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NetworkWorld: You consent to a search if a camera sees you? Facial Recognition vs 4th Amendment:

When you go outside or go to other public places such as a bank or a mall, have you automatically given up your Fourth Amendment rights and consented to a search? When it comes to tracking you via facial recognition technology, what if the government or other law enforcement were to use that argument, that by simply being in a place where there are security cameras, you waived your Fourth Amendment rights and consented to a search?

The FBI and DOD sponsored a legal series about the U.S. government using facial recognition; the latest forum was titled "Striking the Balance - A Government Approach to Facial Recognition Privacy and Civil Liberties." Whenever the word 'balance' is used, privacy and civil liberties are usually about to be kicked in the name of 'security.' When it comes to surveillance via facial recognition technology, federal law enforcement, intelligence personnel and national security agencies are looking into the "gaps in legal/policy authority that may result in privacy and civil liberties vulnerabilities if left unaddressed."

The Future of Privacy Forum (FPF) Senior Fellow Peter Swire, also a law professor at Ohio State University, spoke about "Facial Recognition by the Government: Privacy and Civil Liberties Issues." Since using "one's facial image, with or without knowledge or consent," can identify and be used to track a person "an inherent tension exists between privacy and facial recognition." The forum was to "examine where the appropriate balance lies between crime and terrorism prevention using facial recognition and robust privacy safeguards." Swire started with two different perspectives about facial recognition, according to FPF.

Failure to file a suppression motion is not a ground for IAC without showing how it would have been granted. Just alleging one wasn't filed doesn't cut it. People v. Johnson, 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 519 (March 20, 2012).*

Defendant’s claim defense counsel was not ineffective for not moving to quash the arrest warrant fails because there was clearly probable cause. People v. Lambert, 2012 Mich. App. LEXIS 499 (March 20, 2012).*

The CI was not shown to be reliable except by corroboration by an “extensive” police investigation, and that was adequate. The triggering conditions of the anticipatory warrant here satisfied Grubbs. United States v. Donnell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36487 (D. Minn. February 2, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped at the Omaha bus terminal apparently because he showed an interest in what the police were doing with bags on the bus. [Note: Every criminal defense lawyer does too. Does that give reasonable suspicion? Not here.] The government conceded there was no reasonable suspicion, but it argued that defendant consented. The District Court’s finding of no consent was supported by the evidence, and lifting defendant’s pant leg was without reasonable suspicion. Meth was found and suppressed. United States v. Aquino, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5970 (8th Cir. March 22, 2012)*:

The government contends the dispositive issue in this case is whether Aquino's compliance with Lutter's request to pull the bottom portion of his pant leg tight against his body was a consensual act which gave rise to reasonable suspicion when Lutter noticed the concealed bulge, in turn justifying a subsequent investigatory detention. We disagree. This case turns not on Aquino's last act before being handcuffed, but rather Lutter's first act after placing Aquino in handcuffs, which was to lift Aquino's pant leg to reveal the concealed bulge. Under the circumstances involved in this case, Lutter violated the Fourth Amendment when he searched underneath an article of Aquino's clothing without his consent and without probable cause to do so, instead of performing a pat down to confirm whether the concealed bulge was a weapon.

Dog sniff outside the defendant’s house in a multi-family unit was reasonable under Place and Caballes, and Jardines is rejected. United States v. Anthony, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38123 (D. N.J. March 20, 2012):

This is the type of distinction the Florida Supreme Court found in Jardines v. State, 73 So.3d 34 (Fla. 2011). The Court reasoned that even though the revelation of possession of contraband could not invade a privacy interest, the canine sniff outside a home "will invariably entail a degree of public opprobrium, humiliation and embarrassment for the resident, for such dramatic government activity in the eyes of many-neighbors, passers-by, and the public at large-will be viewed as an official accusation of crime." Id. at 36. The Court added that if police can conduct suspicionless sniff tests, there was nothing to prevent discriminatory or irrational use of the procedure. Id.

However, neither reason for distinguishing Caballes is persuasive as applied to the present facts. First, the Florida Court's conclusion that sniffs "will invariably entail a degree of public opprobrium, humiliation and embarrassment for the resident" is less applicable to the facts of this case, in which the sniff occurred away from the plain view of the general public inside a common area of a multi-family residence with the permission of the owner. Nothing in the record suggests anyone but the landlord was privy to the presence of police activity, much less aware of the particular apartment being sniffed. Similarly, this Court is not asked to determine whether police presence with a dog on the curtilage of a home without permission involves some intrusion into privacy not present in Caballes or Place. Instead, this situation involves police presence in a common area with express permission to be there.

