may have had a pocket knife didn’t mean he was false when he said he had no weapons on him because small pocket knives are not considered weapons to most people. Defendant’s frisk was without reasonable suspicion he was armed. United States v. House, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6081 (10th Cir. March 23, 2012) (unpublished):

It is likely that many law-abiding citizens would not consider themselves armed with a weapon, while carrying a folded pocket knife, when approached on the street and questioned unexpectedly by an officer. To allow a search based on the hunch that a citizen walking down the street is illegally carrying a firearm, without more, serves to erode the precious protections of the Second and Fourth Amendments. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 ("[I]ntrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches [are] a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction.").

An officer is free to initiate a consensual encounter without any articulable suspicion. Such an encounter may develop previously unconfirmed suspicions of criminal behavior and/or result in genuine concerns for officer safety. United States v. Jones, 606 F.3d 964, 968 (8th Cir. 2010). The difficulty in this case is that the consensual encounter did neither; in the absence of which, the evidence must be suppressed as violative of the Fourth Amendment.

A commercial vehicle safety stop was valid, and defendant’s lack of knowledge about his load, where he got it, and exactly where he was going was reasonable suspicion to detain him for a dog sniff. The USMJ concluded that the trailer was unlawfully searched but a drug dog alert after that was inevitable discovery because that was probable cause. United States v. Rendon, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5974 (11th Cir. March 22, 2012) (unpublished).*

The testimony of consent was conflicting, but the credibility determination of the trial court is binding on appeal. State v. Reglus, 2012 Ohio 1174, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1033 (9th Dist. March 21, 2012)* (sustaining consent); State v. Durden, 2012 Ohio 1194, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1048 (8th Dist. March 22, 2012) (finding consent involuntary).

The trial court concluded that the officer’s car blocked defendant’s car and was a stop, but it was with reasonable suspicion. State v. Spradlin, 2012 Ohio 1211, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1071 (5th Dist. March 12, 2012).*

An affidavit for search warrant that showed utterly no connection to the place to be searched lacked probable cause. And, it was so lacking in probable cause that the good faith exception did not apply. United States v. Bautista, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39222 (W.D. Ky. March 22, 2012):

To establish probable cause, the affidavit must have indicated why evidence of illegal activity would be found at the particular place to be search-Lot #78. The affidavit does not do so. Like in Laughton, the affidavit in this case neither indicated that Lot # 78 was Bautista's residence nor indicated that the drug sales described by Copeland occurred at Lot # 78. Instead, the affidavit states only that the drug sales occurred at Bautista's residence, and then lists Lot # 78 as the place to be searched. The government contends that, given all the circumstances of Copeland's information and the detailed description of the place to be searched, the inference can be made Lot #78 is Bautista's residence. However, the government's argument is to no avail because the affidavit contains no evidence from which such an inference could be made. The single paragraph setting forth the factual details fails to even mention Lot #78. Accordingly, probable cause to search the residence located at Lot #78 was not established because the affidavit submitted to obtain the warrant did not explain the significance or the relevance of searching the home located at this particular location. See United States v. Hove, 848 F.2d 137, 139 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding no probable cause where the affidavit failed to provide any nexus between the residence and the illegal activity).

. . .

Likewise, here, the affidavit simply lists an address of the premises to be searched, and states Copeland's allegations regarding the fact that he regularly purchased methamphetamine from Bautista at his home. There is not even a "modicum of evidence" linking the criminal activity described by Copeland and Lot #78. Cf. United States v. Van Shutters, 163 F.3d 331, 337 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying good faith exception where affidavit for search warrant neglected to indicate why the affiant believed the defendant had any connection to the residence, but did state that the rooms in the residence were available to the defendant). Importantly, the affidavit did not state any evidence linking Bautista to Lot #78 and did not even state that Bautista resided at Lot #78. No reasonable officer could have believed that the affidavit was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to be reliable. Although the Court does not find that the law enforcement officers acted in bad faith, it nonetheless must conclude that the Leon good faith exception does not apply.

A citizen informant’s report that his store was a crime victim was a sufficient basis for a stop. State v. Wiggins, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 178 (March 20, 2012).