Defendant’s confusing account of his travel plans was reasonable suspicion. The trial court’s findings of consent to the search was clearly supported by the record. Defendant was unhandcuffed and sitting in the police car during the search. A dog alert made that irrelevant. Thus, a challenge to the search was frivolous. Defendant did not show how his failure to testify at the suppression hearing would have changed anything in light of the video, not that IAC claims can be raised on direct appeal anyway. United States v. Penlton, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5888 (7th Cir. March 21, 2012) (unpublished)*; United States v. Harris, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5878 (7th Cir. March 21, 2012) (unpublished).*

Plaintiff state prisoner failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim that he was unreasonably removed from his cell during a suicide threat. “Insofar as Brown contends that his seizure during this incident was unreasonable, even assuming that a prisoner has any Fourth Amendment right not to be seized and transported from one place to another within a state prison facility, there is no record evidence that this particular seizure was not justified by the same legitimate interest in safety and security.” Brown v. Graham, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5825 (2d Cir. March 21, 2012) (unpublished).*

Defendant was stopped for not dimming his headlights, and he was without a DL. The officers’ search incident of defendant’s car violated Gant, even though the defendant and his passenger weren’t handcuffed and were standing at the rear of the car, they were outnumbered. The government’s argument that Long justified a protective weapons search of the car was also rejected. United States v. McCraney, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5818, 2012 FED App. 0081P (6th Cir. March 21, 2012):

Here, McCraney and Ammons were not handcuffed or secured in the back of a patrol car. They were standing, however, behind the Buick as instructed, two or three feet from the rear bumper, with three officers standing around them, while the other two officers on the scene conducted the search of the passenger compartment. Ricker testified that he stood approximately eight feet from McCraney, and watched him closely while the search was conducted. The officers outnumbered the detainees and, although not formally arrested, handcuffed or secured in a patrol car, the district court did not err in finding that the officers could not reasonably believe McCraney and Ammons were "within reaching distance" of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. Given the narrowed scope of the exception in light of Gant, the search may not be justified as a search incident to arrest.

Officers’ determination that they could hold defendant for 48 hours on an illegal arrest was the cause of defendant’s statement, and it should have been suppressed. State v. Bishop, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 171 (March 14, 2012).*

Talking to defendant sitting in a parked car was a “consensual encounter” under Ohio case law, and the officer’s plain view of two roaches in the ashtray was valid. State v. Calhoun, 2012 Ohio 1128, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 994 (11th Dist. March 19, 2012).*

Defendant's 2255 was couched in terms of a Fourth Amendment violation and not a Sixth Amendment violation, so it should have been raised in the direct appeal. Ford v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38296 (E.D. Mo. March 21, 2012).*

Geekosystem: FBI Can’t Crack Pimp’s Phone’s Pattern Lock, Serves Google With Warrant by James Plafke:

The FBI secured a pimp’s Samsung Android phone as part of a case following a former pimp released on parole who seemed to be partaking in pimping activities once again, specifically through the use of his Android phone. The pimp previously signed a Fourth Amendment search rights waiver, which allowed the FBI to search his home and property at any time without a court order. When he turned over his phone, he didn’t unlock the device, even though his parole conditions prevented him from hiding or locking digital files, but claimed the phone belonged to his sister. Amusingly, the FBI couldn’t crack the phone’s unlock pattern, and then served a warrant to Google, Android’s developer, to help them unlock the phone.

The FBI obtained a warrant to search the phone last month, but weren’t able to crack it due to the phone’s swipe password lock, which can actually be easily defeated — either by simply looking at the smudges on the phone’s screen, or because you’re the FBI and should have access to a variety cracking tools and skilled employees who know how to use them. The FBI attempted the password too many times, which locked the phone, which in turn could only be unlocked using the phone owner’s Google account credentials. As you could imagine, the pimp refused to cooperate, so the FBI served Google with a warrant in order to get the Android developers to help out.

This is the logical step. See ZDnet.com: "Woman who pleaded Fifth in password case now citing Fourth". If the owner of the phone can plead the Fifth, then the government has to attempt to use a search warrant to get into the phone.

NPR: FBI Still Struggling With Supreme Court's GPS Ruling by Carrie Johnson:

Earlier this year, the Supreme Court said police had overstepped their legal authority by planting a GPS tracker on the car of a suspected drug dealer without getting a search warrant. It seemed like another instance in a long line of cases that test the balance between personal privacy and the needs of law enforcement.

But the decision in U.S. v. Jones set off alarm bells inside the FBI, where officials are trying to figure out whether they need to change the way they do business.

Before the Supreme Court ruling in late January, the FBI had about 3,000 GPS tracking devices in the field.

See also BLT: Prosecutors Gear Up For GPS Drug Case, Sans Tracking Data:

With the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark warrantless surveillance case back in Washington federal district court, prosecutors said they are gearing up for a legal fight over the availability of certain pieces of evidence.

The high court in January ruled for a Washington nightclub owner named Antoine Jones. Prosecutors have accused him of running a cocaine trafficking ring in the Washington metropolitan area.

BLT: D.C. Judge Weighs Constitutional Challenge to 'Post and Forfeit' by Zoe Tillman:

U.S. District Judge Amy Berman Jackson heard arguments today about whether a legal challenge to a controversial post-arrest procedure in the District of Columbia known as "post and forfeit" should survive a motion to dismiss.

Under "post and forfeit," a person arrested for certain low-level offenses in D.C. can post collateral and then agree to forfeit it in exchange for having the case essentially dropped. The Metropolitan Police Department has come under scrutiny in the past amid concerns that officers used "post and forfeit" to quickly close and cover up wrongful arrests.

Indiana Law Blog: Ind. Law -- Gov. signs SEA 1, the right to defend against unlawful entry

A news release just received:

Tuesday evening, Governor Daniels signed SEA 1, titled “Right to defend against unlawful entry.” He issued the following statement about his decision to sign the bill:

“After close inspection, I have decided to sign Senate Enrolled Act 1. Contrary to some impressions, the bill strengthens the protection of Indiana law enforcement officers by narrowing the situations in which someone would be justified in using force against them. Senate Enrolled Act 1 puts into place a two-part test before a person can use deadly force against a law enforcement officer: First, it clarifies and restates the current requirement that a person reasonably believe the law enforcement officer is acting unlawfully. Second, it adds that the force must be reasonably necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the citizen. This second requirement is not part of the current law.

“Moreover, unless a person is convinced an officer is acting unlawfully, he cannot use any force of any kind. In the real world, there will almost never be a situation in which these extremely narrow conditions are met. ..."

The Act is to counter the Indiana Supreme Court's Barnes case, posted here.

While the 911 calls did not say that there was a domestic disturbance in progress, the officer could reasonably assume that when he arrived and assessed the situation, and that was exigency for an entry on these facts. United States v. Ladeaux, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37251 (D. S.D. March 16, 2012).*

Defendant lost on his arrest issue on the merits on appeal, so he can’t pursue it on a 2255. Martinez v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36781 (D. S.D. March 19, 2012).*

Officers had reasonable suspicion first from a CI tip that “Little Rob” was dealing meth from a red F-150. They later learned that it was defendant. Then, another officer in an “ongoing investigation” [never telling us the quality of this information] told this officer that defendant would be delivering meth and they set up surveillance. This was reasonable suspicion when defendant showed up. The traffic stop was reasonable based on a traffic offense. United States v. Harrelson, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5612 (11th Cir. March 15, 2012) (unpublished)* [This case essentially says that a search on reasonable suspicion was proper because it never says there was probable cause for the search of the vehicle after the stop on reasonable suspicion or the traffic offense. If that’s what it means, it’s wrong. This may just be sloppy writing.]

Defendant was in a car that was stopped and the police had probable cause. The made her leave her purse behind. When the warrant issued, the purse could be searched because it was with the car, for which there was probable cause. State v. Campbell, 2011 Wash. App. LEXIS 2875 (December 29, 2011), Order Granting Motion to Publish 165 Wn. App. 1021, 2011 Wash. App. LEXIS 2915 (Wash. Ct. App., Dec. 29, 2011):

Circumstances can exist where probable cause may exist for a search of an individual's property even though officers do not have equivalent probable cause that the owner of the property is involved in crime. Cf. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556-57, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 56 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1978) (Fourth Amendment does not prevent issuance of a warrant to search property simply because the owner or possessor is not reasonably suspected of criminal involvement); see also 2 Wayne R. Lafave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.10(b) at 747-48 (4th ed. 2004) (distinguishing entitlement to search a visitor's belongings where police have grounds to believe items sought in the warrant might be concealed there). Both Worth and Hill implicitly recognize that personal property belonging to someone other than the owner of premises can be subject to a warrant for a premises search where probable cause exists and the scope of a warrant is accordingly broad: Worth's holding depends on its reasoning that no probable cause brought Worth's purse within the scope of the warrant. Hill's holding that “generally officers have no authority under a premises warrant to search personal effects an individual is wearing or holding” implies that sometimes they do. 123 Wn.2d at 644 (emphasis added).