Factual disputes on excessive force as shown by the video was enough to deny qualified immunity. Staten v. Tatom, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5991 (5th Cir. March 22, 2012).*

Appellate counsel’s decision not to appeal the alleged lack of probable cause for the search warrant was justified because it was a loser issue. Ford v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38296 (E.D. Mo. March 21, 2012).*

It was reasonable to arrest plaintiff with probable cause on a controlled delivery because he signed for the package with a fictitious first name for him. This was more than mere acceptance of the package known by the police to carry drugs. He left the house with the package and got into a car with the package, and that gave probable cause to search the car [citing search incident cases, which was wrong; automobile exception applied]. Johnson v. United States, 2012 D.C. App. LEXIS 130 (March 22, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped for a seat belt violation, and reasonable suspicion developed from numerous factors, one of which was that defendant was a known drug trafficker who made a five hour trip to a store and didn’t buy anything. State v. Fisher, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 386 (March 20, 2012).*

Fourth Amendment issue raised on direct appeal and rejected was not a proper subject of a 2255. Martinez v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36781 (D. S.D. March 19, 2012).*

Officers found defendant in an apartment being searched under a search warrant, and they had probable cause as to him on the premises. This was unlike the unwitting bar patron in Ybarra. A patdown of defendant produced car keys, and keys were subject to the warrant. It was immediately apparent what they were by feel, unlike Dickerson. United States v. Cowan, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6051 (8th Cir. March 23, 2012):

Cowan’s presence in Booth’s apartment, unlike the patron in the public tavern in Ybarra and more like the passenger in the private car in Pringle or the hotel room occupant in Romero, could lead a reasonable officer “to infer [Cowan was part of] a common enterprise” among the people in the apartment. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373. Although an apartment “is a larger and more multipurpose space,” Romero, 452 F.3d at 618 n.2, than the hotel room in Romero, Detective Canas had additional reason to suspect Cowan was involved in the drug trafficking activity. After breaking down the exterior door to the building and before entering the apartment, the officers saw someone running inside, which reasonably suggested people present in the apartment were trying to conceal evidence of drug trafficking activity. When Cowan stated he was from Chicago—the reputed source of the crack cocaine used in the suspected drug trafficking operation occurring in the apartment—Cowan gave Detective Canas particularized suspicion that Cowan himself was involved in the drug trafficking. The present case is further distinguishable from Ybarra because Detective Canas frisked Cowan’s outer clothing pursuant to Terry, and the search of Ybarra was not a valid Terry frisk. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92-93. Detective Canas did not violate Cowan’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by patting down Cowan’s pockets and seizing the keys.

Defendant failed to show standing in a hotel room that he was not registered to that he was only a casual visitor to. United States v. Bushay, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37935 (N.D. Ga. March 12, 2012)*:

First, Judge Baverman concluded that Bushay lacked standing to challenge the agents' search of the hotel room because he did not establish that he had a subjective or objective expectation of privacy in the hotel room. As to Bushay's subjective expectation of privacy, the magistrate judge concluded that Bushay did not show that he had an unrestricted right of occupancy or custody and control of the premises as distinguished from occasional presence on the premises as a mere guest or invitee. Specifically, Bushay failed to establish that the room was rented in his name, that he paid for the room, or that he was the registered additional guest.

In reaching this conclusion, Judge Baverman found significant that Bushay described his presence in the area as having "met friends"; referred to "the" hotel room rather than "his" hotel room; never proved that the two plastic keys were in fact the keys to room 308; did not prove that the vehicle he was operating at the time of his arrest was a vehicle registered for room 308; was not using the hotel for lodging; and kept no personal items in the room other than the gun. Although Bushay argued that the fact that the agents believed that he was staying in the room helped prove his standing, Judge Baverman found this argument unpersuasive because a defendant may not establish standing by relying on the government's theory of the case. Because he could not establish that the hotel room was his, nor could he establish that he was an overnight guest, Judge Baverman found that Bushay had not established that he had a subjective expectation of privacy. Further, he concluded that Bushay had also failed to establish an objective expectation of privacy in the hotel room because at most he was only a casual visitor.

Cell phone pictures might have evidence of crime in drug cases. I've been seeing for years in search warrant affidavits that officers want to see pictures on computers or in a house because of the propensity of drug traffickers to take pictures of their scores. And, I've seen them in evidence: all the plants of the grow operation, the bounty from the big score, the pound of coke before it is parceled out. See Mail Online: Driving his Porsche in pants, posing with stacks of cash and beating up his rivals: Photos found on lost phone of 'Chinese gangster' show his bad-boy lifestyle. Besides the stacks of cash, there's a picture of torture with a pair of pliers and a foot to the neck.