The search warrant was for marijuana, cocaine, and paraphernalia, but there was only probable cause for marijuana, so the remainder is excised from the warrant. Nevertheless, the police were properly in defendant’s home on the warrant, and they could seize other drugs in plain view and as inevitable discovery. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 2012 PA Super 65, 2012 Pa. Super. LEXIS 103 (March 19, 2012).

Two people lived at defendant’s house besides him, and one of the others granted consent. There was no reason to doubt their authority to consent. Smallfoot v. State, 2012 WY 39, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 41 (March 16, 2012).*

The district judge does not need to say that a de novo review was done because it is presumed that it was. Defendant was removed from the house and another officer stayed behind to ask about others in the house, and then a plain view occurred. It was reasonable. United States v. Ginn, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5627 (8th Cir. March 19, 2012) (unpublished).*

Florida Independent: Scott signs latest random drug testing of state employees bill by Ashley Lopez:

Last night, Gov. Rick Scott signed into law the state’s second attempt to randomly drug test state employees.

A bill passed through both chambers of the Legislature this month that would allow state agencies to adopt policies for randomly drug testing all of their employees. Civil rights and labor groups spoke out against the bill, which was lobbied for by the governor’s office, as it made its way through the Legislature.

The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc in United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2011), posted here.

Today we examine a question of first impression in the Ninth Circuit: whether the search of a laptop computer that begins at the border and ends two days later in a Government forensic computer laboratory almost 170 miles away can still fall within the border search doctrine. The district court considered the issue to be a simple matter of time and space. It concluded that the search of property seized at an international border and moved 170 miles from that border for further search cannot be justified by the border search doctrine. We disagree.

The seizure of defendant’s clothing in the ER was not shown to be supported by any exception to the warrant requirement. It was not shown to be inevitable by the state, it was in an opaque bag so not plain view, and it was not by exigency or consent. Clay v. State, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 301 (March 19, 2012).

There is no constitutional requirement [citing no cases] that a CI be searched before a controlled buy. Also, the CI here unwittingly led the police to defendant, and that enhanced his reliability. United States v. Donnell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36487 (D. Minn. February 2, 2012).*

Wearing an empty holster and putting something in a saddlebag is probable cause there is a gun in the saddlebag. State v. Pryor, 2012 Ohio 1033, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 973 (1st Dist. March 16, 2012).*

Defendants lived at the place searched, and the fact that it was also used to distribute drugs did not deny them standing under Carter. United States v. Vazquez-Velazquez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35867 (N.D. Ga. February 23, 2012):

Notwithstanding the Government's evidence that the house at 1986 Benthill Drive was used for some drug activity, the evidence does not establish that the house was used primarily for drug operations. Based on the evidence discussed above, I conclude that Defendants met their burden of showing that they lived in the house and used it for ordinary activities of daily living, and thus, had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house.

A traffic stop based on a reasonable belief that a traffic violation occurred is proper. United States v. Rodriguez-Trevino, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36561 (N.D. Ga. February 21, 2012)*:

"the propriety of the traffic stop does not depend on whether the defendant is actually guilty of committing a traffic offense," but instead, "the pertinent question is whether it was reasonable for the officer to believe that a traffic offense had been committed." United States v. Crump, Criminal Action File No. 4:10-CR-032-HLM-WEJ, 2011 WL 6153106, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 21, 2011) (citation omitted), adopted by 2011 WL 6179211, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 12, 2011).

ACLU.org: Even After Supreme Court GPS Decision, Feds Still Want Warrantless Cell Phone Tracking by Sarah Roberts, Speech, Privacy and Technology Project:

Even after January's landmark Supreme Court decision cast significant doubt on the government’s ability to electronically track a person’s location without a warrant, the Justice Department continues to defend this practice. On Friday, the ACLU, along with the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Center for Democracy and Technology, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, filed a friend-of-the-court brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the government should be required to obtain a warrant based on probable cause before seizing 60 days’ worth of location information generated by an individual’s cell phone.

Volokh Conspiracy: What Are the Damages for a Fourth Amendment Search? by Orin Kerr:

Imagine the police search a home for evidence of crime. No one is home but the door is unlocked, and the officers look in the kitchen, bedroom, and closets. They find nothing, and then they leave. Assume that the police do not damage any property or make a mess of things inside the home.

. . .

Now imagine the homeowner learns of the search. The homeowner believes correctly that the search violated the Fourth Amendment, and he sues the officers for money damages. Imagine five possibilities for why the search violated the Fourth Amendment: ...

Here’s my question. Assume that there is no qualified immunity, and that the officers are liable for whatever damages the homeowner suffered for the search. If you are a juror and you are tasked with estimating the damages, what do you think the damages are for these five scenarios?

With this Supreme Court, not much. Maybe no qualified immunity, but how do you calculate the damages?